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This thesis argues that European Union law can serve as an instrument for the extension of the 
values of justice beyond the nation state. Approaching the question of justice from this 
perspective, however, presupposes three things: it challenges us to think beyond the 
contractarian reflex that equates justice with political self-determination by a demos; it demands 
that we allocate legal authority between the national and European level in accordance with 
their respective capacity to 'do' justice; and it requires that we construct transnational ideas of 
solidarity that integrate the different elements into a single, coherent, ethics of justice. This 
thesis offers all three. It argues that the ethics of justice that is emerging in the European Union 
focuses on allowing its citizens to live a 'good life', which both requires access to the positive 
entitlements that emerge from the national welfare states and depends on the capacity of the free 
movement rights to enlarge the range of available choices for citizens in deciding how to live 
that life. The stability of this tiered conception of justice, however, presupposes the careful 
incorporation of the normative assumptions that bind and connect individual citizens in Europe 
within the reciprocal structures that sustain the national welfare state. This thesis suggests that 
transnational solidarity can serve as a device for such incorporation. The first part describes a 
theory of transnational solidarity that distinguishes between the rights that Union citizens accrue 
under market solidarity, communitarian solidarity, and aspirational solidarity. The bulk of the 
thesis offers a critical in-depth comparative analysis of the incorporation of the demands of 
transnational solidarity by the Union legislator and the Court of Justice within the particular 
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The paradox of the idea of ‘social justice’ is that while its implementation requires the existence 
of political institutions, such institutions can never fully realise its potential. In other words, the 
institutions that we have created in order to ‘produce’ social justice – whether in the form of the 
welfare state, or the set-up of democratic institutions – also necessarily confine the universal 
nature of the underlying concepts of justice to the political context in which they are 
traditionally expressed: the nation state. This paradox has led many commentators to argue that 
there is no space for a cosmopolitan or distinctly European ‘ethics’ of justice as a result of the 
lack of sophisticated political communities and democratic institutions that transcend the nation 
state.1 In fact, the question of (social) justice is hardly ever discussed in the European Union or 
EU law.2 Of course, the integration project’s original intentions of establishing lasting peace and 
generating economic prosperity on a shattered continent were not unrelated to ideas of justice 
and ‘the good life’, but the integration process was never meant to engage in what social justice 
is, means, and requires. Those tasks were left to the Member States, where redistributive criteria 
are elaborated and legitimised through robust democratic institutions and public spheres.  
 
At the same time, it has increasingly become clear in recent years that the European Union, as a 
transnational institutional structure that situates itself between the nation state and the global 
level, almost inevitably engages in the redistribution of resources, and that its norms (and to a 
lesser extent its institutions) intuitively conform to some kind of ill-defined and transnational 
ethic of social justice. This thesis aims to analyse the sources and the normative building blocks 
of this ethics of justice. It argues that EU law can serve as an instrument for the extension of the 
values of justice beyond the nation state. While the nation state ‘does’ justice, it does not, after 
all, fully exhaust what it requires. Europe’s tiered institutional settlement offers a novel and 
fascinating way of extending the values of social justice beyond the nation state without 
renouncing on a normatively more ambitious agenda than protecting basic human rights. It does 
so by standing on the shoulders of the national welfare state construction, and adding a 
                                                
1 See for example T. Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’ 33 Philosophy and Public Affairs (2005), p. 113 or A. 
Sangiovanni, ‘Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality’ 16 Journal of Political Philosophy (2008), p. 137ff, 
A. Sangiovanni, ‘Global Justice, Reciprocity and the State’ 35 Philosophy & Public Affairs (2007), p. 2-39. See for 
the opposite view: J. Cohen and C. Sabel, ‘Global Democracy?’ 37 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 
(2005), p. 763ff.  
2 Notable exceptions include A. Williams, ‘The Ethos of Europe’ (Cambridge, CUP, 2010) and A. Somek, 
‘Engineering Equality’ (Oxford, OUP, 2011).  
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transnational dimension to its values. Such a tiered understanding of the ethics of justice in 
Europe, however, presupposes three things: it challenges us to think beyond the contractarian 
reflex that equates justice with political self-determination of a demos; it demands that we 
allocate legal authority between the national and transnational level in accordance with their 
respective capacity to ‘do’ justice; and it requires that we construct novel concepts of 
transnational solidarity that integrate the different elements into a single, coherent, ethics of 
justice. This thesis shows how all three presuppositions can be realised. It argues that Amartya 
Sen’s theory of justice provides a convincing conceptualisation for the development of justice in 
a tiered institutional settlement like the European Union; it stresses the different ways in which 
the European Union can and cannot contribute to such development; and it finally collapses 
these findings into a theory of transnational solidarity, which distinguishes between the moral 
and legal rights that Union citizens accrue under market solidarity, communitarian solidarity, 
and aspirational solidarity. The bulk of the thesis offers a critical, in-depth, comparative analysis 
of the incorporation of the demands of transnational solidarity by the Union legislator and the 
Court of Justice within the particular context of healthcare, education, social security and social 
assistance, and labour law.  
 
That the ethics of justice that has emerged in Europe incorporates both national and 
transnational elements should not come as a surprise. The multi-level or tiered nature of 
Europe’s institutional, political, legal and normative set-up, after all, directly informs its 
particular ethics of justice. CHAPTER 1 deconstructs the tiered nature of the Union from the 
perspective of the relative capacity of ‘the national’ and ‘the European’ to procure what we 
understand as ‘justice’. It does not delve into the discussion as to which exact level of 
redistribution is required. Rather, it argues that the dynamics that underlie representative 
democracy, in particular in ‘communities of fate’ like the nation state, in which inter-personal 
bonds of solidarity are structurally institutionalised, mean that they almost automatically 
generate their own justice claims. For our purposes, which focus on how to expand such ideas 
beyond the space of the nation state, this suffices. Conversely, we cannot understand justice on 
the European level in these political or procedural terms. The Union does not possess a political 
structure strong enough to either capture the normative desires of its citizens, or translate such 
claims into a criterion of distributive justice. Just as the thickness of national democratic 
institutions serves to amplify national feelings of social or political solidarity and allows for 
their institutionalisation, the lack of strong political and representative structures on the 
European level means that equivalent transnational solidarities – to the extent that they even 
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exist – dissolve.3 This is not simply due to the lack of tax-and-spend competences of the Union, 
but goes, properly understood, to the political inadequacies and asymmetries that exist within 
the transnational settlement. They highlight the lack of a transnational public sphere, the 
dominance of the economic over the political, the primacy of the executive over the 
parliamentary, and the loss of the citizen’s voice in the process.4 It will not be until such 
problems are faced head-on, and a vast process of re-enfranchisement of the European public is 
undertaken, that the Union will be able to give substantial effect to its recently introduced 
commitments to ‘social justice’ and ‘citizen well-being’, shape to its ‘social market economy’, 
and take account of social objectives in all its policy proposals.5 
 
This institutional incapacity, however, does not entail that the European Union does not 
incorporate demands of social justice within its norms. It simply means that the norms of justice 
which it generates cannot (and should not) be of an explicit redistributive nature, and that they 
should not seek to replace national ideas of justice. Rather, their function, it will be argued, is to 
stabilise, spatially expand, and normatively complement those national ideas. A useful starting 
point in thinking about what justice means beyond the outcome of (national) political processes 
and how it can be conceptualized in a tiered structure like the Union’s is the theory of justice 
offered by Amartya Sen. He has argued in favour of understanding justice as a demand of 
individual freedom. To this notion he attaches both positive welfare demands (without which an 
individual cannot be ‘free’ in any meaningful way) and a demand that individuals be free in 
making valuable choices about how to live their lives.6 In essence, Sen stresses that we need to 
make sure that the irreducible plurality of conceptions of ‘the good’, which typifies any society, 
be accommodated not only through a voice in the political process, but also by reinforcing the 
citizen’s capacity to actually act upon their own conception of what is ‘good’. As Sen pointedly 
reminds us, there is something inherently ‘just’ in generating the presuppositions for the 
individual to freely determine how (and where) to live his life.7 Both the availability of positive 
welfare entitlements that emerge from the structures of the national welfare state, and the 
availability of a range of choices between alternative ways of living are thus elemental to our 
understanding of justice.  
                                                
3 See on the link between solidarity and democracy: H. Brunkhorst, ‘Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global 
Legal Community’ (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005). 
4 See also regenerationeurope.tumblr.com 
5 Articles 2 and 3 TEU; and Article 9 TFEU. 
6 A. Sen, ‘The Idea of Justice’ (London, Penguin, 2010), chapters 11-14, and in particular p. 228-230. 
7 A. Sen, ‘The Idea of Justice’ (London, Penguin, 2010), p. 229. 
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From this perspective, and as will be further discussed in the second part of chapter 1, the legal 
framework of the Union can be understood to contain three immanent (but very implicit) claims 
of justice. The first highlights the need to expand the available choices for the citizen beyond 
those provided by ‘his’ political unit. The Union, and in particular its norms of free movement, 
seek to liberate the European citizen and his life’s choices from the spatial and normative 
confines of the nation state. On this view, free movement offers its citizens a ‘trampoline’ to 
vault over the rules and limitations elaborated by national political processes, and allows them 
to choose between twenty-seven different conceptions of ‘the good life’.8 The second claim of 
justice that is implicit in the European integration project sees to equal citizenship. The national 
political process excludes non-nationals from participation in the political negotiation of what is 
considered ‘just’. In other words, it structurally rejects the basic procedural obligation that what 
we consider to be ‘just’ must be free from bias, and, to put it in familiar vocabulary, taxes 
migrants without representation.9 The Court has developed the principle of non-discrimination 
to counteract this structural exclusion. It does not require equal political participation in 
deciding what is ‘just’, but instead demands equal access to what is (internally) considered 
‘just’, for example in terms of social entitlements. This demand of non-discriminatory inclusion 
thus serves to ensure that every European is fully able to pursue his conception of ‘the good’ 
throughout the Union’s territory. The third immanent justice claim that emerges from the 
Union’s set-up calls for the protection of what the welfare state can, but the European Union 
cannot do. There are strong normative and systemic reasons that stress the need to stabilise the 
capacity of national welfare states to generate and sustain the positive welfare entitlements that 
are foundational to any understanding of freedom or justice. Combined, the three demands of 
justice which emerge on the transnational level offer a framework which conforms to Amartya 
Sen’s understanding of justice by connecting, on the one hand, the unparalleled capacity of the 
nation state in sustaining the willingness of individual citizens to redistribute resources through 
political mediation with, on the other hand, the capacity of the Union to empower individuals to 
structure their lives in accordance with their own autonomous conception of ‘the good’, rather 
than in accordance with preordained national political choices. To put it simply, it rouses the 
suspicion that the European Union can significantly complement the Member States’ attempt to 
                                                
8 T. Kingreen, ‘Fundamental Freedoms’, in: A. Von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), ‘Principles of European 
Constitutional Law’(Oxford, Hart, 2008), p. 561. 
9 See also J. Habermas, ‘The European Nation State: On the Past and the Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship’, 
in: J. Habermas, C. Cronin and P. De Greiff (eds.), ‘The Inclusion of the Other’ (Cambridge, CUP, 1998), p. 105-
128. 
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‘do’ justice. The stability of this tiered conception of justice, however, presupposes the careful 
incorporation of the normative assumptions that bind and connect individual citizens in Europe 
so as to expand the reciprocal commitments that sustain positive welfare entitlements on the 
national level beyond the nation state without undermining their stability. 
 
This thesis, and more specifically CHAPTER 2, suggests that transnational solidarity can serve 
as a theoretical framework for this purpose. Solidarity, after all, serves to institutionalise justice: 
it is an instrument that allows for the translation of obligations of justice into actual rights and 
entitlements. The function of transnational solidarity, then, is not to structure a framework for 
distributive justice, but to reflect and bound the new forms of association that have emerged 
horizontally between individual Union citizens and vertically between such citizens and the 
different Member States with which they share economic, social or cultural affinities. Chapter 2 
argues that three such transnational solidarities exist. Market solidarity reflects the rights and 
obligations which emerge from the interdependencies generated by the European single market; 
communitarian solidarity reflects the rights which Union citizens accrue simply by virtue of that 
status; and aspirational solidarity captures the rights that are implicit in Europe’s promise of 
ever more choice and opportunities. Together, they offer a prism through which to describe, and 
a conceptual framework through which to implement, the ethics of justice that exists in Europe.  
 
The first transnational solidarity that can be traced originates from market interactions. This 
market solidarity is in many ways a transnational variant of the solidarity upon which many of 
the first welfare rights were based. It is reminiscent of Durkheim’s concept of organic 
solidarity,10 and argues that the mutually advantageous division of labour in a market engenders 
rights and obligations of solidarity. At its core, it seeks to express the obligation that markets 
engender by virtue of the mutually interdependent but asymmetrical relationship between 
‘capital’ and ‘labour’. Bluntly put, market solidarity serves to make market structures socially 
acceptable by compensating workers for their individual submission to the logic of the market. 
It does so by attaching a right to solidarity to the individual’s participation in the mutually 
advantageous division of labour on the market. Market solidarity is thus in principle not closely 
tied to ideas of national belonging, but stresses the connection which citizens have with the 
polity in which they work, regardless of their nationality. In the transnational setting, this is 
reflected both in the idea that workers should be insulated against the asymmetrical power 
                                                
10 E. Durkheim, ‘The Division of Labour in Society’ (New York, Palgrave, 1984), p. 68-86. 
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advantage which ‘capital’ derives from the free movement provisions, and in the idea that 
migrant workers should fall – simply by virtue of their engagement with the economy of the 
host state – within the scope of that state’s redistributive arrangements. This means, in simple 
terms, that as soon as, and for as long as, a migrant is economically active in another Member 
State, that state must extend access for the worker and his family to all social entitlements, 
regardless of his nationality or place of residence. It is, after all, the migrant’s economic 
engagement with the host state’s economy that brings into being a claim of market solidarity. 
The existence of these obligations of market solidarity in EU law is relatively uncontested. Most 
challenges to the notion of market solidarity have taken place at the edges, and deal in particular 
with the rights of economically active non-residents, unemployed citizens, and workers who – 
to put it bluntly – ‘consume’ more from the public purse than they generate. In all such 
instances, the mutually advantageous nature of the interaction between the migrant and the host 
state is tenuous, and their claims of access to social structures under market solidarity therefore 
doubtful.  
  
Europe is more than a market, however. It is also an (incipient) political community. 
Communitarian solidarity is the solidarity that follows from this community, and describes the 
rights that are attached to our common status as Union citizens.11 Communitarian solidarity 
reflects what Europe ‘is’ and ‘means’ by connecting Union citizenship to national citizenship. 
Communitarian solidarity is expressed by way of extending access for Union citizens to rights 
and entitlements that were traditionally accessible for national citizens only. This incorporation 
of the bonds that link all European citizens within the structures that reflect national citizenship 
takes place by extending the commitments of reciprocity that underlie the different welfare 
entitlements on the national level to cover non-national residents. Communitarian solidarity, in 
other words, strips Member States from the capacity to differentiate in welfare access on the 
basis of criteria of nationality or residence alone; but instead requires that eligibility criteria are 
drafted in such a way as to reflect the commitments of reciprocity which sustain the welfare 
good to which access is sought. Such an obligation serves to contextualise the demands of 
migrant citizens within the structures that sustain welfare entitlements on the national level. 
What communitarian solidarity demands, then, is not unconditional access for all migrants to 
domestic welfare goods, but differs depending on the nature and function of a certain welfare 
                                                
11 It is highly fluid and constantly changing in nature, which makes the Court very uncomfortable in deciding on its 
scope. See, most recently Case 34/09, Ruiz Zambrano [nyr], and Case C-256/11, Dereci [nyr]. 
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good. This entails that – at least as far as access to social benefits goes – the shape and size of 
political communities are context-specific: they expand according to the social function of the 
different welfare goods. Accordingly, access to benefits which are ‘foundational and 
fundamental’ for the capacity of citizens to live a ‘good life’, such as primary education,12 
emergency healthcare13 or minimum subsistence benefits,14 must be extended to all resident 
Union citizens, regardless of nationality or period of residence. Such citizens, after all, easily 
meet the type of reciprocity upon which such basic social goods are reliant: it is purely one of 
human need, for which no distinction between national and non-nationals can be made. Most 
other welfare entitlements, however, are sustained by a type of parochial solidarity which 
reflects a reciprocal or general engagement with one particular society, takes different forms and 
shapes, and can be either prospective or retrospective, and which newly-arrived migrants may 
therefore not necessarily meet. In assessing the rights of mobile Union citizens to access 
benefits such as student grants or child-care benefits, communitarian solidarity demands that we 
first describe the precise nature and function of any particular social benefit, extrapolate its 
implicit demands of reciprocity, and ensure that such demands apply equally to national and 
migrant citizens. Communitarian solidarity, in other words, demands that access to structures of 
national citizenship and the corresponding welfare entitlements is decided by virtue of their 
social function alone. It is a normatively shallow but procedurally strong idea of political 
membership, which serves to open up national systems of citizenship to Union citizens.15 
 
Every polity grants its citizens not only rights on the basis of their role as a market actor and 
citizen, but also in accordance with the polity’s specific aspirations. Europe’s aspirations – 
whether to prevent war, generate prosperity or (more recently) promote individual freedom – 
have always centred on the rights to free movement. Aspirational solidarity seeks to capture the 
obligations and rights that Member States have accrued by ‘buying into’ this European promise 
of ever more choice and possibilities for its citizens. Enhancing the capacity of one citizen to 
meet his ambitions and aspirations by opening up possibilities for him to enter job markets, 
universities, and hospitals in another Member State, however, is not uncontentious. It increases, 
after all, the infrastructural pressure on those institutions. There are simply not enough jobs to 
keep the whole of Europe employed, not enough hospital placements in any one state to train all 
                                                
12 See chapter 3. 
13 See chapter 4. 
14 See chapter 5.  
15 See also F. De Witte, ‘The Ends of EU Citizenship and the Means of Non-Discrimination’ 18 MJ (2011), p. 86-
107. For the most recent restatement of the case law, see Case C-503/09, Stewart [nyr], para. 78-90. 
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young Europeans who wish to become a doctor, nor are there enough beds in one state to treat 
all Europeans who require a hip replacement. Such aspirational claims clash with the territorial 
nature in which social entitlements are traditionally sustained and distributed. Aspirational 
solidarity, then, tells us something about how to balance the aspirations of one group of citizens 
against those of other groups. It is about resolving the conflict that occurs when such aspirations 
are pitted against each other without the possibility to defer to the mediating function of a 
political system. The theoretical discussion on aspirational solidarity will make clear that 
aspirational solidarity is not unconditional (unlike market solidarity and communitarian 
solidarity). Aspirational solidarity can be limited to protect the availability of welfare 
entitlements to a state’s own citizens. This availability could come under pressure when the 
bounds of solidarity that sustain welfare entitlements on the national level are overstretched. 
Bluntly put, this means two things. First, Union citizens may make use of non-divisible public 
goods in other states but may not demand financial benefits from other states in the name of 
aspirational solidarity. Access to the former, after all, has no effect on the host state’s capacity 
to sustain their internal distributive choices, while access to the latter does. The latter simply 
goes beyond what host Member States owe other European citizens. Second, aspirational 
solidarity entails that migrants have a prima facie right to export welfare benefits from their 
home state. Access to such benefits is premised on complex dynamics of reciprocity and reflects 
past commitments, not residence alone. Aspirational solidarity, in other words, allows for the 
extra-territorial consumption of welfare goods that the migrant has ‘deserved’ by a past 
commitment to his home state. This possibility for European citizens to make use of their rights 
to free movement without loss of welfare entitlements is the great aspirational promise of 
Europe. 
 
The second part of the thesis offers a critical comparative analysis of the incorporation of the 
demands of transnational solidarity by the Union legislator and the Court within the particular 
context of healthcare, education, social security and social assistance, and labour law.16 Only by 
                                                
16 The scope of this thesis also naturally excludes certain discussions that are relevant to the development of a more 
grounded understanding of how ideas of justice behave in the transnational arena. First, the rights of third-country 
nationals are excluded. While their rights will, at times, be highlighted in the thesis, such third-country nationals 
are not a priori included in the aspirational engagement of the twenty-seven Member States which has been 
institutionalised through the rights to free movement. It is precisely this type of ‘(a-) political justice’, however, 
which is of interest in this thesis. Another exclusion from the thesis’ material scope is competition law. Within 
many of the welfare areas discussed, transnational competition law norms have been used to challenge national 
understandings of justice and solidarity. Such cases will not be covered by this thesis, not (only) for lack of space, 
but also because the norms of competition law only produce second-order claims of justice. This is not to deny that 
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looking at such policy areas in great depth can we understand the precise ethic of justice that 
operates in Europe. The choice for these four policy areas is informed by their central role in the 
implementation of what it is that redistributive and regulatory justice exactly requires. More 
importantly, while each serves to incorporate elements of justice within the fabric of society, 
they do so in different forms and for different reasons. A different idea of social justice 
underlies each policy area. These differences allow for a more sophisticated understanding of 
the ethics of justice in Europe by providing for a second contextualising element. While the 
transnational solidarities incorporate the different individual attachments that have emerged in 
the process of European integration, the specific social function of a policy area provides a 
setting for their ‘translation’ into actual rights and entitlements. To put it in simple terms, the 
transnational solidarities behave differently because of the specific social function of the 
different policy areas. This differentiation on the basis of the specific social function is both 
visible within the four different policy areas, and between those four areas. The sections below 
will briefly describe the latter; that is, how the specific social function of a policy area affects 
the way in which the three types of transnational solidarity operate. 
 
CHAPTER 3 discusses how the social function of healthcare has informed its extension beyond 
the territory of the nation state. In essence, healthcare fulfils two social functions. First and 
foremost, it protects the physical integrity of citizens and prevents their premature death. A 
system of public healthcare is premised on the assumption that human life is simply too 
precious to be lost as a result of a car accident, complications giving birth, or upon contracting 
HIV. As such, it constitutes the most elemental social good for the citizens’ capacity to live a 
‘good life’ – or indeed any life. The provision of a system of high-quality healthcare that is 
adequate to protect the citizen’s physical integrity is, in consequence, an absolute basic 
obligation undertaken by all Member States, and buttressed by its articulation in national 
constitutions and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The second social function of healthcare – 
moving beyond the protection of the physical integrity of the citizen – is about allowing citizens 
to improve their health, whether by whitening their teeth, removing their tonsils or offering 
physiotherapy to help them recover from knee surgery. This second social function of healthcare 
treats health as a consumable good, and sees the relationship between citizens and the state in 
contractual terms. The method through which healthcare is organised in almost all Member 
                                                                                                                                           
they express justice claims, but simply to emphasise that they are not – like the free movement rights – framed as 
individual social claims, nor projected towards a redistributive institutional settlement such as the welfare state.  
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States reflects this double social function of healthcare. The system of compulsory insurance, 
through which citizens are forced to insure themselves and each other against sickness, serves 
not just to generate the vast amount of resources necessary to protect the citizens’ physical 
integrity, but also structures the scope and exact content of the more contractual right to 
reimbursed healthcare by listing the range of treatment options which patients can avail 
themselves of. The transnational solidarities serve to extend both social functions of healthcare 
to incorporate cross-border situations. In light of the logic of insurance which underlies the 
systems of public healthcare, they not only normatively inform whether a patient is able to 
access healthcare in another state, but also whether his state of insurance must reimburse the 
costs of such cross-border healthcare. 
 
The first social function of healthcare (to protect the physical integrity of citizens) is extended to 
include cross-border situations by the logic of communitarian solidarity. As discussed above, 
communitarian solidarity demands that the criteria for access to social benefits be based 
exclusively on the social function of a certain benefit. In light of the fundamental nature of the 
social function provided by primary healthcare, it will be argued that all Union citizens who can 
demonstrate medical urgency can access healthcare wherever they find themselves in the 
European Union. Whenever a Member State cannot provide for healthcare which is adequate to 
the citizens’ physical needs, moreover, for example because the treatment options available are 
insufficient to protect his physical integrity, or because waiting lists are in place which are so 
long that they endanger his health, the patient is even allowed to seek treatment in another 
Member State and send the bill back to his state of insurance. In other words, communitarian 
solidarity posits that the protection of the life of a Union citizen is so precious that it requires 
effective protection, even from the inadequacies of the healthcare system in his own state.  
 
The more contractual aspect of healthcare – where it is not elemental to the protection of the 
physical integrity of citizens – is extended to include a cross-border dimension by way of 
market solidarity and aspirational solidarity. Market solidarity stresses that patients accrue 
certain rights from the contractual nature of public healthcare schemes through which they 
insure themselves against sickness and through which the state, in return, offers them a set 
number of treatment options. Market solidarity essentially allows patients to enforce the terms 
of the contract of healthcare. Whenever a state simply cannot provide access to the treatment 
options for which it has insured its citizens, market solidarity allows the patient to be treated in 
another Member State and send the bill to his defaulting state of insurance. Aspirational 
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solidarity, finally, informs the rights of patients to simply choose to be treated abroad, even 
when the same treatment is available in the state of insurance. Aspirational solidarity, it was 
suggested, imposes a limited obligation on Member States to allow – in this case – patients to 
exercise their rights to healthcare throughout the European Union. This means that while 
patients are free to autonomously decide where to consume their healthcare, their right to 
reimbursement is limited to the amount to which they would be reimbursed if treated at ‘home’ 
and can even be altogether denied where it detracts from the rights to healthcare of immobile 
patients – for example due to infrastructural pressures. Read together, the transnational 
solidarities not only extend the two different social functions of healthcare to cover cross-border 
situations, but also strengthen their exercise. Both the need to protect the physical integrity of 
the patient, and the more contractual nature of public healthcare are translated into individual 
rights to healthcare which the patient can assert across the European Union, and which are 
guaranteed by virtue of EU law.  
 
CHAPTER 4 considers benefits related to education that serve, in general terms, two distinct 
social functions. First, it is a basic precondition to facilitate the social integration of citizens. 
Without the ability to write and read, for example, a citizens’ autonomy and capacity to pursue a 
‘good life’ is severely restricted. The importance of these basic capabilities is reflected by the 
fact that education is compulsory throughout the whole of Europe up to the age of (more or less) 
sixteen. Education beyond this age, and in particular subsidised access to universities, 
vocational courses, and financial support systems such as student grants, serves a different and 
much more aspirational function in encouraging social mobility. It offers citizens a stepping-
stone to achieve their professional and social ambitions. The policies that promote social 
mobility are not normatively required in order to allow citizens to live autonomous lives but 
instead reflect a much more complex and tighter-knit relationship between the individual 
student and the state. Access to such aspirational benefits is usually contingent on the student 
demonstrating a certain form of attachment to the state providing them. This attachment, it 
would appear, is composed of prospective (in light of the expected future contribution to society 
which a student is expected to make), retrospective (as a reflection of past commitments of the 
student and his parents), and even more intangible obligations (‘our’ youngsters should be 
allowed to flourish). The transnational solidarities serve to extend these structures of social 
integration and social mobility beyond the nation state.  
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Communitarian solidarity suggests that the first social function of education, which is to ensure 
that individuals possess the basic capabilities to function as autonomous agents in society, is so 
fundamental that it is to be extended to cover all resident Union children, regardless of 
nationality. Again, this effect of communitarian solidarity is premised on the fact that all 
resident children automatically meet the conditions of reciprocity that underlie access to 
compulsory education. In other words, it is the child’s status as a human being, rather than his 
status as a future citizen of one particular polity, that requires the facilitation of his social 
integration through access to education.17 
 
The social function of tertiary education establishments (such as universities), and the financial 
benefits such as student benefits that facilitate its access, is to encourage social mobility of 
citizens. Aspirational solidarity – which seeks to offer citizens more choices to decide how to 
live their lives – extends this social function to cover all universities in Europe. Students are free 
to study throughout the Union. The financial burden of educating such students is allocated 
between the different Member States with which the student has established different reciprocal 
connections. Aspirational solidarity tells us that the host state finances the student’s access to 
university. This assumption is implicit in the role that university plays in the communal 
aspirations of the Member States and the European Union. This burden is relatively limited 
given that most costs tied to access to university are structural and generally offset by the 
contributions which students make (and will make) to that state’s society. Aspirational 
solidarity, however, imposes only a conditional obligation – it finds a limit where a Member 
State is faced with such an influx of foreign students that it can no longer maintain its promise 
of social mobility vis-à-vis its own citizens. This exception to aspirational solidarity is relevant 
only for degrees such as medicine where the available places are necessarily finite.  
 
Access to student benefits is less related to the communal aspirations of the national and 
European citizenry and is much more individualised. Access, it will be argued, is dependent on 
the relative strength of the individual reciprocal connection between the student and a particular 
Member State. Market solidarity highlights that economic engagement with a state constitutes a 
strong enough connection to entitle the worker and his children to access all educational 
benefits, including student grants. Communitarian solidarity suggests that economically inactive 
                                                
17 More than that – as will become clear in chapter 4 – access to compulsory education is considered so vital for the 
young citizen that it even comes with a right to residence for the child and his primary carer that extends until such 
education is completed. 
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migrants can only demonstrate a close enough connection to a certain state to deserve access to 
student grants when they have resided in that state for a number of years, while aspirational 
solidarity posits that this exact retrospective character of the connection between student and 
polity allows mobile students to export their student grants from their home state towards their 
state of education. Read together, the transnational solidarities serve to strengthen both social 
functions of education. The social function of compulsory education, which is to teach children 
the capabilities necessary for their integration in society, is extended to cover all resident 
children, regardless of nationality or duration of residence. The social function of universities 
and financial support systems such as student grants, which is to allow for the upwards social 
mobility of the student, is also expanded to cover the whole European Union by allowing the 
student to access universities throughout Europe while allocating the resultant financial burden 
of that education between the different Member States with which the student has established 
different reciprocal connections.   
 
CHAPTER 5 deals with social security and social assistance. In the most general terms, this 
covers all financial benefits which supplement or substitute income generated through market 
interactions. A sharp distinction can be drawn between the social function of social assistance 
and that of social security. Although a certain degree of overlap between the two is evident, and 
it is difficult to classify entitlements as falling exclusively in one of the categories, it is 
nevertheless instructive to discuss the difference between them. Mechanisms of social assistance 
fulfil a very basic social function. Their role is to provide an ultimate safety net to protect 
human beings from the brutality of mere survival. Social assistance grants a minimum level of 
resources necessary to afford life’s basic necessities, and allows people to live their lives with a 
bare minimum of dignity and autonomy. As such, the provision of social assistance reflects a 
basic ‘duty to save’ human beings in dire need which is incumbent on every other human being, 
and, by implication, on every polity. The social function of social security, on the other hand, is 
to mitigate the effect of a number of life’s risks on the wage-earning potential of the individual. 
Through social security, the individual is forced to insure himself against risks such as 
unemployment, invalidity or old age, and – when the risk materialises – the individual receives 
a supplementary income. The differences between these social functions are reflected in the way 
in which the transnational solidarities suggest that cross-border situations be incorporated.  
 
The social function of social assistance, which is to prevent human suffering, finds its cross-
border manifestation primarily through communitarian solidarity. Communitarian solidarity 
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suggests that this basic obligation of preventing suffering is couched not in the strength of the 
relationship between the citizen and one particular polity, but in that between a polity and a 
human being in need. In other words, any resident Union citizen that meets the required level of 
need automatically meets the criteria of reciprocity that legitimise access to social assistance, 
regardless of his nationality or duration of residence. In consequence, the obligation to offer a 
basic level of subsistence necessary to ‘save’ a citizen is incumbent on each Member State in 
respect of all legally resident Union citizens. Communitarian solidarity, in this way, promises 
Union citizens that they will have access to sufficient resources to live their lives with a 
minimum level of dignity. 
 
The transnational dimension of social security, which serves to protect individuals against 
certain risks of life, is much more complex. Its elaboration requires a distinction to be drawn 
between the two sides of social security: on the one hand the period of insurance, and on the 
other hand the period when the risk has materialised and the benefit is paid out. The 
transnational solidarities include cross-border situations in both sides to social security. Market 
solidarity indicates that economic engagement in a certain Member State connects the worker to 
the social security system of that state, regardless of his nationality or place of residence. In 
other words, as soon as a migrant is economically active in a particular Member State, that state 
must insure him against life’s risks. Communitarian solidarity suggests that mere residence has 
a similar effect. Even if a state may ask economically inactive migrants to contribute to their 
systems of social security, they must nevertheless insure all residents on equal terms. Once the 
risks against which social security tries to protect the citizen has materialised, and the benefit is 
paid out, aspirational solidarity suggests that economic activity or residence in the state of 
insurance is no longer relevant. In other words, social security benefits are in principle portable 
across the European Union. Access to such benefits is, after all, dependent primarily on the past 
insurance record of the citizen and the materialisation of the risk insured against, rather than the 
nationality of the individual or his continuous residence in the state that issues the benefit. Read 
together, then, the transnational solidarities argue that the state of insurance should cover the 
citizen against the materialisation of a set number of risks wherever he may subsequently find 
himself; while the state of residence prevents the worst of suffering by providing for a minimum 
level of resources required to prevent human suffering. The distinction between social security 
and social assistance is not as clean-cut in reality. Many entitlements straddle both categories, 
and force the Union legislator and Court to carefully tease out the exact social function of a 
specific welfare entitlement before their transnational dimension can be ascertained.  
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CHAPTER 6, finally, discusses a type of regulatory rather than redistributive welfare: labour law. 
Its inclusion serves to test whether the model of transnational solidarity defended here 
transcends the interaction between redistributive policies and the free movement provisions, and 
can in fact serve to explain and assess the normative development of other areas of EU law. The 
social function of labour law is to protect the individual from the raw power of the market. It 
essentially serves to ensure that the market is an instrument for, rather than an impediment to, 
the individual’s pursuit of a ‘good life’. In different ways, labour law protects the worker from 
the asymmetrical power advantage that the employer holds over him. In this vein, labour law 
regulates the conditions under which employment can take place, it structures the 
communication and interaction between ‘labour’ and ‘capital’ as collectivities, and it controls 
the conditions for access to, and forced exit from, the employment market. In contrast with the 
other policy areas discussed, then, the social function of labour law does not presuppose the 
stability of bounded commitments of reciprocity. Rather, it presupposes the political authority to 
regulate all employment relationships. Only by way of compulsory adherence can the social 
functions of labour law be ensured; and can the raw power of capital be embedded to protect the 
worker’s capacity to live a ‘good life’. 
 
In labour law, the three transnational solidarities inform how the different social functions of 
labour law are implemented on the internal market. Market solidarity and communitarian 
solidarity, each in their own way, demonstrate how the need to protect the worker from the 
asymmetrical power advantage of the employer can be articulated on the European market. 
Market solidarity tells us that the worker derives, from his engagement in the division of labour 
on the market, a right to work under ‘just’ working conditions, which give him a fair return on 
the depletion of his wage-earning potential. Most European labour law indeed serves to regulate 
the fairness of the conditions under which labour can take place. It does so not by imposing a 
new normative level across the internal market. The heterogeneity of that market and the lack of 
a robust political space on the European level make harmonisation ineffective as a mechanism 
for the incorporation of the norms of market solidarity. Rather, market solidarity demands the 
insulation of the capacity of national political systems to decide the conditions under which 
labour is to take place within its territory. While the Union legislator has grasped this, the Court 
has not. It has allowed the dynamics of the internal market to become an instrument that 
increases rather than limits the asymmetrical power advantage of the employer over the worker, 
and potentially allows workers to be pummelled into accepting unfair employment conditions.  
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Communitarian solidarity tells us that the regulation of the employment relationship requires not 
only the protection of the role of the worker as an economic agent, but also his role as a citizen. 
It requires – simply put – that citizens retain a level of autonomy and dignity that transcends 
their role in the production process. This is traditionally expressed by way of rights to industrial 
citizenship, which institutionalise the autonomy of labour through rights to co-determination in 
the management of the workplace and through rights to collective action. The effectiveness of 
such rights is – again – protected by compulsory adherence and their politicised nature. Their 
translation to the transnational space, then, again presupposes the insulation of the exercise of 
rights to industrial citizenship on the national level rather than its reconfiguration on the 
European level. Any, yet again, while the Union legislator has grasped this, the Court has 
spectacularly misread the nature of industrial citizenship and in doing so undermines the 
achievement of its social function.18  
 
The final social function of labour law is to regulate the effect of the employment market on the 
citizen’s life by stipulating conditions for access to, and exit from than market. Aspirational 
solidarity, which seeks to liberate citizens from the constraints imposed by their own state on 
their capacity to live good lives, serves to rationalise this process. Both through soft-law 
mechanisms such as the OMC and through the Court’s case law on the principle of non-
discrimination on the basis of age, aspirational solidarity forces Member States to take account 
of the way in which their regulation of the employment market impacts on the citizen’s capacity 
to live a good life. It requires that (forced) exclusion from the employment market is 
accompanied by the availability of mechanisms, such as schemes of social security, that 
mitigate the effects of such exclusion and ensure that the citizens’ capacity to live a good life is 
not undercut. Read together, the three types of transnational solidarity seek to institutionalise the 
social functions of labour law – to protect the worker’s role in and beyond the employment 
market – on the European level. This specific social function requires a different 
conceptualisation of the role of political institutions than in the other policy areas analysed, 
which is not always appreciated by the Court.  
 
The CONCLUSION of this thesis will bring the theoretical and comparative parts together and 
describe the ethics of justice that is emerging in Europe. It describes that Europe’s idea of 
                                                
18 See chapter 6.3.  
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justice is tiered, and simultaneously protects the stability of national welfare entitlements and 
the capacity of citizens to move around Europe in pursuit of their conception of the good life. 
The transnational solidarities offer a framework for this exercise by severing ties between 
territory, residence and entitlement; and reconstructing the individual’s entitlement on the basis 
of the moral commitments and social ideals that undergird the different policy areas. While this 
thesis highlights that a specific ethics of justice underlies EU law, it also highlights that that 
ethics is articulated only implicitly and is limited by the Union’s particular institutional setting. 
This gives rise to problems; not just between the different institutions involved in the generation 
of justice, but also between such institutions and the individual citizen. Such problems risk 
frustrating the potential of the Union’s to contribute to the attainment of justice, and fragments 
its precarious legitimacy to engage in that process in the first place. A more explicit engagement 
by the Union with the demands of justice, and a rhetorical, institutional and normative shift 
towards a paradigm that builds on transnational solidarity, could, as this thesis will discuss, 
benefit the individual citizen, protect the national welfare state, and prove to be a legitimising 
force for the project of European integration. 
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1 THE TIERED CONCEPT OF JUSTICE IN EUROPE 
This chapter analyses the interaction between the national welfare state and the process of 
European integration in the pursuit of justice beyond the nation state. While both projects share 
the ambition to produce a stable and prosperous society, they traditionally have been governed 
separately. This separation reflects their respective institutional capacities. Over the past 
decades, however, the narratives of the welfare state and that of the integration project have 
become intertwined. The functional and political separation between the projects has become 
tenuous, and the question of coherence between the normative claims they produce is 
increasingly significant. This chapter seeks to assess the strengths and limitations of the national 
welfare state and the process of European integration in contributing to the attainment of justice; 
and discusses the implications of those findings for the relationship between the two projects.  
 
The first section of this chapter discusses what is understood by the term ‘social justice’, and 
highlights that social justice is centred around allowing individual citizens to live a ‘good life’, in 
accordance with their personal preferences, and thus aims at both the alleviation of individual 
suffering, as well as the promotion of individual aspirations (1.1). It will be argued that the 
effective management of this understanding of social justice presupposes a functioning system of 
representative democracy and inter-personal solidarity bounds ‘thick’ enough to sustain the 
redistribution of wealth, which explains the primary role of the nation state in its development 
(1.2). Notwithstanding the inherently limited role of the European Union in the development of 
justice norms, this chapter will highlight that more and more transnational elements of justice 
have emerged, which serve to both extend the capacity of citizens to live ‘good lives’ beyond the 
nation state and stabilise national distributive arrangements (1.3). The possible tension caused by 
the normative incoherence between these different conceptions of social justice will be further 
assessed in the following chapter, which argues in favour of the articulation of the concept of 
transnational solidarity in order to effectively integrate national and transnational conceptions of 
justice.  
 
1.1 THE IDEA OF ‘SOCIAL JUSTICE’ 
This section sets out what is understood by the term ‘social justice’, and how society in general, 
and the welfare state in particular, have contributed to its effective attainment. The idea that the 
structure of society should contribute to ‘justice’ is premised on the basic preconception that 
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society is an artefact made by its citizens, and thus also serves as an instrument for the realisation 
of claims of justice that reflect the citizen’s values and ideals.1 After all, by accepting that the 
citizen is the focal point of societal construction, “[t]he question of human suffering and human 
aspirations”2 automatically becomes central to all such attempts. The promise of a ‘good life’, 
wherein citizens can live ‘free from need’ and ‘free to aspire’, is therefore (at least rhetorically) 
indispensable in all social structuring.3  
 
Yet, what is a ‘good life’? Is it the assurance that one has a roof over one’s head and enough food 
to survive? Or is it the freedom to live one’s life in whichever fashion one pleases? On the highest 
level of abstraction, any conception of social justice must accept that every citizen has a different 
conception of the ‘good life’.4 Any coherent conception of justice, it seems, must accept that 
different people may have different outlooks of life, different needs and different desires, and 
must therefore find a way to accommodate the irreducible plurality of conceptions of the ‘good’ 
that is intrinsic in society.5 Placing the pursuit of ‘a good life’ on centre stage, then, automatically 
focuses our attention on the way in which society can help individual citizens to construe their 
own ‘basket of happiness’: 
“The various attainments in human functioning that we may value are very diverse, 
varying from being well nourished or avoiding premature mortality to taking part in 
the life of the community and developing the skill to pursue one’s work-related plans 
and ambitions. The capability that we are concerned with is our ability to achieve 
various combinations of functionings that we can compare and judge against each 
other in terms of what we have reason to value.”6 
 
                                                
1 See M. Halberstam, ‘Totalitarianism and the Modern Conception of Politics’, (New Haven, YUP, 1999), p. 16. 
Whether society is perceived as “the all-encompassing social system that orders all possible communication between 
human beings” (N. Luhmann, ‘Political Theory in the Welfare State’ (Berlin, De Gruyter, 1990), p. 30) or as “the 
subjective expressions of requirements for social integration”, (A. Honneth, ‘Redistribution as Recognition: A 
Response to Nancy Fraser’ in: N. Fraser and A. Honneth, ‘Redistribution or Recognition: a politico-philosophical 
exchange’ (London, Verso, 2003), p. 174) the underlying theme is the same: society is mouldable around the ideals 
and values of its subjects, and does not serve a divine or ‘natural’ external objective. 
2 M. Halberstam, ‘Totalitarianism and the Modern Conception of Politics’, (New Haven, YUP, 1999), p. 17.  
3 Consider, for example, the radically different notions of ‘ubuntu’ in African ethics and of ‘autonomy’ in liberal 
western political though, which nevertheless both emphasise that societal construction must center on citizen well-
being. E.g. A. Shutte, ‘Politics and the Ethics of Ubuntu’, in: M. F. Murove (ed.), ‘African ethics: an anthology of 
comparative and applied ethics’, (Scottsville, University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2009), or T. H. Green (edited by J. 
Rodman), ‘The Political Theory of T. H. Green: Selected Writings’ (New York, Appleton, 1964), p. 138-141. 
4 J. Habermas, ‘The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory’, (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1998), p. 260. 
5 See on irreducible plurality T. Nagel, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, 83 The Philosophical Review (1974), p. 441-3 
where he argues that we cannot possibly understand what other people value. See also A. Sen, ‘Plural Utility’, 81 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1981) p. 193-215, where he shows that even the singular conception ‘utility’ 
is composed of many strands which are ordered in accordance with individual preferences. 
6 A. Sen, ‘The Idea of Justice’ (Harvard, HUP, 2009), p. 233. 
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Amartya Sen offers a useful starting point in translating the priority of individual notions of the 
‘good life’ into a more structured and communal understanding of social justice. He uses the 
concept of freedom to make this connection. In his argument, a commitment to the ‘good life’ and 
personal freedom both requires the provision of the substantive preconditions for an individual to 
live a ‘good life’ (such as being well nourished) and the absence of interference in allowing 
citizens to lead their lives in accordance to their own perception of the ‘good life’: 
“Freedom is valuable for at least two distinct reasons. First, more freedom gives us 
more opportunity to achieve those things that we value, and have reason to value. This 
aspect of freedom is concerned primarily with our ability to achieve, rather than with 
the process through which that achievement comes about. Second, the process through 
which things happen may also be of importance in assessing freedom. For example, it 
may be thought, reasonably enough, that the procedure of free decision by the person 
himself (no matter how successful the person is in getting what he would like to 
achieve) is an important requirement of freedom. There is, thus, an important 
distinction between the ‘opportunity aspect’ and the ‘process aspect’ of freedom.” 7 
 
It would therefore appear that the conceptualisation of social justice as having ‘a good life’ as its 
normative aim entails both a negative obligation on the structuring of society, ensuring the general 
absence of outside interference with the determination, expression, and pursuit of an individual’s 
normative preferences, as well as a positive obligation, guaranteeing the availability of a valuable 
range of core entitlements, such as a basic level of material resources and services, that form an 
indispensable part of a ‘good life’.8  
 
This positive obligation on the state appears to primarily require those entitlements that are 
essential preconditions for any conception of the good life. Access to adequate housing, food, 
water, primary education, or emergency health-care can be seen as liberating individuals, 
regardless of personal normative values, from the chains of mere survival, and allow a more 
efficient pursuit of individual preferences as to how to live a ‘good life’, whatever this may entail. 
In other words, they are both fundamental and foundational for the development and expansion of 
the pursuit of a good life,9 and can be identified without intervention of the electorate:  
                                                
7 A. Sen, ‘Rationality and Freedom’, (Harvard, HUP, 2002), p. 585. 
8 See A. Sen, ‘The Idea of Justice’ (London, Penguin, 2010), chapters 11-14, and p. 228-230 in particular; and T.H. 
Green (edited by J. Rodman), ‘The Political Theory of T.H. Green: Selected Writings’ (New York, Appleton, 1964), 
p. 138-141 and p. 111-116. 
9 See M. Walker and E. Underhalter, ‘The Capability Approach’, in: M. Walker and E. Underhalter (eds.), 
‘Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach and Social Justice in Education’ (New York, Palgrave, 2007), p. 8. 
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“some capabilities may be so basic to human welfare that they can be identified 
without any prior knowledge of the particular commitment that are held and expressed 
by an individual or group”10 
 
Such basic entitlements thus reflect a minimum social obligation on any polity to look after its 
citizens, a duty which is in fact insulated from (democratic) erosion through its constitutional 
entrenchment and (more recently) supranational codification.11  
 
There is no reason, however, for a polity to limit itself to these minimum social obligations. A 
guarantee that all citizens will be allowed, free of cost, to fly to the moon once in their lifetime 
may very well be undertaken by a polity. Yet, the justification for such entitlement must 
necessarily be different. Whereas minimum social entitlements stem from the very nature of 
society as an artefact and serve a procedural purpose (to guarantee individual freedom), other 
entitlements cannot but find their justification in the normative preferences of the people that 
compose a polity. In other words, a society can become committed to sending all its citizens to 
the moon only when a majority of its citizens perceive that to contribute to ‘the good life’. This 
is an important distinction to draw because all communal entitlements imply a financial effort, a 
limitation of individual decisional autonomy and thus ultimately derive their normative 
legitimacy from the wants of their citizens. A project entitling all citizens a journey to the moon 
is funded through the public treasury (that is, the citizens) and implies a limitation of other 
alternatives (‘the state will not pay for my trip to Mars, or for me sitting in the pub, or living a 
year in Mozambique, instead’). Such financial participation and normative limitations are only 
legitimate and justice enhancing if its outcome (‘everyone to the moon!’) incorporates and 
reflects the normative demands of individual citizens. A socially ‘just’ society thus requires a 
mechanism to periodically collect the individuals’ needs and desires on the communal level, 
mediate between the different individual justice claims, and translate the eventual outcome into 
reality. Such trade-offs, balancing between individual ‘process’ related normative preferences, 
and desired communal outcomes, give actual content to the notion of ‘social justice’ beyond the 
minimum social obligation on the state.  
 
                                                
10 S. Alkire, ‘Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s capability approach and poverty reduction’ (Oxford, OUP, 2002), p. 154. 
11 See, for example, The Charter of Fundamental Rights, which lists the right to education (Article 14), right to non-
discrimination (Article 21), right to collective bargaining (Article 28), right to fair and just working conditions 
(Article 31), the right to social security (Article 34) and the right to healthcare (Article 35). For an overview of the 
social rights enshrined in national constitutions throughout the European Union see: 
http://www.ecln.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=29&Itemid=52. 
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This political dimension to the development of justice automatically entails that its 
implementation is cut up into territorially closed units. While, for example, all European states 
provide for public access to core entitlements such as primary education, striking differences 
exist beyond such core obligation on the state. Just as some states, for example, consider it ‘just’ 
that individuals pay £9000 for their own university education, other states consider it ‘just’ that 
the state takes up such financial burden. A political community thus both expresses and re-
iterates what its citizens consider to be ‘a good life’.12 The reflexive process, stimulated by 
unique historical, cultural, or ethno-religious idiosyncrasies, is the reason for which polities have 
all developed a distinctly national flavour of social justice. The communal nature of the 
realisation of the preconditions for the individual to live a ‘good life’, moreover, presupposes a 
redistribution of resources between the focal group. This, as will be discussed in depth in the 
next section, has further entrenched ideas of justice within the confines of the nation state. 
Simply put, the willingness to share resources in order to alleviate need and foster communal 
aspirations was born within the national context, and continues to rely on its spatially bounded 
character, thereby systematically excluding ‘outsiders’ from moving in, and ‘insiders’ from 
exporting entitlements.  
 
1.2 INSTITUTIONS AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 
The above conceptualisation of social justice already indicates that its attainment depends on 
social structuring, that is, on the elaboration of institutional structures necessary for its 
attainment. Such structuring is required to ensure the availability of core entitlements, to prevent 
encroachment on the individual’s autonomy to pursue his own aspirations, and to peacefully 
mediate between the different value judgments made by different citizens.13 The structuring of a 
polity thus not only serves to ensure that citizens be ‘free’, but also strongly legitimises its 
development as an exercise of the individual’s right to self-determination. This section will 
identify which institutional and normative structures are required for such development (1.2.1), 
argue that their character reflects the great institutional capacity of the nation state as a 
distributor of well-being, and highlight the institutional limitations faced by the European Union 
in reproducing such structures (1.2.2).  
                                                
12 See, for example, J.Mayerfeld, ‘Suffering and Moral Responsibility’ (Oxford, OUP, 1999), p. 87-89; or J. Raz, 
‘The Authority of Law’ (Oxford, Clarendon, 1979), p. 239, who argues in favour of the existence of a ‘moral 
obligation to contribute to the welfare of others’. 
13 A. Honneth, ‘The Point of Recognition: A Rejoinder to the Rejoinder’, in: N. Fraser and A. Honneth, 
‘Redistribution or Recognition: a politico-philosophical exchange’ (London, Verso, 2003), p. 258-9.  
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1.2.1 JUSTICE ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
Two structures crucially underlie the nation state’s capacity to produce ‘social justice’. The first 
is, as mentioned above, a political system that allows it to mediate between the different justice 
demands of the citizens. The second is the degree of inter-personal solidarity between its 
citizens, which counteracts the individualistic notion that society can be ‘just’ and its citizens can 
be ‘free’ without the availability of (core) welfare entitlements. While the political system thus 
serves the legitimacy of the communal delivery of social justice, solidarity protects the 
sustainability of positive welfare entitlements.   
 
The political process fulfils an indispensable institutional role in the pursuit of normative 
objectives such as ‘social justice’ or ‘citizen well-being’. It ensures both equal participation of 
citizens, on the basis of individual and autonomously generated normative preferences, albeit 
abstracted through the development of political parties,14 and it provides legitimacy for the 
redistributive outcome of such process. The “categorical opening to normative viewpoints”15 
guaranteed by the political process ensures that the social order remains responsive to social 
discontent and newly-generated social justice claims,16 while the structures of representative 
democracy are meant to ensure that citizens ‘get what they want’. As a consequence, modern-
day national institutions are almost exclusively concerned with the production and distribution of 
well-being,17 not just to meet their subject’s needs and desires, but also to consolidate their own 
role in the process.18 This instrumental conceptualisation of the political process is still at the 
basis of the contemporary welfare state. Societal construction through the political process can 
thus be seen as a sophisticated communal expression of the individual’s normative needs and 
desires, building on the contemporarily full, equal, and bounded nature of the individual’s 
autonomy. The national welfare state, can, in turn, be seen as an institutional expression of this 
                                                
14 See for critique J. Buchanan, ‘Social Choice, Democracy and Free Markets’, 62 Journal of Political Economy 
(1954), p. 114-123, even if its institutionalisation did allow for the more effective implementation of solidarity. See 
S. Stjernø, 'Solidarity in Europe: the History of an Idea’, (Cambridge, CUP, 2005). 
15 A. Honneth, ‘Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser’ in: N. Fraser and A. Honneth, 
‘Redistribution or Recognition: a politico-philosophical exchange’ (London, Verso, 2003), p. 134.  
16 As argued by Esping-Andersen, “democracy is an institution that cannot ignore majoritarian demands”. See G. 
Esping-Andersen, 'The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism', (Cambridge, CUP, 1990), p. 15.  
17 G. Esping-Andersen, 'The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism', (Cambridge, CUP, 1990), p. 1. 
18 M. Ferrera, ‘The JCMS Annual Lecture: National Welfare States and European Integration: In Search of a 
'Virtuous Nesting'’ 47 JCMS (2009), p. 223. 
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mediation process,19 both legitimising the role of the political process, and serving as a territorial 
stabiliser by strengthening the vertical loyalty of the citizen towards the state, thus allowing the 
latter to govern more purposefully.20  
 
As a result of its articulation through the national political process, the expression of justice 
through the welfare state is highly specific to the historical, cultural, and institutional texture of 
the nation state. This has created a spatially bounded expression of justice, something along the 
lines of: ‘we take care of ourselves’. Simply put, the ‘we’ equals ‘ourselves’, so that citizens not 
formally included within a certain political community cannot usually benefit from the outcomes 
of such determination. In consequence, the spaces of ‘social sharing’ that emerged throughout 
Europe are distinctly national in structure and substance. In structural terms, access to welfare is 
premised on membership (electoral rights, welfare services and goods are provided exclusively 
to the members of a political community to the exclusion of those who do not fit in fictitious 
categories based on identity and belonging), and territoriality (the consumption of welfare 
services and goods is territorially bound in order to ensure that “a state can maintain sufficient 
control over the complex ‘mechanics’ of its welfare system”).21  
 
This has had an effect on the normative development of national welfare states. Each welfare 
state has developed idiosyncratically, partially as a result of the need to meet its own historically 
unique needs, circumstances and institutional preferences, and partially as a result of the strength 
and nature of the communal claims articulated by individual citizens. Social entitlements require 
the redistribution of resources, given that their financial burden is not usually shouldered by 
those who profit most from them. It presupposes that citizens care about the misery and 
happiness of their fellow citizens. Without such horizontal willingness to ‘share’ with ‘others’ 
within the same ‘community’, communal aspects of social justice cannot be sustained. If only 10 
% of the electorate is willing to give up part of their finances for the establishment of certain 
welfare entitlements, such entitlements are unsustainable, both morally and financially. Even 
                                                
19 See generally M. Ferrera, ‘The Boundaries of Welfare’, (Oxford, OUP, 2005), in particular chapter 1. 
20 The first welfare states were, in fact, largely devised in order to strengthen the nation state’s territorial claims. 
Bismarck’s Soziaalstaat, which can be seen as the first elaboration of the modern welfare state, was not an exercise 
in wealth redistribution or social recalibration, but a crafty state-building attempt. Nevertheless, the continental 
welfare states, which roughly followed Bismarck’s example, soon embraced the role of political parties as 
interlocutors of normative recognition claims. See for an overview of social policies in the early European welfare 
states: M. Ferrera, ‘The Boundaries of Welfare’, (Oxford, OUP, 2005), p. 14 and 61-62. 
21 K. Lenaerts and T. Heremans, ‘Contours of a European Social Union in the Case-law of the European Court of 
Justice’ 2 EUConst (2006), p. 102. 
 32 
though whole libraries have been written on these notions, captured by the term ‘solidarity’, it 
remains a nebulous concept – stuck somewhere between rationality and emotion, between 
egoism and altruism.22 Somek’s conceptualisation of solidarity as entailing both a sense of 
identification and one of societal transcendence captures these ambiguities nicely, and explains 
how the use of social solidarity as a moral platform for the development of social justice has 
increased the distinctly reciprocal and spatially bounded nature underlying participation in 
spaces of social sharing. Solidarity as identification implies that solidarity is essentially based on 
the recognition that fellow citizens “endure what one abhors”.23 This is the most classic form of 
solidarity, and underlies social policies in the sense that it rationalises the pooling of resources in 
order to prevent general need throughout society. It is strongly self-referential in the sense that it 
is centred on the individual’s own desires and needs (if I were to get sick..), and thus assumes 
social protection set at the level beneath which the citizen would not want to live himself.24 
Solidarity as identification is thus continuously vulnerable to ‘negative des-identification’, in the 
sense that greed, individualisation, the privatisation of welfare, ethno-cultural pluralism, and 
resentment can lead to decreased identification with those in need,25 even if it seems that the 
common ethic aimed at alleviation of the worst of human suffering will always guarantee a basic 
level of solidarity.26 The second aspect of solidarity is conceptualised by Somek as solidarity as 
transcendence.27 In its theoretical core this entails identification with life of the community as 
such, that is to say with capacities and opportunities that fellow citizens (do not) possess. This 
can be distinguished from solidarity as identification in the sense that it places the interests of 
society as a whole in the centre of the normative claims. The reasoning changes from an 
egocentric (if I were to get sick..) to one encompassing society as such (citizens in this 
community should be looked after when sick). Solidarity as transcendence requires a new frame 
of mind, coined by Stjernø ‘enlightened self-interest’, in which not the individuals’ own interest 
                                                
22 See for a compelling chronological account of the development of the concept of solidarity H. Brunkhorst, 
‘Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community’ (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005). 
23 A. Somek, ‘Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European citizenship’ 32 ELRev (2007), p. 807. 
24 It is, consequently, premised on a delicate balance: where the wants of those protected by social rights become 
higher than the egocentric abhorrence of the rest of society, solidarity as a concept fails, and the standard of social 
protection will be lowered in order to meet the new equilibrium between abhorrence and need. 
25 A. Somek, ‘Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European citizenship’ 32 ELRev (2007), p. 810. See also S. 
Stjernø, ‘Solidarity in Europe: the History of an Idea’, (Cambridge, CUP, 2005), p. 2. 
26 J.Mayerfield, ‘Suffering and Moral Responsibility’ (Oxford, OUP, 1999), p. 131. Somek calls this the ‘agapistic 
reflex’ of solidarity. 
27 A. Somek, ‘Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European citizenship’ 32 ELRev (2007), p. 808. 
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is placed on the fore, but the general interests and aspirations of the members of the organic 
community to which the individual belongs.28 
 
Both senses of solidarity entail a “moral commitment to ‘sharing with others’, which is not easy 
to activate at the individual and primary group levels”.29 The sustainability of the welfare state’s 
strong redistributive character presupposes that inter-personal solidarity bounds be ‘thick’ 
enough. Citizens must feel connected enough to each other in order to give up part of their 
finances for the ‘communal good’ of alleviating suffering of, or creating opportunities for, fellow 
citizens. The process of nation building has greatly contributed to the creation of such ‘thick’ 
solidarities, by emphasising the ethno-cultural similarities between national citizens and creating 
fictitious ‘communities of fate’.30 The binding property and identity-building capacity of 
concepts such as citizenship and nationality, as well as the closure provided by territorial 
boundaries, have allowed for societal sophistication, both in terms of the creation of a ‘cultural 
infrastructure’,31 and in terms of the cultivation of individual and collective identities and 
belongings.32 This has generated strong horizontal solidarities based on a shared cultural, 
historical, or institutional heritage,33 which have in turn led to the formation of very 
homogeneous social groups, of strong centre-periphery relations, and of institutional 
mechanisms, such as the political sphere and the welfare state, capable of reproducing these 
solidarities.34 It is hardly surprising therefore, that horizontal solidarities ‘thick’ enough to 
sustain inter-personal wealth redistribution have primarily developed within the nation state. 
 
Both the national reflex of horizontal solidarities and the closed nature of political membership 
as an instrument for the development of justice norms highlight that a degree of reciprocity 
between individual and society is crucial for a ‘just’ social construction. This explains both the 
                                                
28 S. Stjernø, ‘Solidarity in Europe: the History of an Idea’, (Cambridge, CUP, 2005), p. 201 and E. Durkheim, ‘The 
Division of Labour in Society’ (New York, Palgrave, 1984), p. 150. See for an interesting digression: P. Lafargue, 
‘The right to be lazy, and other studies’ (Kerr, Chicago, 1907).    
29 M. Ferrera, ‘The Boundaries of Welfare’, (Oxford, OUP, 2005), p. 46. 
30 D. Millar, ‘On Nationality’ (Oxford, OUP, 1997) p. 22-27 and 184-5. 
31 M. Ferrera, ‘The Boundaries of Welfare’, (Oxford, OUP, 2005), p. 21. 
32 M. Ferrera, ‘The Boundaries of Welfare’, (Oxford, OUP, 2005), p. 20. 
33 See T. Faist, ‘Social Citizenship in the European Union: Nested Membership’ 19 JCMS (2001), p. 37 and M. 
Dougan and E. Spaventa, ‘‘Wish you weren't here ...’: new models of social solidarity in the European Union’, in: M. 
Dougan and E. Spaventa (eds.), ‘Social Welfare and EU Law’ (Oxford, Hart, 2005), p. 185. 
34 See D. Miller, ‘Citizenship and National Identity’ (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000), p. 31-32, and C. Joppke, 
‘Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity’, 11 Citizenship Studies (2007), p. 38. 
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eight structural policy differences between the four welfare models that exist in Europe,35 and the 
importance of concepts of (political) membership and territoriality in protecting the sustainability 
of the welfare state. Closed membership sustains ‘thick’ notions of solidarity, which in turn 
sustain the vast redistributive transfers and collective welfare mechanisms that typify the welfare 
systems of the Member States. National welfare policies are thus per se based on, and justified 
by, a parochial bias favoring ‘insiders’ over ‘outsiders’, which are structurally excluded from 
sharing arrangements. Such solidaristic bias has indeed been construed as essential for the long-
term viability of social rights, as it protects it against destructuring moral and political 
pressures.36 
 
1.2.2 EUROPE’S INSTITUTIONAL INADEQUACIES 
As a consequence of this distinctly national character of welfare, it should not come as a surprise 
that welfare competences have remained on the national level notwithstanding half a century of 
European integration. In fact, much of the success of the project of European cooperation and its 
objective of creating ‘peace and prosperity’ depended on their retention on the national level. In 
the run-up towards the negotiations on the Treaty of Rome, it was thought that both the creation 
of a common market, which would stimulate economic growth and increase living standards 
while intertwining the different polities in order to create political stability,37 as well as the 
national welfare state with its solidarity mechanisms, which would continue to look after the 
well-being and specific social needs of its citizens, were necessary in order to create a stable, 
efficient and ‘just’ Europe.38 In other words, the structure of the integration process was meant to 
create a common market while at the same time supporting the Member States’ autonomy in 
                                                
35 The four welfare models (three developed by Esping-Andersen, who distinguishes between the Scandinavian 
model, the Continental Model and the Anglo-Saxon Model, to which the welfare model of former communist 
countries in central and eastern Europe may be added) differ in terms of eligibility and risk coverage, benefit 
structure and generosity, methods of financing, service intensity, family policy, employment regulation, logic of 
governance and the regulation of industrial relations. See A. Hemerijck, 'The Self-Transformation of the European 
Social Model(s)', in: G. Esping-Andersen (ed.), 'Why We Need a Welfare State', (Oxford, OUP, 2002), p. 178. 
36 See for more in depth discussion F. De Witte, ‘National Welfare as Transnational Justice?’ in J. Rutgers (ed.), 
‘European Contract Law and the Welfare State’ (Europa Law, Groningen, 2012), and R. Bellamy, ‘The Liberty of 
the Post-Moderns? Market and Civic Freedom within the EU’ LEQS Paper Series 1/2009, p. 14. 
37 Official summary of the ‘Ohlin Report’, 74 (1956) International Labour Review, p. 101. 
38 D. Damjanovic and B. de Witte, ‘Welfare Integration through EU Law: The Overall Picture in the Light of the 
Lisbon Treaty’, in: U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen and L. Roseberry (eds.), ‘Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law’ 
(Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, 2009), p.59. See also M. Ferrera, 'The Boundaries of Welfare', (Oxford, OUP, 
2005), p. 94. 
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welfare policy.39 This ‘separate track’ solution would, especially “when account is taken of the 
strength of the trade union movement in European countries and of the sympathy of European 
governments for social aspirations”,40 serve as a guarantee against unacceptable social 
consequences of economic integration and thereby ‘socially embed’ the European integration 
project on the national level in accordance with the justice claims of the national electorates.41 
Even though the Union’s legislative competences in the social area have, overtime, gradually 
increased in order to meet new functional challenges in the establishment of the internal market, 
they still do not extend beyond a merely complementary role in labour law,42 and an even more 
restricted mandate in fields covering redistributive welfare.43 That the primary task of welfare 
redistribution remains on the national level is also reflected by the lack of taxation powers for the 
Union, and by the fact that the Treaty obliges the Union to respect the Member States’ autonomy 
in core welfare areas, explicitly prohibiting harmonising measures.44 Several aspects of the 
Member States’ welfare models, such as the fundamental principles underlying the social 
security systems, or the right to strike, have even been intentionally ring-fenced from Union 
interference.45 
 
The refusal of Member States to transfer welfare competences to the Union is informed both by 
the preoccupation that such transfer would reduce the legitimacy of the national political process, 
which strongly depends its central role in the distribution of well-being,46 and by the more 
normative preoccupation that the Union is institutionally incapable of sustaining redistributive 
welfare tasks. Such claims highlight the absence on the European level of the two essential 
institutional preconditions for effective and ‘just’ social structuring: a functioning system of 
                                                
39 In fact, it is felt that the main concern of the Ohlin Group, which discussed the need for social harmonisation as a 
precondition for effective economic integration, was that of “guaranteeing the maintenance (and progressive 
expansion) of highly developed and autonomous systems of social protection within individual Member States.” See 
S. Giubboni, ‘Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution: A Labour Law Perspective’ 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2006), p. 42, and more generally 157-8. 
40 Report by a Group of ILO Experts, ‘Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation’ (Geneva, International 
Labour Office, 1956), para. 210.  
41 Official summary of the ‘Ohlin Report’, 74 International Labour Review (1956), p. 108 and 112, claiming that 
social policies as such have an impact on international trade, but their content would not reduce the benefits that any 
Member State derives from free trade. 
42 Article 153 TFEU. 
43 Article 156 TFEU. 
44 Articles 149 TFEU and Article 153 (2)(b) TFEU. See also Declaration 31 attached to the Treaty of Lisbon. 
45 Article 153 (4) and (5) TFEU. 
46 See, for example, S. Bartolini, ‘Old and New Peripheries in the Processes of European Territorial Integration?’ in: 
C. Ansell, and G. Di Palma, (eds.) ‘Restructuring Territoriality’ (Cambridge, CUP, 2004), p. 25. 
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representative democracy, and (consequently)47 the incapacity to generate and sustain inter-
personal solidarities and communal redistributive arrangements. The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
(‘BverfG’) picked up on these institutional limitations in its recent ruling on the constitutional 
validity of the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
The first limitation lies in the fact that the European institutional structure is not democratic 
enough to correctly determine the normative content of social policies. The requirement of a 
strong democratic process is essential given that the legitimacy of, and participation in, 
redistributive welfare as an expression of social justice is premised on the dynamic – 
institutionalised through the electorate process – that the citizens’ normative preferences must 
eventually be translated into social policy.48 This holds true especially in relation to questions of 
great normative salience and political contestation such as social justice and redistributive 
welfare. Simply put, as citizens must be able to get what they want, whichever polity decides on 
matters of welfare must ensure that its institutions are capable of actually determining (and 
implementing) their citizens’ needs and desires. The BverfG has conceptualised this in terms of 
the individual’s right to (political) self-determination.49 It argues that in order to ensure such self-
determination, “the right, and the practical possibilities of action, to take conceptual decisions 
regarding systems of social security and other social policy and labour market policy 
decisions”,50 must remain on the national level, given that the Union’s system of representative 
democracy cannot guarantee that the social policy decisions potentially made accurately reflect 
the normative wishes of the electorate.  
 
The BverfG essentially lays down the democratic benchmark for the legitimate exercise of 
welfare competences. This benchmark includes the requirement that the main legislative body be 
directly elected51 on the basis of free and equal elections,52 through an organised competition 
between political forces,53 which are open to participation of all citizens,54 and are conducted in a 
                                                
47 Brunkhorst argues that solidarity and democracy are inextricably linked. See H. Brunkhorst, ‘Solidarity: From 
Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community’ (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005), p. 172. 
48 A. Heritier, ‘Elements of democratic legitimation in Europe: an alternative perspective’ 6 Journal of European 
Public Policy (1999), p. 278, and Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 208 and 256. 
49 Article 38 of the German Grundgesetz.  
50 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 399. 
51 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 210. 
52 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 212 and 270. 
53 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 213 and 270. 
54 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 250. 
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space of public and free opinion-forming.55 Any government established through such election 
must moreover be sure to represent the will of the majority of the electorate,56 and be 
counteracted by an unhindered opposition that may come into force upon a shift of the 
electorate’s opinion.57 It is evident that the European Union does not meet these requirements. 
The limited powers of the EP, as the body representing the European electorate,58 the insulation 
of the European executive and the agenda-setting from the vote,59 the digressively proportionate 
composition of the EP,60 and consequently its incapacity to guarantee simple majority decision 
making,61 the absence of genuine European political parties,62 the limited political participation 
in European elections,63 and the absence of a European public sphere,64 all severely restrict the 
legitimacy of Europe’s potential assumption of welfare competences.  
 
The second institutional problem faced by the Union follows from its lack of a robust political 
space. As Brunkhorst has convincingly argued, such structures are indispensible in producing 
(or, less cynically, capturing) the feelings of solidarity that exist in a polity.65 And while it may 
be true that we are “linked with each other through trade, commerce, literature, language, music, 
arts, entertainment, religion, medicine, healthcare, politics, news reports, media 
communication”,66 the kind of general, long-term, undisputed, thick solidarity that sustains 
actual, positive welfare entitlements, cannot be found or administrated in such transnational 
settings. This is both an empirical claim (Europe generates less ‘thick’ solidarity than its 
constituent parts) and a normative claim (the Union should not take up a redistributive agenda 
for fear that it is much less capable than its Member States in providing the preconditions for its 
citizens to live a ‘good life’).  The absence of a transnational solidarity ‘thick’ enough to sustain 
transnational welfare policies more ambitious than aiming to mitigate the most egregious of 
                                                
55 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 213, 250, 268, and 270. 
56 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 209, 210, 250, and 270. 
57 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 213, 268, and 270. 
58 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 284 and 286. 
59 P. Dann, ‘European Parliament and Executive Federalism: Approaching a Parliament in a Semi-Parliamentary 
Democracy’ 9 ELJ (2003), p. 558-560, see also Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 270 and 
280.  
60 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 277 and 280. 
61 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 280 and 284. 
62 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 280. 
63 The most recent EP election (in 2009) had a voter turnout of 43% on average, taking into account that in two 
Member States voting is compulsory. 
64 H. Brunkhorst, ‘Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community’ (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005), 
p.119ff, and D. Grimm, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’ (1995) 1 ELJ, p. 293-4. 
65 H. Brunkhorst, ‘Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community’ (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005). 
66 A. Sen, ‘The Idea of Justice’, (Penguin, London, 2010), p. 172-3. 
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suffering has indeed been welcomed by those who seek an antidote to the redistributive nature of 
the national welfare systems.67 Strong normative arguments can be articulated, however, why we 
must stabilise the national welfare state’s capacity to generate positive welfare entitlements. 
Simply put, such entitlements allow us to live lives which freedom alone does not allow for.68 If 
the EU is to conform to the demands of social justice, it must relinquish welfare policies to the 
nation state. Given that such policies are based on a reciprocal limitation of the individual’s 
freedom, and establish a communal insurance against life’s risks, as well as the communal 
provision of certain services, their effectiveness presupposes both a substantial moral and 
financial redistributive effort by those participating. This effort in sharing one’s resources with 
other citizens is, bluntly put, more effective when people feel more connected to each other – 
whether couched in entho-cultural terms or (more convincingly) in terms of participation in 
collective spaces of democratic self-determination.69 The nation state, with its shared cultural, 
linguistic or religious heritage, as well as the centrifugal force of its political community of 
fate,70 is particularly capable of generating solidarity ties ‘thick’ enough to sustain the 
preconditions for effective sharing and morally justifying large inter-personal redistributive 
transfers.71 A transnational articulation would, in other words, be sub-optimal as it partially robs 
citizens to harness solidarity as an instrument to improve their own, and by proxy each other’s 
chances of living a ‘good life’. The BverfG briefly touches upon this where it argues that the 
development a ‘just’ social condition presupposes a degree of vertical identification. As long as 
the patterns of vertical and horizontal identification and interaction that underlie the 
determination of welfare policy remain inextricably tied up with national characteristics such as 
a shared language, culture, and history; social policies cannot be transferred to the European 
level: 
‘[e]ven if due to the great successes of European integration, a joint European public 
that engages in an issue-related cooperation in the rooms of resonance of their 
respective states is evidently growing, [..] it cannot be overlooked [..] that the public 
perception of factual issues and of political leaders remains connected to a 
considerable extent to patterns of identification which are related to the nation-state, 
                                                
67 See A. Somek, ‘The Social Question in a Transnational Context’, 39 LEQS (2011).  
68 See for more section 1.3.3. 
69 See on the latter H. Brunkhorst, ‘Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community’ (Cambridge, 
MIT Press, 2005), in particular chapter 3.  
70 David Miller convincingly argues that only imaginary communities of fate, such as the nation state with its 
symbols and myths, can generates ties ‘thick’ enough to allow for efficient redistribution. See D. Miller, ‘On 
Nationality’ (Oxford, OUP, 1995) chapters 2 and 3; D. Miller, ‘Citizenship and National Identity’ (Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 2000), p. 31-32. 
71 A. Somek, ‘Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European citizenship’ (2007) 32 ELRev, p. 813-815, and D. 
Chalmers, ‘Gauging the cumbersomeness of EU Law’ LEQS Paper 02/2009, p. 18-21. 
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language, history and culture. The principle of democracy [..] therefore require[s] to 
factually restrict the transfer and exercise of sovereign powers to the European Union 
in a predictable manner particularly in central political areas of the space of personal 
development and the shaping of the circumstances of life by social policy.’72 
 
This claim, arguing that the legitimacy of social policy elaboration is directly correlated with the 
strength of the identification between polity and demos, makes sense. As discussed above, 
vertical democratic identification implies horizontal solidarity, without which the delivery of the 
communal aspects of social justice would be all but impossible. The second limitation for 
Europe’s social dimension is thus that until its democratic structures become robust enough; it 
cannot engage the bonds of solidarity that exist between its citizens and should therefore not seek 
to develop a criterion of distributive justice.  
 
The structure through which the ideas of social justice are traditionally articulated is thus both 
normatively and institutionally tied up with national processes. Given that the European Union 
cannot reproduce such structures, it appears that the development of policies implementing 
individual and communal perceptions of justice is justly retained on the national level.  
 
1.3 ENTER EUROPE: JUSTICE NORMS BEYOND THE NATION STATE 
Notwithstanding these fundamental limitations to Europe’s capacity to contribute to the 
attainment of the normative objectives of ‘social justice’ and ‘citizen well-being’ pursued by the 
national welfare state, the European Union clearly possesses certain social policy competences,73 
and, as the BverfG highlighted, it must even be social.74 This apparent contradiction between the 
Member States’ clear prerogative in welfare construction and the simultaneous development of 
Europe’s social dimension can be best explained in terms of their respective spatial 
predisposition. Simply put, even if the institutional preconditions for the development of ‘justice’ 
have not shifted from the national level to the European level, the regulatory space in which 
individuals exercise their right to choose how to live a ‘good life’, have increasingly shifted to 
the European level (1.3.1). This gradual shift has highlighted the justice externalities implicit in 
                                                
72 See Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para 251. 
73 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 393. 
74 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 258: “Germany’s participation in the process of 
integration depends, inter alia, on the European Union’s commitment to social principles. Accordingly the Basic 
Law not only safeguards social tasks for the German state union against supranational demands in a defensive 
manner but wants to commit the European public authority to social responsibility in the spectrum of tasks accorded 
to it.” 
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the development of justice norms within the nation state: it is premised on a structural parochial 
bias (1.3.2). At the same time, it has highlighted the need for the European Union to protect the 
stability and sustainability of welfare entitlements on the national level from destructuring 
transnational pressures (1.3.3). The following sections will elaborate on these three immanent 
transnational claims of justice, which, together, offer an insight into how justice can be 
elaborated beyond the nation state without renouncing the commitment to the vast transfer of 
resources that typifies the national welfare state.  
 
1.3.1 FREE MOVEMENT AS A COMMITMENT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
The first way in which the European Union serves the demands of justice is by extending 
individual choices beyond the confines of political boundaries. As such, it offers a new 
dimension to the opportunity of citizens to live their lives in accordance with their own 
normative preferences. From the start of the integration process, the most dynamic and pervasive 
provisions of EU law have been the free movement provisions, which allowed factors of 
production (and in a later stage, citizens) to move around freely throughout the territories of the 
Member States. This logic of free movement originally served as an instrument to take the sting 
out of nationalism,75 and it has always been understood as a tool to increase economic 
efficiency.76 Increasingly, however, it is conceived as an instrument to generate citizen well-
being and increase justice. Rights to free movement provide a ‘trampoline’ for individuals to 
vault over the limitations imposed by the national decision-making process.77 As such, they 
liberate the individual from ‘his’ political community and encourage him to choose to pursue his 
own interpretation of a ‘good life’, wherever that may lie.78  
 
The justice claim inherent in free movement is that it – much like the whole integration project – 
unshackles behaviour from the limitations of national decision-making and the limitations on 
individual aspirations imposed by that political community. This liberating effect lies in the fact 
that – since individual preferences are incomplete, must allow for future changes of mind, and 
                                                
75 See M. P. Maduro, ‘Reforming the Market or The State? Article 30 and the European Constitution’ 3 ELJ (1997), 
p. 62; where he discusses the “inevitable connection between the aims of individual freedom and the avoidance of 
nationalism”. 
76 M. P. Maduro, ‘European Constitutionalism and Three Models of Social Europe’, in: M. Hesselink (ed.), ‘The 
Politics of a European Civil Code’,(Den Haag, Kluwer, 2006), p. 128-9. 
77 T. Kingreen, ‘Fundamental Freedoms’, in: A. Von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), ‘Principles of European 
Constitutional Law’ (Oxford, Hart, 2008), p. 561. 
78 See Adrian Favell for a passionate recount of the many ways in which free movement had liberated Europeans 
from the limits of their home state: ‘Eurostars and Eurocities’, (Oxford, Blackwell, 2008). 
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are abstracted through the political process79 – one national political process can never fully 
reflect the normative demands placed by an individual on the institutional elaboration of his 
needs and desires. As Amartya Sen’s work on the concept of justice suggest, living a ‘good life’ 
is not only about social entitlements, it is also about the possibility of making valued choices in 
life:  
“in assessing our lives, we have reason to be interested not only in the kind of lives we 
manage to lead, but also in the freedom that we actually have to choose between 
different styles and ways of living”.80  
“Our motives [for living any particular life] are for us to choose – not, of course, 
without reason, but unregimented by the authoritarianism of some context-independent 
axioms or by the need to conform to some canonical specification of “proper” 
objectives and values. The latter would have had the effect of arbitrarily narrowing 
permissible “reasons for choice”, and this certainly can be the source of a substantial 
“unfreedom” in the form of an inability to use one’s reason to decide about one’s 
values and choices”.81 
 
The free movement provisions translate the importance of individual choice to the European 
context and institutionally entrench it. As Weiler and Lockhart have put it: 
 “[p]art of the Community ethos (..) lies in the important civilizing effect [which] (..) is 
achieved through the intended inability of Member States, practical and legal, to 
screen off different social choices, legally sanctioned, in other Member States.”82  
 
The extension of opportunities and choices for Europe’s citizens beyond those offered within the 
national context, in other words, is ‘just’ because it expands the capacity of citizens to be free. 
This insight from social choice theory, which focuses on ranking available realisations in terms 
of their relevance for the individual’s (‘good’) life, shows how limited the nationally-bounded 
conception of justice is. It fails to accommodate the irreducible plurality of conceptions of ‘the 
good’ beyond allowing citizens to vote.83 The rights to free movement serve to overcome this 
limitation and extend the potential scope for individual choice beyond a Member States’ spatial 
boundaries. 
 
                                                
79 See A. Sen, ‘Rationality and Freedom’, (Harvard, HUP, 2002), p. 77. 
80 A. Sen, ‘The Idea of Justice’, (London, Penguin, 2010), p. 227. See also J. Griffin, ‘On Human Rights’ (Oxford, 
OUP, 2008), p. 167. 
81 A. Sen, ‘Rationality and Freedom’, (Harvard, HUP, 2002), p. 5-6 
82 J. Weiler and N. Lockhart, ‘Taking Right’s seriously’ seriously: The European Court of Justice and its fundamental 
rights jurisprudence 32 CMLR (1995), p. 604.  
83 Such variations are important given that we can never predict how different citizens will value the same outcome, 
even if they have voted for it. See on this problem of subjectivity: T. Nagel, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, 83 The 
Philosophical Review (1974), p.  441-3. 
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This logic of opportunity and choice underlies, of course, the construction of the European 
economic constitution. The fact that a toy lawfully produced in Hungary is to be allowed on the 
Finnish market can be (and has been) perceived as merely streamlining economic regulation of 
the internal market, but also contains a strong aspirational claim. A producer of toy soldiers in 
Budapest is all of a sudden allowed to market his toy soldiers freely throughout all the Member 
States. Equally, a service provider from Estonia can freely provide services throughout Europe, 
and a British patient can choose to get her hip replaced in France. Examples in the social sphere 
are not difficult to find. A Belgian student, for example, can no longer exercise his right to 
university education within Belgian universities, but can move to London to pursue his 
education. After all, why limit a student’s choices of universities to the level, language, nature or 
intellectual predisposition of the universities on the Belgian territory, when the Union’s 
unrivalled diversity allows a prospective student to make so many other informed choices, better 
tailored to meet his aspirations?84 
 
This more aspirational interpretation of the rights to free movement is also strongly reflected in 
the Court’s attitude towards the right of all Union citizens to move throughout the Union. Article 
21 TFEU reflects this right:   
 “Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in 
the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect.” 
 
The limitations and conditions to which Article 21 TFEU refers can be found in the string of 
directives enacted in early 90s, which essentially conditioned free movement upon the citizen not 
making use of the welfare system of the host Member State.85 This way, it was thought, the 
extension of free movement beyond the ‘market citizen’ would not produce unreasonable 
burdens on the national welfare systems. In essence, it extended the aspirational promise of 
Europe to cover ‘rich’ Europeans, excluding those who did not have enough resources to sustain 
themselves while resident in other Member Stats. Over the course of fifteen years, however, the 
Court consistently lowered this threshold by widening the personal and material scope of Article 
21 TFEU, and by insisting on the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality in its 
                                                
84 Cf. the language of the Court used in Bressol, where it held that the “opportunity for students coming from other 
Member States to gain access to higher education” constitutes the “very essence of the principle of free movement of 
students” which is protected by the Treaty. See Case C-73/08, Bressol [2010] ECR I-2735, para. 79, emphasis added. 
85 Articles 1 to Directive 90/364, Directive 90/365 and Directive 93/96; now recast as Article 8 (4) of Directive 
2004/38. 
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application.86 The requirements of sufficient resources and sickness insurance, central in the 
attempt of the directives to protect the national welfare state, are relegated, through the 
application of the principle of proportionality, to simple formal requirements that citizens can 
easily meet (and even circumvent).87 More stringent requirements imposed by Member States 
have been consistently invalidated by reference to the unconditional character of Article 21 
TFEU,88 as have attempts to mitigate this lack of welfare protection by expelling foreign citizens 
making claims on the national welfare state.89 The Court thus interpreted Union citizenship as a 
new individual freedom to be protected by the European constitutional order. In this view, as 
highlighted by Benhabib:  
“crossing borders and seeking entry into different polities [becomes] (…) an 
expression of human freedom and the search for human betterment in a world which 
we have to share with our fellow human beings”.90  
 
Indeed, recent case law of the Court emphasises its desire to insulate the right to residence, as a 
corollary of the exercise of free movement, against the unilateral capacity of Member States to 
limit the aspirations of European citizens. Once a Union citizen is legally ‘installed’ in another 
Member State – that is, once the threshold of sufficient resources is met – the right of residence 
cannot be lost by a subsequent loss of resources.91 In other words, the aspirational promise of 
Europe led to a significant change in national migration policies, at least as far as Union citizens 
are concerned: once legally installed, their right to residence behaves autonomously from their 
economic status. It is individual choice, primarily, which dictates the rights of European citizens 
to move and live in another Member State. This emphasis on choice and opportunity, allowing 
                                                
86 See for example Case C-413/99, Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091, or Case C-408/03, Commission v Belgium [2006] 
ECR I-2647. See more generally M. Dougan, ‘The Constitutional dimension of the case law on Union citizenship’, 
31 ELRev (2006), p. 613 – 641. 
87 R. Bellamy, ‘The Liberty of the Post-Moderns? Market and Civic Freedom within the EU’ LEQS Paper Series 
1/2009, p. 17-18. Arguably the practical result of cases like Grzelczyk and Commission v. Belgium is that a migrant 
Union citizen must simply declare that he/she will not immediately become a burden on the welfare state. Such 
declaration may be based on non-personal or temporary financial support. See Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk [2001] ECR 
I-6193 and Case C-408/03, Commission v Belgium [2006] ECR I-2647. 
88 See M. Dougan, ‘The Constitutional dimension of the case law on Union citizenship’, 31 ELRev (2006), p. 613 – 
641, and A. Somek, ‘Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European citizenship'’32 ELRev (2007), p. 795. 
89 See A. Somek, 'Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European citizenship' (2007) 32 ELRev, p. 796-7, and 
Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para. 42-43, and Case C-456/02, Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, para. 
45. 
90 S. Benhabib, ‘Rights of Others’ (Cambridge, CUP, 2004), p. 177. Within the EU, however, the reason for mobility 
seems to be no longer economic necessity but choice. See A. Favell, ‘Eurostars and Eurocities’ (Blackwell, Oxford, 
2008), p. 84ff.  
91 See Case C-310/08, Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065, and Case C-480/08, Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107. The Court may 
give further indications in a similar case which is pending at the moment. See Joined Cases C-147/11 and C-148/11, 
Czop and Punakova (pending). 
 44 
Union citizens to move to the state in which they think their ‘good life’ can be found, is the first 
justice claim which is implicit in Europe’s make-up.  
 
1.3.2 NON-DISCRIMINATION AS A DEMAND OF EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 
The opening up of spatial boundaries for all Union citizens has highlighted a more systemic 
problem of justice in the European Union. Simply put, the development of justice within 
segregated political units is strongly contingent on the procedural demand of equal citizenship, 
which is guaranteed by attaching political rights to the status of citizenship. This mechanism 
ensures that each citizen’s needs and desires are equally incorporated within the development of 
the norms which govern society and that such norms are free from bias in favour of certain 
groups in society. At the same time, it excludes non-members from the political process 
altogether, allowing for the exact bias that the political process was meant to prevent. To use 
familiar vocabulary, migrant Union citizens are taxed without being represented in the political 
process. EU law counters this risk and reinstates the principle of equal citizenship by attaching a 
right to non-discrimination to the individual exercise of the rights to free movement. Through the 
back door, this is meant to prevent parochial biases in national decision-making and to ensure the 
inclusion of excluded interests in the national political process. 
 
Free movement challenges the traditional conception of political citizenship and democratic 
representation.92 While migrant Union citizens obtain electoral rights for municipal and 
European elections,93 they do not obtain the right to vote in nation-wide, general elections. The 
latter, however, are indisputably the most crucial when assessed from the perspective of the 
incorporation of the individuals’ needs and desires within the way society is structured, even in 
federal states. In other words, only Dutch nationals get to vote on what is ‘just’ within the Dutch 
territory, even though it has an effect on the lives, needs and desires of non-national residents. 
This disconnect between the subjects and objects of rule is problematic in a procedural sense, but 
even more so in the development of welfare policies. Given that such policies already express 
nationally-bound solidarities, the procedural exclusion of non-nationals risks creating a 
substantive normative bias which discriminates non-nationals in access to social entitlements. 
                                                
92 C. Joppke, ‘Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity’, 11 Citizenship Studies (2007), p. 38. 
93 Article 20 (2)(b) TFEU. 
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The very requirement for effective redistribution on the national level – political deliberation by 
insiders – thus creates injustice when perceived from the transnational perspective.  
 
The second way in which EU law enhances ‘justice’ within Europe is by forcing the inclusion of 
excluded interest within national decision-making. As Joppke has correctly identified, it is the 
liberal-democratic principle – which requires congruence between the subjects and objects of 
rule – that plays a central role here.94 The justification for the development of a European 
dimension of social justice, then, is to re-establish the essential procedural notion that the 
development of justice norms be guided by objective criteria free from parochial bias.95 Kumm 
helps to explain:  
“on a high level of abstraction it is possible to state a relatively uncontentious 
criterion: The structure, composition, and practices of political institutions must 
reflect a commitment to free and equal citizenship. It is clear that a process which 
entrenches structures that tend to privilege a particular class of actors in each 
jurisdiction does not fulfil this requirement. […] The structural bias provides a reason 
– a weak prima facie case, not a conclusive reason – for the federal legislator to 
consider intervention.” 96 
 
The most evident solution to the problem of ‘exclusionary neglect’ is simply to extend national 
electoral rights to ‘outsiders’ that reside in other Member States. That way, impartiality would be 
restored within each Member State, allowing citizens to move, vote and participate in the 
outcomes wherever they wish. Yet, the full equalisation of migrants with nationals in terms of 
political rights remains very problematic, for both normative and political reasons. Tying 
electoral rights to residence somewhat dissolves the bond between membership and the nation 
state, which asks fundamental questions about the role of collectivities in the expression of state 
sovereignty, and about the role of the integration process, which the EU is not willing to ask (or 
answer). In addition, much resistance is to be expected by national institutional actors, as it 
                                                
94 C. Joppke, ‘Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity’, 11 Citizenship Studies (2007), p. 40. 
95 At the conceptual basis of each theory of justice lies a demand of impartiality on its elaboration. Rawls’ ‘veil of 
ignorance’, Sen’s focus on public deliberation and rational scrutiny, or Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’ are all attempts 
to ensure that decisions be free from biases and prejudices, equally incorporate everyone’s views, and be based on 
objective reasoning. See specifically A. Sen, ‘The Idea of Justice’ (Harvard, HUP, 2009), p. 138-152 and p. 54 where 
he argues that the foundational idea of fairness and justice: “must be a demand to avoid bias in our evaluations, 
taking note of the interests and concerns of others as well, and in particular the need to avoid being influenced by 
our respective vested interests, or by our personal priorities or eccentricities or prejudices. It can broadly be seen as 
a demand for impartiality.”  
96 See M. Kumm, ‘Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco Regulation in the 
European Union’ 12 ELJ (2006), p. 513-514, even though his argument dealt with the scope of (what is now) Article 
114 TFEU. 
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fundamentally changes the perception of what the ‘state’ is for. Rather than the institutional 
reflection of a demos, and the container of certain (ethno-cultural and historical) intangible 
values associated with membership to a political community, the nation state would become 
more of an instrument for the effective realisation of functional demands. Consider the example 
of Luxembourg, in which migrant Union citizens make up 33,5% of the (potential) electorate.97 
Extending voting right to such citizens may or may not have a (large) impact on decisions 
concerning taxation, migration, or nuclear energy. What is more problematic, however, from a 
constitutional perspective, is how it would affect answers to the question if the Grand-Duc 
should remain the head of state, or whether Luxembourg should form a new republic with 
Wallonia and parts of Germany. Opening political participation to all residents destabilises the 
basic assumption that collective self-determination is a not just a tool for the functional 
construction of society but also for the elaboration and constant normative reiteration of what the 
nation state ‘means’ to its citizens. Polities not only facilitate but also contain normative claims. 
Allowing ‘non-members’ to participate in answering such questions pierces through this status 
quo, which is, as we saw before, particularly useful in solidifying ties of solidarity.98 At the same 
time, not extending electoral rights may also seem unjust. Surely someone who has lived in 
Luxembourg for six years should both be able to decide how his taxes are spent, and, in 
particular, have access to the social structures he helps to finance? If not taken seriously, the 
‘exclusionary neglect’ of the national political process could severely hamper the individual 
migrant’s capacity to make use of his aspirational rights to free movement and at the same time 
still enjoy positive welfare entitlements to – say – education, healthcare or disability benefits.  
 
The European Union has found a remarkably easy solution to this problem. Instead of extending 
political rights to non-members, EU law offers them a right to non-discrimination during their 
stay in the host state. Whenever a Union citizen finds himself in another Member State, he must 
be treated as an equal as nationals of the host state. In other words, his needs and desires are not 
incorporated in the construction of society by ex-ante participation in the political process, but by 
ex-post access to whatever the nationals consider ‘just’ and ‘fair’. These rights to non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality are laid down in Regulation 1612/68, Directive 
2004/38, Article 18 TFEU, and have been read into the ‘five’ freedoms. The choice to move to 
                                                
97 Assuming an equal proportion of minors among Luxembourgers and nationals of other EU Member States. See for 
numbers: http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=587. 
98 See for a good discussion: R. Baubock, ‘Why European Citizenship?’ 8 Theoretical Inquiries into Law (2007), p. 
471-480. 
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another Member State is thus accompanied by a guarantee that the migrant can access those 
social entitlements which the citizens of the host state consider necessary for themselves to live a 
‘good life’, and which serve to alleviate their needs and accommodate their desires.  
 
By way of the principle of non-discrimination EU law becomes an instrument of corrective 
justice, correcting the distributive outcomes on the national level to account for the aspirations of 
those excluded from participation in the national decision making process. Azoulai calls this the 
review function of EU free movement law, which:  
“helps the Member States to “recontextualise” the decision-making process at 
national level to force them to take account of interests coming from or situations in 
other Member States, which are not only interests of firms but also of citizens, 
workers or students”99 
 
Equal access to the outcome of the political process, thus, goes some way towards both this  
incorporation of the needs and desires of outsiders,100 and towards teasing out national parochial 
biases, as it forces Member States to take account of the individuals beyond their closed circle of 
‘membership’ who will be eligible for the same rights and entitlements as members.101 Properly 
understood, then, the principle of non-discrimination is a political right to representation that 
serves to internalise extraterritorial effects.102 Maduro has already alluded to this within the 
scope of the free movement of goods,103 but its use seems even more fundamental in the realm of 
the free movement of persons. The principle of non-discrimination thus seems to mitigate the 
exclusionary force of the idea of political membership that drives decision-making on the 
national level, and re-establishes the basic notion that all residents are equal.  
 
1.3.3 THE NEED TO STABILISE DISTRIBUTIVE COMMITMENTS 
In constructing the free movement provisions as an instrument to integrate transnational forms of 
justice within national social policies, however, the European Union faces a very complicated 
                                                
99 L. Azoulai, ‘The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy: The Emergence of an Ideal and the 
Conditions for its Realisation’ 45 CMLR (2008), p. 1342-3. 
100 Cf. Somek who argues that “so long as outsiders are not discriminated against they can be said to be virtually 
represented in the political process”. See A. Somek, ‘The Argument from Transnational Effects I’, 16 ELJ (2010), 
p. 323. 
101 L. Azoulai, ‘The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy: The Emergence of an Ideal and the 
Conditions for its Realisation’ 45 CMLR (2008), p. 1342-3. 
102 See C. Joerges, ‘European Law as Conflict of Laws’ in C. Joerges and J. Neyer (eds.), ‘Deliberative 
Supranationalism Revisited’, 2006/20 EUI Working Paper, p. 22-23. 
103 M. P. Maduro, ‘We, the Court’ (Oxford, Hart, 1998). 
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task. Much deeper and wider social conflicts lurk behind the simple juxtaposition of the closed 
nature of the national determination of justice and the transnational demand of free movement 
and non-discrimination.104 A powerful narrative exists in both political and academic circles that 
argues that the EU free movement and non-discrimination rights have dislocated ‘the social’ 
from the national level. Properly understood, this narrative highlights that such rights impose a 
political and moral challenge to the sustainability of the positive welfare entitlements that are 
generated and sustained by the national welfare state. It seems that justice itself demands the 
insulation of such national distributive arrangements. The third demand of justice that emerges at 
the European level, then, suggest that it is for EU law to stabilise the sustainability of national 
welfare entitlements.   
 
To put it simply – the effectiveness of free movement and non-discrimination as instruments in 
extending the capacity of individuals to live a ‘good life’ is dependent (even parasitic) on the 
actual availability of positive welfare entitlements. EU law can entitle an Italian migrant to equal 
access to German universities, but if the German electorate does not wish to financially or 
morally sustain such structures, the claim of justice on the basis of EU law is utterly 
meaningless. But exactly this is the potential effect of free movement. Simply extending, say, a 
right to unemployment benefit to all unemployed Union citizens who reside to Sweden without 
regard to how such benefits are sustained and legitimised, may lead to the Swedish electorate 
deciding to no longer financially support unemployment benefits. As Bellamy put it:  
“whether justified or not, citizens have demanded governments pursue politics that 
guard against putative welfare ‘scroungers’ and have been sensitive to ‘economic’ 
immigration if that is felt to detract from the employment opportunities available to 
existing citizens or to place additional burdens on social services such as housing, 
hospitals, schools without any compensating gain in tax revenue towards their 
maintenance and improvement” 105 
 
If citizens evaluate a certain claim as extending solidarity and reciprocity to those who do not 
‘deserve it’, they may simply be inclined to reduce their own (no longer reciprocated) 
commitments to communal sharing.106 The real problem, then, is that demands of non-
                                                
104 F. De Witte, ‘Transnational Solidarity and the Mediation of Conflicts of Justice’ 18 ELJ (2012), forthcoming. 
105 R. Bellamy, ‘The Liberty of the Post-Moderns? Market and Civic Freedom within the EU’, LEQS Paper 1/2009, 
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Democracy’ (Cambridge, CUP, 2004).  
106 See A. Falk and U. Fischbacher, ‘A Theory of Reciprocty’, CESifo WP No 457 (2001), p. 3-4 for a theoretical 
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discrimination risk limiting the willingness of national citizens to sustain the positive welfare 
entitlements that are instrumental to any conception of ‘the good life’.  
 
To this practical need to insulate the capacity and willingness of national citizens to sustain 
positive welfare entitlements we can add a normative element. As Sen has put it: 
“[w]hy should we regard hunger, starvation and medical neglect to be invariably 
less important than the violation of any kind of personal liberty?”107  
 
If we take the capacity of individuals to live a ‘good life’ as central to our conceptions of justice, 
it seems we must be primarily concerned with what we are actually able to do, rather than what 
we can potentially do. Even though we are all free to jump from London to Madrid, in the sense 
that no one is preventing us from doing so, we are evidently not able to do so.108 Any conception 
of freedom or justice, it would appear, requires us to incorporate our respective ability to enjoy 
those things in life that we value. Those values can be realised only:  
“if [individuals] also have access to and enjoy a bundle of rights and entitlements 
which are necessary for them to lead lives of human dignity and autonomy”.109  
 
In other words, positive welfare entitlements are important because they enable us to live a type 
of life which freedom alone would not allow for. Given that the Union, however, can neither (at 
the moment) generate the solidarity, nor administer such positive welfare entitlements, and that 
its justice claims are parasitic on the presence of positive welfare entitlements on the national 
level, the sustainability of such entitlements becomes a matter for EU law. Unless we consider 
transnational cooperation as an antidote against redistributive arrangements on the national level, 
as Hayekian scholars tend to do, it is argued that transnational norms have to allow for the 
effective elaboration of such arrangements and stabilise the connections of reciprocity that 
sustain them. This requires not only the insulation of national solidaristic and reciprocal 
commitments but also the prevention of capture by way of free movement and non-
discrimination. Several studies have shown that the actual exercise of free movement rights 
contains significant distortions and asymmetries, which are both the result of the use of EU law 
by repeat players and private litigants,110 and the way in which rights to movement operate.111 
                                                
107 A. Sen, ‘The Idea of Justice’, (Penguin, London, 2010), p. 65. 
108 Example stolen from Raymond Plant’ plenary address at the IGLRC, King’s College London, 7th April 2011. 
109 S. Benhabib, ‘Rights of Others’ (Cambridge, CUP, 2004), p.  111. 
110 M. P. Maduro, ‘European Constitutionalism and Three Models of Social Europe’, in: M. Hesselink (ed.), ‘The 
Politics of a European Civil Code’,(Kluwer, Den Haag, 2006), p. 130. Fligstein shows that those exercising their 
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Given that national policies automatically incorporate such asymmetries (as a result of the 
obligations of non-discrimination), it structurally favours (in the most general terms) the much 
more mobile capital and the richer citizens over immobile labour and poorer citizens by making 
policy choices which go against the interests of such mobile actors unavailable. This process has 
been described in company law,112 labour law,113 and regulation of the marketing of goods114 - 
where policy outcomes are structurally biased towards the interests of global (and mobile) 
capital. This same trend is visible in access to social entitlements such as education, where   
“the reality is that (poor and usually non-mobile) taxpayers from the host countries 
are supporting the education of (middle class) students from other Member States 
with whom they share little by way of community of interests”.115  
 
The paradox is thus that allegedly non-represented external interests become over-represented in 
the elaboration of the just distribution of scarce resources. The core of the argument, then, is that 
free movement and non-discrimination combine to pose a threat to the social and political 
conditions of individual self-expression and self-determination.116 Even if redistribution may not 
be inherent in the Union’s perception of justice, respecting its articulations on the national level 
clearly is. Destabilising such practices in the name of aspirational movement is therefore doubly 
unjust – as it potentially limits the availability of the positive welfare entitlements that are 
essential for citizens to live ‘good lives’, as well as their capacity of collective (political) self-
determination. The third immanent justice claim that emerges on the transnational level, then, is 
that the stability of national welfare entitlements is indispensable for the development of a tiered 
European ethics of justice.  
 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to break down the complexity of Europe’s social dimension in order 
to distil hoe to best develop justice beyond the nation state without renouncing on the 
                                                                                                                                            
rights under free movement are mostly professional, white collar, middle-class citizens. See N. Fligstein, ‘Euro-
Clash: The EU, European Identity and the Future of Europe’ (Oxofrd, OUP, 2010), p. 170-186.  
111 F. Scharpf, ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration, or: why the EU cannot be a ‘social market economy’’, 8 
Socioeconomic Review (2010), p. 218-20. 
112 S. Deakin, ‘Reflexive Harmonisation and European Company Law’, 15 ELJ (2009), p. 224ff. 
113 S. Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition after Laval’, 10 CYELS (2008), p. 581-609. 
114 M. P. Maduro, ‘We, the Court’, (Oxford, Hart, 1998), p. 141-3.  
115 C. Barnard, ‘EU Citizenship and the Principle of Solidarity’, in: M. Dougan and E. Spaventa (eds.), ‘Social 
Welfare and EU Law’, (Oxford, Hart, 2005), p. 178. 
116 F. Scharpf, ‘Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity’ 1 European Political Science Review (2009), p. 173ff; 
S. Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition after Laval’, 10 CYELS (2008), p. 581-609; or A. Somek, ‘The Social Question 
in a Transnational Context’ 37 LEQS (2011). 
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redistributive commitment that underlies the national welfare state. The picture that emerges is 
one that is both institutionally and normatively tiered. On the one hand, Member States remain 
the most legitimate locus for the generation and distribution of well-being and material 
resources. The national welfare state, and the mechanisms ensuring its smooth functioning as the 
institutional instrument for the mediation between different social justice claims, are still 
strongly reliant on national processes, and therefore produce a distinct national ‘flavour’ of 
justice. At the same time, the European Union has, without challenging the primary mandate of 
the national welfare state in the elaboration of welfare policy, developed its own transnational 
claims of justice, which centre on increasing the individual’s autonomy, incorporating external 
interests within national political processes, and stabilising national distributive balances. The 
further elaboration of these claims of justice requires a contextualised analysis of what it is 
exactly that Member States owe citizens from other Member States. The following chapter offers 
a framework for such an analysis in the form of a theory of transnational solidarity, which serves 
to connect the unparalleled capacity of the national welfare state to generate and sustain the 
willingness to redistribute scarce resources with the different ways in which the European Union 
contributes to the capacity of its citizens to live a ‘good life’. 
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2 THE THREE WORLDS OF TRANSNATIONAL SOLIDARITY 
This chapter formulates a framework for the institutionalisation and implementation of the 
diverse justice claims that exist in Europe. It suggests that the concept of transnational solidarity 
can serve to bridge the institutional and normative divide between the ideas of justice that 
emanate from the national welfare state and those that were identified in the previous chapter to 
exist on the European level. In doing so, it can ensure that, together, both projects cooperate to 
allow citizens to pursue their ‘good life’ throughout the Union while at the same time stabilising 
access to positive welfare entitlements. The transnational solidarities do so by articulating and 
institutionalising the normative assumptions that are implicit in the Union’s functioning. Three 
types of transnational solidarity can be traced in the European Union. They emerge when we look 
at the different dimensions of the Union. If we look at the relationship between individuals on the 
European market, we find implicit notions of market solidarity, which seek to extrapolate the 
rights and obligations that are created by the mutually advantageous division of labour on that 
market (2.1). The European Union, however, is also a political community. As such, it engenders 
claims of communitarian solidarity, which reflect the rights that Union citizens derive from their 
status as a member to the European political community alone (2.2). Finally, the European Union 
is also an aspirational structure. Its ambition to provide a better life for its citizens has 
engendered an ill-defined type of aspirational solidarity, which argues that Member States 
should not limit the capacity of citizens to make use of the opportunities provided by the free 
movement provisions (2.3). Together, the three types of transnational solidarity explain and 
govern the interpretation of primary and secondary legislation, and are therefore not trapped in 
such provisions. While this chapter traces the theoretical background and legal development of 
each of the three solidarities, the subsequent chapters will offer a more detailed discussion of 
their application, scope and specific realisation within the specific context of healthcare, 
education, social assistance, social security and labour law.    
 
2.1 MARKET SOLIDARITY  
The primary policy objective of European integration was the creation of a single market. It was 
thought that by intertwining the economies of the different Member States political conflict could 
be minimised and economic productivity increased. As in any market, however, the interaction of 
market actors on the new European market needed to be normatively embedded, so that the 
outcome of market transactions would be socially acceptable. This takes place by 
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institutionalising the rights and obligations of solidarity that emerge almost spontaneously as a 
result of the mutual interdependence between market actors. On the national level the political 
system has served as a conductor for the institutionalisation of such demands of market 
solidarity. The Union, however, has always had limited competences to directly ‘socialise’ the 
market and incorporate a truly transnational concept of market solidarity. Despite this lack of 
legislative competences, the Union legislator and the Court have devised several mechanisms to 
incorporate the normative commitments that an integrated and transnational market engenders.   
 
For the functional division of labour on a market to work properly, a degree of solidarity is 
indispensable. Durkheim has conceptualised this as ‘spontaneous’ or ‘organic’ solidarity, which 
results from the interdependencies between actors and the mutually advantageous nature of their 
transactions.1 Bluntly put, it entails that the butcher and the brewer, by exchanging the goods that 
they produce, enter into a fictitious relationship which is not only governed by the financial 
transaction between them, but also by a tacit acknowledgement of their respective obligations 
and rights which ensure that their engagement is stable and remains mutually advantageous.2 In 
negative terms, then, market solidarity serves to ensure that the market relation between such 
market actors is durable (that is, socially acceptable) and mutually advantageous despite the 
power asymmetry that may exist between the actors. Market solidarity thus compensates market 
actors, and in particular the weaker parties to a contract, for their submission to the meritocratic 
logic of the market, and guarantees them a ‘juste retour’ on their engagement with that market. In 
other words, market solidarity, whether in the form of social entitlements or rights to 
participation, is a return for the general acceptance of market structures as determining our social 
structures and quality of life. In consequence, all actors who engage in the division of labour on 
the market automatically accrue right and obligations under market solidarity. 
 
It is hardly surprising that a transnational market requires a degree of transnational market 
solidarity in order to function properly, in both normative and economic terms. Given that the 
spatial enlargement of national markets through economic integration has changed the dynamic 
and structure of, and opportunities generated by, market interactions, the sense of justice and 
solidarity that governs such interactions has changed accordingly. What a European market 
would require, really, is a political system that could internalise what would be considered fair on 
                                                
1 E. Durkheim, ‘The Division of Labour in Society’ (New York, Palgrave, 1984), p. 68-86. 
2 See also A. Smith, ‘An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’ (Oxford, Clarendon, 1976), p. 
26-7. 
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a market without internal political boundaries. The drafters of the Treaty of Rome in fact, while 
acknowledging that almost all social policy competences were to remain in the hands of the 
Member States, already realised that an inter-national market which is not regulated centrally 
could be inefficient and unjust.3 What is ‘just’ in interactions on the national market (and 
therefore institutionalised by national political processes) is simply not necessarily ‘just’ on a 
transnational market (and vice versa). 
 
Yet, a sufficiently robust transnational political system does not exist. Instead, the regulation of 
the market is tiered, partially devised in national capitals and partially in Brussels. This absence 
of centralised political authority has led to the manifestation of many different instruments that 
serve to implement transnational market solidarity. On the most abstract level, such market 
solidarity is reflected in the objectives of the Union, which refer to a ‘social market economy’; 
and in the horizontal clause that calls for the incorporation of social and labour protection in all 
European policies.4 This sense of market solidarity can also be traced on the highest political 
level, where schemes compensate market actors and indeed entire (groups of) Member States for 
the justice externalities of the internal market through the establishment of the CAP,5 Social 
Funds,6 or cohesion funds7 and accession agreements.8 Equally, the bail-outs and establishment 
of structural monetary arrangements are explicitly justified by reference to the interdependence 
between the Member States’ fiscal and economic policies.9 The Union legislator also 
automatically incorporates such market solidarity in its function as market (re-)regulator. Given 
that market regulation cannot take place in a normative vacuum, and is always “about something 
else as well”,10 the regulation of, say, roaming charges or environmental regulation entails 
                                                
3 Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, demanding that Member States introduce the principle that men and women 
receive equal pay for equal work, for example, was premised on the logic that differences in pay-structures within a 
single Member State would upset the dynamics of inter-state integration. See Ohlin Report para. 104-110 and 156. 
4 See Article 9 TFEU. 
5 The Common Agricultural Policy redistributed common resources on the basis of the need to “ensure a fair standard 
of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in 
agriculture”. Article 39 (b) EEC: ‘to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by 
increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture’. 
6 See Article 123 EEC, and its function of ‘rendering the employment of workers easier and of increasing their 
geographical and occupational mobility within the community’.  
7 See Article 174 TFEU: “the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the 
various regions and the backwardness of the least favored regions”. 
8 Through which the Union in essence negotiates access to new markets by the exchanges of vast funds. 
9 The preamble to the new ‘Fiscal Compact’ highlights that the “need for governments to maintain sounds and 
sustainable public finances (..) is of an essential importance to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole”. 
See Article 3 of that same compact for more examples. 
10 B. De Witte, ‘Non-Market Values in Internal Market Legislation’, in: N. Nic Shuibhne (ed.), ‘Regulating the 
Internal Market’ (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006), p. 75. 
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making a normative assessment of the contractual positions and demands of operators and 
consumers in different Member States, and its regulation on the European level therefore 
automatically entails the incorporation of transnational market solidarities.11  
 
The development of market solidarity is more complex and contested in two areas. This 
complexity arises from the institutionally tiered nature of the regulation of the market, and 
highlights the normative and structural tensions that exist between the transnational and national 
interpretation of what it is that market solidarity requires. The first area in which this tension is 
apparent is in the regulation of the interaction between ‘capital’ and ‘labour’. The power 
relationship between these two is asymmetrically skewed in favour of the former. The national 
political process has since long infused norms of market solidarity in order to level out this 
asymmetry and ensure that the relationship between the individual worker and his employer is 
socially acceptable. The dynamics of the integrated European market, and in particular the 
undercurrents of mutual recognition and regulatory competition, however, risk undercutting the 
capacity of national political systems to normatively embed the relationship between ‘capital’ 
and ‘labour’, thereby liberating the former from the constraints of national market solidarity and 
potentially subjecting the worker to unjust working conditions. It is in order to mitigate this 
structural effect – which an integrated market with decentralised regulatory norms almost 
inevitably engenders – that social competences in policy fields directly linked to the regulation of 
the internal market have progressively been transferred to the Union.12 Their exercise on the 
European level serves to bring the interaction between capital and labour back into the realm of 
political contestation – either on the national or the transnational pane.13  
 
The second area in which the implementation of market solidarity has been contested lies in the 
transnational dimension of redistributive welfare policies. In those areas, Member States remain 
in principle completely autonomous: they can freely decide how to redistribute scarce resources 
between their citizens. Yet, the creation of an integrated and transnational market presupposes the 
free circulation of labour; and, logically, the opening up of territorial redistributive arrangements 
                                                
11 See Regulation 717/2007 amending Directive 2002/21 (on roaming charges), as well as the Court’s ruling on the 
validity of the measure, in which it held that: “As is clear (…) the level of retail charges for international roaming 
services, (…) was high and the relationship between costs and prices was not such as would prevail in fully 
competitive markets.” Case C-58/08, Vodafone et al. [2010] ECR I-4999, para. 38-39. 
12 See, for an overview of the gradual transfer of competences D. Damjanovic and B. de Witte, ‘Welfare Integration 
through EU Law: The Overall Picture in the Light of the Lisbon Treaty’, in: U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen and L. 
Roseberry (eds.), ‘Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law’ (Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, 2009), p. 67. 
13 See for a detailed analysis, chapter 6. 
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for migrant workers. Article 51 of the Treaty of Rome already highlighted that it might be 
necessary to coordinate the social entitlements of migrant workers in order to ensure that the 
transnational mobility of labour conforms to ideas of market solidarity.14 It seems quite natural, 
for example, that an Italian worker who is employed in Germany should be entitled to the same 
social benefits as his fellow German workers. Both are engaged in the effective division of labour 
in Germany, and both should derive the same social entitlements from that engagement. There is 
no reason to assume that the Italian is less deserving of the entitlements which reward such 
engagement or serve to protect the dignity and autonomy of the worker inside and outside the 
workplace – whether in the form of minimum wages, healthcare benefits or childcare allowances. 
In this transnational context, then, market solidarity entails that transnational labour mobility 
must be accompanied by access to social entitlements in the host state.  
 
This logic of market solidarity – if an migrant engages with the host state’s economy, he is 
entitled to welfare benefits on equal terms as nationals of that state – has since been elaborated by 
the Union legislator and the Court. In Regulation 1612/68 the Union legislator laid down the 
benchmark for market solidarity: workers have access to the same “social and tax advantages as 
national workers”.15 The Court has interpreted the scope of this provision widely. It has included 
part-time workers and workers who earn less than the minimum level of subsistence within the 
scope of market solidarity:16 
“the concept ‘worker’ (..) has an autonomous meaning specific to European Union 
law and must not be interpreted narrowly. Any person who pursues activities which 
are real and genuine, to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be 
regarded as purely marginal and ancillary, must be regarded as a ‘worker’. The 
essential feature of an employment relationship (..) is that for a certain period of time 
a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return 
for which he receives remuneration.”17 
 
In other words, as long as a migrant engages in the division of labour in the host state, regardless 
of his actual contribution or the nature of his position,18 he has a right to access social benefits 
                                                
14 See Article 51 EEC, which reads: “The Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the 
Commission, shall, in the field of social security, adopt the measures necessary to effect the free movement of 
workers, in particular, by introducing a system which permits an assurance to be given to migrant workers and their 
beneficiaries”. 
15 See Article 7 (2) of Regulation 1612/68.  
16 Case 53/81, Levin [1982] ECR 1035, para. 17, and Case C-413/01, Ninni-Orasche [2003] ECR I-1027, para. 26-29. 
17 Case C-345/09, Van Delft [nyr], para. 89.  
18 See Case C-456/02, Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, para. 16. 
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under market solidarity. This right covers all entitlements short of political rights;19 and even 
extends to cover benefits for dependent family members20 on the basis that a social advantage for 
a dependent family member is automatically an advantage for the worker himself.21  
 
Given that rights accrued under market solidarity are exclusively attached to the engagement of 
the migrant worker with the labour market of the host state, they cannot, logically, be made 
conditional upon residence in that state. Frontier workers, in other words, can still access social 
benefits in their state of employment and even export those entitlements towards their state of 
residence. This has been criticised on two accounts. First, it has been argued that it overlooks the 
economic link between the worker and the state of employment. Since income tax is paid in the 
state of residence rather than in the state of employment,22 the argument runs, the migrant worker 
does not contribute to the public purse in the state of employment, and should not be able to 
obtain benefits paid from that purse. Second, the Court has long rhetorically justified the rights 
under market solidarity in terms of “facilitating the mobility of such workers within the 
Community”,23 and facilitating their “integration in the society of the host country.”24 Frontier 
workers would evidently not require access to social benefits from their state of employment for 
these purposes if they reside in another state. Cases like Meeusen, however, dispel these 
arguments and emphasise that the sole relevant criterion is the economic engagement of the 
migrant worker. In Meeusen, the Court allowed a Belgian student whose parents were Belgian 
nationals and who lived in Belgium but worked in the Netherlands to claim Dutch student 
benefits in order to study in Antwerp.25 The student in question had no personal connection 
whatsoever with the Netherlands, nor had her parents any link beyond economic activity. The 
reason for equal treatment was solely the economic activity in the host state. Economic 
engagement thus functions as a master-key to unlock the closed nature of sharing arrangements 
within the host Member State, regardless of the place of residence. This master-key is delivered 
to migrant workers from the moment that the migrant worker starts to work in the host state. It is 
not premised on financial parity but on the comparative advantage of the division of labour (that 
                                                
19 See for example Case 207/78, Even [1979] ECR 2019; Case C-237/94, O’Flynn [1996] ECR I-2617; or Case 
137/84, Mutsch [1985] ECR 2681, para. 17. See for an overview A.P. Van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Persons 
within the European Community’ (Oxford, Hart, 2003), p. 31-34. 
20 Case 32/75, Cristini [1975] ECR 1085, para. 15, and Case 316/85, Lebon [1987] ECR 2811, para. 2. 
21 Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, para. 26. 
22 See OECD Double Taxation Treaty; available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/27/35363892.pdf 
23 Case 207/78, Even [1979] ECR 2019, para. 22. 
24 Joined Cases 389/87 and 390/87, Echternach and Moritz [1989] ECR 723, para 35. See for a similar argument 
Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, para. 41 and 47-49. 
25 Case C-337/97, Meeusen [1999] ECR I-3289. 
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is, the migrant theoretically plays a role in the generation of national economic welfare in 
accordance with his potential and has a claim to standardised social welfare on that very basis).26 
The Court will soon have the chance to explicitly clarify its position in an infringement procedure 
started against the Netherlands, which requires economically active migrants to have resided on 
the Dutch territory for three out of the previous six years before they are eligible for certain social 
entitlements.27 As AG Sharpston has correctly opined, the imposition of such criterion on 
economically active migrants runs against Article 45 TFEU, which attaches an absolute right to 
equal treatment to the economic activity of the migrant.28 
 
This logic of market solidarity, which attaches full access to welfare benefits to economic 
activity, implies that market solidarity is conditional upon continuous economic activity.29 
Migrant workers may lose such rights as quickly as they accrue them. Generally, and logically in 
light of the political problems which may occur when solidarity is stretched beyond the bounds of 
reciprocity,30 the Court appears reluctant to extend the scope of market solidarity beyond the 
period during which a migrant is actually economically active. After all, the mutually 
advantageous nature that justifies claims of market solidarity is absent once the migrant no longer 
engages in the division of labour in the host state’s economy. Unemployed workers, for example, 
have no right to access social benefits on the basis of market solidarity. They may have rights, 
however, as the next section will argue, under communitarian solidarity as a reflection of their 
past commitment to the host state’s society and their contribution to different systems of social 
insurance.31 
                                                
26 More recently, the Court has muddled its case law by emphasising that, for certain benefits, Member States would 
be allowed to impose a criterion of residence on economically active and economically inactive migrants alike (see, 
for example Case C-213/05, Geven [2007] ECR I-6347). This, as will be highlighted throughout the following 
chapters, is arguably the result of the conflation of the rights which migrant workers derive by virtue of their 
economic engagement, which are absolute, and the rights which economically inactive migrants obtain under 
communitarian solidarity, which may be limited in accordance with the nature and function of a particular social 
good. 
27 Case C-542/09, Commission v Netherlands (pending). 
28 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-542/09, Commission v Netherlands (pending), para. 72ff.  
29 Case C-444/98, De Laat [2001] ECR I-2229, para. 37; Decision U3, OJ C106/45, 2010.  
30 See section 1.3.3. 
31 Until recently, the Court (and later the Union legislator) routinely interpreted the demands of market solidarity 
extensively, so as to protect the worker beyond his period of economic activity. With the emergence of 
communitarian solidarity, however, which allowed for the crystallisation of less absolute but autonomous rights for 
economically inactive migrants, the Court has begun to interpret the scope of market solidarity more restrictively 
(and rightly so): only for as long as a migrant is economically active in a host state can he derive rights to education, 
healthcare or social security and assistance from that state under market solidarity. Some hangovers of the previous 
situation are still to be found, however. The Union legislator, for example, allows a full right to equal treatment for 
workers who are “temporarily unable to work as a result of an illness or accident”, workers who are in “duly recorded 
 59 
 
The first type of transnational solidarity that is implicit in the Union’s normative make-up thus 
serves to ensure that market interactions are ‘fair’. This is done partially by deferring substantive 
decisions to national legislators but extending such decisions to cover migrant workers; and 
partially by the assumption of the legislative capacity to normatively embed the market on the 
supranational level. Both approaches seek to ensure the incorporation of the rights and 
obligations that the mutually advantageous division of labour on a transnational market engender.  
 
2.2 COMMUNITARIAN SOLIDARITY 
The European Union is more than a market alone; it is also a political community. Evidently it 
cannot be compared with the nation state as a container and expression of political values, but it 
is a polity nonetheless, even if in an incipient and functionally differentiated form. And as in 
every polity, norms of communitarian solidarity govern the interaction between the citizens and 
the public authority in the European Union.32 As Brunkhorst has argued, the self-constitution of a 
polity automatically generates claims of solidarity.33 The rights which an individual derives 
simply by virtue of his role as a member to a certain political community often reflect the need to 
protect the individual from ‘unfreedom’, either by limiting the coercive capacity of the state, by 
ensuring political voice and guaranteeing access to essential public goods, or by mitigating 
structural inequalities that threaten to subvert the individual’s capacity to live a free, dignified 
and autonomous life. They are almost a type of procedural rights that allow polities to 
functionally operate and bolster their political authority. This section seeks to break down which 
rights Union citizens derive from their status as a citizen in the European political community. 
 
In her opinion in Ruiz Zambrano, AG Sharpston compared the Court’s interpretation of the 
notion of Union citizenship with its landmark ruling in Van Gend and Loos, in which it defined 
the autonomous nature of the European legal order, and drew the citizens closer to the 
functioning of the integration project.34 Union citizenship, in her view, could serve as an 
instrument for another paradigmatic shift in our conception of the integration process, leading the 
                                                                                                                                                   
involuntary unemployment” and “registered as a job-seeker with the relevant employment office”, as well as for 
students whose degree is a continuation of previous employment. See Article 7 (3) of Directive 2004/38. 
32 D. Held, ‘Between the State and Civil Society: Citizenship, in G. Andrews (ed.), ‘Citizenship’ (London, Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1991), p. 19. 
33 H. Brunkhorst, ‘Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community’ (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005). 
34 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano [nyr], para. 68, with reference to Case 26/62, Van 
Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. 
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way towards a fully-fledged political community with autonomous justice claims and popular 
legitimacy attached to its membership. Indeed, there is no reason why Union citizenship could 
not serve this purpose. At this moment in time, however, no one is seriously arguing that Union 
citizenship should challenge or even replace the conception of membership and the 
communitarian bounds of solidarity that are attached to citizenship on the national level.35 The 
elaboration of Union citizenship was in fact primarily seen as a political statement, and as an 
attempt to legitimise the deepening of the integration project, rather than as ascribing a certain 
normative vision or solidaristic rights to Europe as a political community. As the BverfG recently 
emphasised, Union citizenship is clearly secondary to national citizenship, and its establishment 
did not create a European demos.36 This can be deduced from the wording of Article 20 TFEU 
(‘citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship’), from the 
fact that the Member States retain the autonomy to decide who qualifies as a Union citizen,37 and 
from the fact that Union law explicitly protects communitarian rights granted under national 
citizenship from erosion by virtue of rights granted under Union citizenship.38  
 
At the same time, the BverfG, in the same ruling where it implicitly denied the existence of a 
European demos, typified Union citizenship as “the nucleus of a European solidarity”.39 The 
creation of the European polity, with its European ‘citizens’ as subjects, simply presupposes a 
(minimal) degree of horizontal identification among these citizens. As the progressive 
development of the polity Europe, as well as the establishment of a range of European political 
solidarities40 and fundamental rights41 demonstrates, there are indeed some identity ties, 
interpersonal links and normative commitments that bind ‘all Europeans’ and spatially transcend 
the nation state’s territory. The common identity that ‘all Europeans’ derive from Union 
citizenship entails a shared commitment to each other’s needs, suffering, misery, happiness and 
                                                
35 See, for example T. Faist, ‘Social Citizenship in the European Union: Nested Membership’, 39 JCMS (2001), p. 
51. See also See Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 263. 
36 Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 347-350. 
37 Case C-369/90, Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239, and for an overview of excluded citizens, G.-R. De Groot, 
‘Towards a European Nationality Law’, in: H. Schneider (ed.), ‘Migration, Integration and Citizenship: A Challenge 
for Europe’s future. Volume I’ (Maastricht, Forum Maastricht, 2005). 
38 See Article 21 TFEU and Articles 1 to Directive 90/364, Directive 90/365 and Directive 93/96, and Article 8 (4) of 
Directive 2004/38. 
39 See Lisbon ruling of BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30.6.2009, para. 395. 
40 See for examples of this political solidarity the commitments in the area of external action (Article 24 and 31 
TEU), immigration and asylum (Article 80 TFEU), energy security policy (Article 194 and 122 TFEU), and in the 
event of a terrorist attack (See Article 222 TFEU). 
41 See Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2010/C 83/02. 
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ambitions, just as (if clearly not to the same extent as) it does on the national level.42 This 
normative commitment to citizen well-being and social justice is buttressed by its clear 
codification in the centre of Europe’s constitutional objectives.43 There is simply ‘something’ 
intangible attached to the status of the individual citizen in the European project. The intangible 
and dynamic nature of this ‘something’ makes its definition in terms of legally enforceable rights 
extremely difficult and highly contentious, as the dispute on the legal effect of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights has highlighted. For lack of a political structure which can express the exact 
communitarian sentiments that underlie the Union as a political community, the Court has 
progressively started to impose norms of communitarian solidarity itself, both by defining a 
number of fundamental entitlements which Union citizens can claim even against their own 
Member State,44 and by extrapolating rights of communitarian solidarity which economically 
inactive migrants accrue when they reside in another Member State.    
 
The first case that explicitly discussed the rights that Union citizens accrue simply because of 
their status as a Union citizen was Martinez Sala. The case dealt with a Spanish national who had 
lived in Germany since the age of 12. Between 1976 and 1989 she had been in and out of jobs in 
Germany. In 1993, just after her child was born, she applied for child-raising allowance, which 
was denied by the Bavarian administration on the ground that she possessed neither the German 
nationality, nor a residence permit.45 The Court held that: 
“in the sphere of application of the Treaty and in the absence of any justification, 
such unequal treatment constitutes discrimination prohibited by Article [18 of the 
TFEU].” 
 
In its assessment, the Court came up with a novelty – Martìnez Sala had the right not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of nationality simply because she was a Union citizen lawfully 
residing on the territory of another Member State.46 This vast extension of the scope of the 
                                                
42 See also Interim Evaluation of the Europe for Citizens Programme, (Ecroy, 2011), p. 67, where it is argued that 
“approximately 80 % of participants (..) felt more solidarity with their fellow Europeans” than in the previous 
survey.”  
43  Articles 2 and 3 TFEU. 
44 See explicitly Case C-256/11, Dereci [nyr], para. 63; where the Court held that “[a]s nationals of a Member State, 
family members of the applicants in the main proceedings enjoy the status of Union citizens under Article 20(1) 
TFEU and may therefore rely on the rights pertaining to that status, including against their Member State of origin”. 
See also Case C-434/09 McCarthy [nyr], para. 48. 
45 This was a correct assessment of the factual situation, as the German authorities had not renewed her residence 
permit since 1984, but merely certified that she had applied for an extension, which allowed her to legally stay in 
Germany. 
46 Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala [1998] ECR I-261, para. 61.  
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principle of non-discrimination and, by implication, far-reaching intrusion into national systems 
of social redistribution was justified by reference to the notion of Union citizenship:  
“Citizenship of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to receive 
the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions 
as are expressly provided for.”47 
 
This should not, it is argued, be interpreted to mean that Union citizenship alone allows for full 
equal treatment of all Union citizens in respect of all social benefits. The bounds of 
communitarian solidarity in the EU are not that strong. Redistribution on the national level still 
presupposes “support by strong social and symbolic ties of generalised reciprocity and diffuse 
solidarity”,48 which cannot automatically extend to all mobile Union citizens without causing the 
problematic distributive asymmetries discussed in the first chapter.49 Rather, as highlighted by 
AG Colomer, the Court’s demand of equal treatment cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that 
Martinez Sala had lived practically her whole life in Germany,50 and could therefore reasonably 
be regarded as ‘deserving’ the child-care benefits. Such intuitive judgments as to the strength of 
claims under communitarian solidarity may be pragmatic, but remain unsatisfactory for want of 
normative elaboration.  
 
Starting from its rulings in D’Hoop and Collins, therefore, the Court collapsed its intuition, as 
well as the theoretical demands of social, cultural, financial and moral reciprocity, which serve to 
ensure that national solidarity is only extended to migrant citizens who ‘deserve’ it,51 into a new, 
more procedural test. Member States must devise the eligibility criteria for social entitlements so 
that they reflect the reciprocity that underlies the nature and function of that entitlement. To put it 
as simple as possible: eligibility criteria may only reflect the social function and nature of a 
particular welfare entitlement. This test serves to contextualize the claims of migrants within the 
national structures of reciprocity that sustain the different welfare goods. As summarized by AG 
Geelhoed:  
                                                
47 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para. 30-31, and Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR 
I-11613, para. 22-23; Case C-209/03, Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, para. 31; and Case C-50/06, Commission v 
Netherlands [2007] ECR I-9705, para. 32. 
48 T. Faist, ‘Social Citizenship in the European Union: Nested Membership’, 39 JCMS (2001), p. 46. 
49 See section 1.3.3. 
50 Opinion of AG Colomer in Case C-138/02, Collins [2004] ECR I-2703, para. 65. 
51 Opinion of AG Colomer in Case C-138/02, Collins [2004] ECR I-2703, para. 75. 
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 “depending on the nature of the benefits concerned, the Member States may lay 
down such objective conditions as are necessary to ensure that the benefit is provided 
to persons who have a sufficient link with its territory”52 
This procedural test of communitarian solidarity is divided into two parts. First, the Court will 
analyze the precise function and nature of a particular social benefit, and assess which demands 
of reciprocity underlie its sustainability.53 As it has put it itself – somewhat cryptically:  
“it is for the competent national authorities and, where appropriate, the national 
courts (…) to assess the constituent elements of that benefit, in particular its 
purposes and the conditions subject to which it is granted. (…) [T]he objective of 
that benefit must be analysed according to its results and not according to its formal 
structure.”54 
 
Once the type of reciprocity that underlies a certain welfare benefit has been established, all 
migrants who can reproduce this same reciprocity must be granted equal access. Eligibility 
criteria that are not indicative of the nature and function of the benefit are in principle invalidated 
for breach of communitarian solidarity.55 This requirement of contextualisation of the migrant 
within the norms of reciprocity that underlie a welfare entitlement serves – as the Court has 
recently for the first time picked up on – to protect the redistributive commitment that sustains 
such entitlement: 
“the necessity of establishing a genuine and sufficient connection between the 
claimant and the competent Member State enables that State to satisfy itself that the 
economic cost of paying the benefit at issue (..) does not become unreasonable”56  
 
As a consequence of this requirement of contextualisation, communitarian solidarity demands 
different things for different entitlements, depending on their precise social function. Or, to put it 
differently, communitarian solidarity extends the size of national sharing communities in 
accordance with the social function of a certain welfare good. The following chapters will 
analyse in depth the exact rights that Union citizens derive from communitarian solidarity. From 
the outset, however, it appears that a claim on the basis of communitarian solidarity is strongest 
in respect of basic fundamental social entitlements, such as emergency healthcare, primary 
education or housing. Such goods are both foundational and fundamental to the capacity of 
citizens to live their lives with a minimum of autonomy and dignity; and are implicit in any 
                                                
52 Case C-209/03, Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, para. 33. 
53 See recently, and very explicitly: Case C-503/09, Stewart [nyr], para. 89-103.  
54 Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, Vatsouras [2009] ECR I-4585, para. 41-42. 
55 See explicitly Case C-503/09, Stewart [nyr], para. 95-100; AG Mazak in Case C-158/07, Förster [2008] ECR I-
8507, para. 129: “the criterion used must still be indicative of the degree of integration into society”. See also C. O’ 
Brien, ‘Real links, abstract rights and false alarms: the relationship between the ECJ’s “real link” case law and 
national solidarity’, 33 ELRev (2008), p. 653ff. 
56 Case C-503/09, Stewart [nyr], para. 103. 
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relationship between a human being and the political community in which he lives. Access to 
such primary social goods is thus not sustained by parochial reciprocal commitments but simply 
attach to each citizen in his status as a human being. In consequence, all Union citizens, 
regardless of their nationality or state of residence, derive a claim to access such benefits under 
communitarian solidarity, even vis-à-vis their own Member State.57 
 
Beyond such primary social goods, the task of connecting criteria of eligibility with the function 
of the social good becomes more explicit. At times this task is relatively simple; at other times 
next to impossible. The commitments of reciprocity that underlie child-care benefits, for 
example, are easy to break down. In Hartmann, AG Geelhoed highlighted that they serve to:  
“promote childbirth with a view to guaranteeing a certain degree of stability in the 
demographic composition of [the Member States’] populations.” 58  
 
The function and nature of child-care benefits, in other words, is decisively territorial; and 
migrants can thus meet the reciprocity that it reflects simply by establishing lawful residence. As 
Geelhoed concludes, child-care benefits must then be extended to all persons: 
“who belong to the Member State’s national population, which, of course, includes 
not only German nationals, but all persons lawfully resident in Germany irrespective 
of their nationality.” 59 
 
In contrast, some entitlements, such as student grants or unemployment benefits, are multi-
dimensional, and attach as much importance to past commitments as future participation in 
society.60 The communitarian obligations incumbent on Member States to extend such benefits to 
cover economically inactive migrants are much more difficult to define. The Court has used a 
whole range of different legal instruments to help it make such complex assessments. The proxies 
of ‘real link’, ‘degree of integration’, or the demand on national court to take the personal 
circumstances of the individual into account61 all serve to contextualise ideas of communitarian 
solidarity within national reciprocal commitments. The Union legislator, probably in an attempt 
                                                
57 See also Article 2 TEU. EU law can also be construed as reinforcing the moral obligation on the Member States to 
look after its citizens. The Charter of Fundamental for example can be interpreted as ensuring a minimum level of 
welfare entitlements to all Europeans, including the right to education (notably, in the section on ‘freedom’), the right 
to social security, and a right to health-care (see Article 14 CFR, Article 34 CFR and Article 35 CFR respectively). 
58 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, para. 69, Opinion of AG Geelhoed in 
Case C-213/05, Geven [2007] ECR I-6347, para. 29. 
59 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, para. 69, Opinion of AG Geelhoed in 
Case C-213/05, Geven [2007] ECR I-6347, para. 29. 
60 O. Golynker, ‘Case note on Förster’, 46 CMLR (2009), p. 2033. See also Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-
542/09, Commission v Netherlands (pending), para. 147. 
61 Case C-503/09, Stewart [nyr], para. 100. 
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to instil some administrative efficiency and legal certainty, has proposed a temporary axis to 
define the rights of economically inactive migrants under communitarian solidarity. According to 
Directive 2004/38, such migrants have no rights to social entitlements in the first three months of 
his residence in the host state,62 some more after the first three months, and equal rights across 
the whole spectrum after five years of residence.63 This temporal axis seems unduly rigid. If the 
objective of the use of a proxy is to accommodate ‘deserving’ migrants within national reciprocal 
commitments, length of residence cannot be but one of the criteria assessed, in combination with 
the nature and function of the welfare good, and other personal circumstances of the migrant.64 
Whichever proxy is used, it is fair to say that they remain: 
 “intellectually impoverished substitute[s] for the sort of rigorous analysis of the 
meaning of social solidarity within Europe’s multi-level welfare society”65 
 
The absence of such rigorous analysis is caused by the lack of a robust transnational political 
structure and by the Court’s inability to describe the normative legal texture of Union citizenship. 
Such description would be, however, a tall order. Union citizenship and communitarian solidarity 
are in constant flux. They emerged in 1992, became really visible in 1998, and have since been 
constantly redefined.66 At this moment in time, communitarian solidarity can perhaps best be 
defined as a normatively hollow but procedurally robust form of solidarity based on a 
commitment to equality. It demands that all Union citizens can access basic social goods, 
wherever they reside; and that such citizens can access other social entitlements in other states as 
soon as they can be can reproduce the reciprocal commitments that underlie such entitlements.  
 
2.3 ASPIRATIONAL SOLIDARITY 
Every organisation structures the role of the individual in accordance with their communal 
aspirations and objectives. This applies to book clubs, football teams or terrorist organisations as 
much as it does to transnational integration projects. The European Union grants individuals not 
only rights to protect their role as an economic agent or as a citizen, but also as a reflection of its 
specific aspirations or objectives. Within the context of the integration process, these aspirations 
                                                
62 Article 6 and 14 (1) of Directive 2004/38. See also Catherine Barnard, “EU Citizenship and the Principle of 
Solidarity” in E. Spaventa and M. Dougan (eds.), Social Welfare and EU Law (Hart, Oxford, 2005), p.166-175. 
63 Article 16 and Article 24 (2) of Directive 2004/38. 
64 See explicitly Case C-503/09, Stewart [nyr], para. 95-100. 
65 M. Dougan and E. Spaventa, ‘‘Wish you weren't here ...’: new models of social solidarity in the European Union’, 
in: M. Dougan and E. Spaventa (eds.), ‘Social Welfare and EU Law’ (Oxford, Hart, 2005), p. 203-4. 
66 See most recently, Case 34/09, Ruiz Zambrano [nyr], and Case C-256/11, Dereci [nyr]. 
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have always centred on the promise of providing a better life for the citizen, and its method has 
always been the dispersion of power away from the nation state and the national political system. 
The instrument of choice, as emphasised in the first chapter, has traditionally been the right to 
free movement for factors of production (first) and citizens (later). At first, as the preamble to the 
Treaty of Paris indicates, this was justified in an effort to prevent yet more war:  
“Convinced that the contribution which an organized and vital Europe can bring to 
civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations;(..) 
Resolved to substitute for historic rivalries a fusion of their essential interests; to 
establish, by creating an economic community, the foundation of a broad and 
independent community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay 
the bases of institutions capable of giving direction to their future common destiny.” 
 
The preamble of the Treaty of Rome equally emphasises that the integration project is an 
instrument for Member States with “the essential purpose of constantly improving the living and 
working conditions of their people”, albeit the emphasis this time was on the potential of free 
movement to generate economic prosperity. Now, in 2012, the tandem of ‘peace’ and ‘prosperity’ 
seems less and less convincing as a legitimising force for the integration project. Slowly but 
surely, the aspirational focus of the Union has come to lie on the capacity of free movement to 
secure individual rather than communal objectives – to help individual citizens make something 
of their lives. The link between free movement and individual empowerment, which is also 
clearly visible in the Commission’s policy agendas,67 highlights the aspirational potential of the 
regulatory diversity that typifies the Union. A polity is which all citizens possess a right to free 
movement, but wherein the capacity to regulate important policy areas remains decentralised, 
generates a wide range of choice for individuals to meet their ambitions, personal preferences, or 
normative values. After all, now twenty-seven educational systems, corporate law structures or 
professional associations can be accessed. As discussed above, an increase in individual choices 
and opportunities (even if not exercised) clearly contributes to the individual citizen’s well-being 
by bolstering their capacity to attain their personal conception of the ‘good life’.68 This adds not 
only the stability of the transnational project – as Breton argued, in a multi-level system of 
                                                
67 Indeed, practically all of the Commission’s efforts in ‘citizenship’ are aimed towards making the exercise of free 
movement easier. See the 25 policy proposals in ‘Union Citizenship Report 2010: Dismantling the obstacles to EU 
Citizens’ Rights’ COM (2010) 603final. 
68 A. Sen, ‘The Idea of Justice’ (London, Penguin, 2010), p. 235. 
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governance all levels must be relevant for the individual’s experiences in life69 – but also 
externally complements the task of the national welfare state in creating the preconditions for the 
individual expression of normative preferences. 
 
This interpretation of free movement – as serving individual aspirations – stresses that Member 
States can offer their own citizens, and by implication each other’s citizens, a better life by 
creating a space of free regulatory movement. Citizens might simply be happier living, working 
or studying elsewhere.70 Aspirational solidarity, in turn, describes the precise obligations that 
Member States have accrued by implicitly ‘buying into’ free movement as the instrument for 
achieving their communal aspirations. The duty of aspirational solidarity lies primarily in the 
obligation on Member States not to limit the citizen’s exercise of such opportunities to move 
throughout the Union. This conceptual leap was made in D’Hoop en De Cuyper, where the Court 
held that the rights to free movement for Union citizens not only entailed a prohibition of 
discrimination but also a prohibition on all restrictions to such movement.71 This leap has 
promoted the aspirational right of Union citizens to make use of the possibilities and 
opportunities of free movement into an almost constitutional right.72 
 
There is a ‘dark side’ to such aspirational solidarity, however, which still sparks fierce legal and 
political debate.73 For lack of a political structure that can mediate its effects, it expands in 
accordance to its own logic and is insensitive to the national entitlements upon which it depends. 
It has been typified, somewhat gratuitously, as ‘abusive’ solidarity,74 especially in socially 
sensitive areas such as labour law, healthcare and education, where it is perceived as destabilising 
national normative or redistributive decisions. The most evocative example to clarify the nature 
of this ‘dark side’ is infrastructural. A Belgian hospital will only have a limited number of beds, 
roughly estimated to meet the medical needs of its population. If a high number of French and 
                                                
69 R. Breton, ‘Identification in Transnational Political Communities’, in: K. Knop, S. Ostryn, R. Simeon and K. 
Dwinton (eds.), ‘Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Markets, and Governments in a Changing World’ (Vancouver, 
UBC Press, 1995), p. 42. 
70 See IP/06/389: ‘Europeans move for love and a better quality of life’. See Favell for a whole book full of reasons 
why citizens move to another Member State: A. Favell, ‘Eurostars and Eurocities’ (Oxford, Blackwell, 2008). 
71 See Case C-244/98, D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191; and Case C-406/04, De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-6947. 
72 In Bressol, for example, a case concerning transnational access to university, the Court for example held that the 
“opportunity for students coming from other Member States to gain access to higher education” constitutes the “very 
essence of the principle of free movement of students” which is protected by the Treaty. See Case C-73/08, Bressol 
[2010] ECR I-2735, para. 79. 
73 See, for a well-known example: R. Herzog and L. Gerken ‘Stop the European Court of Justice’ Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 September 2008. 
74 As, for example, argued in C-147/03, Commission v Austria (university access) [2005] ECR I-5969, or Case C-
212/97, Centros [1999] ECR I-1459. 
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Dutch patients seek treatment in those hospitals (making use of their rights to free movement) 
such patients enter into competition with ‘local’ patients for the limited number of hospital beds. 
The inherent risk of unregulated free movement and unconditional equal treatment, then, is that 
Belgium may be unable to provide elementary healthcare services to its own citizens. The dark 
side of aspirational solidarity, then, is that it pits the aspirations of mobile Union citizens against 
those of immobile citizens, potentially allowing for “the social bond which provides all persons 
equal access to the achievements of the functional system on which they are dependent [to be] 
torn”.75 Or, to put it differently, mobile citizens might detract from the entitlements of their 
immobile fellow citizens. 
 
As emphasized in the previous chapter, strong normative reasons exist to limit this dark side of 
aspirational solidarity, and to ensure that EU law in fact stabilises national distributive 
arrangements.76 It is argued that a coherent interpretation of the demands of aspirational 
solidarity is in fact sensitive to potential negative effects. Properly understood, aspirational 
solidarity only entails a conditional (or negative) obligation to allow citizens to make use of their 
rights to free movement, rather than an absolute (or positive) obligation to accommodate or 
stimulate such movement by altering redistributive choices. Whereas under market solidarity and 
communitarian solidarity host states are obliged to ‘look after’ foreign citizens and are positively 
required to integrate them in social sharing schemes; under aspirational solidarity Member States 
are merely obliged to abstain from encroaching on the individual choice to make use of the free 
movement rights. Aspirational solidarity, in other words, requires a commitment of laissez-
passer.77 This distinction between a negative and a positive obligation is already evident in 
Directive 2004/38, which regulates the free movement of Union citizens. The ratio legis of the 
Directive is that citizens are free to move around Europe, and have a right to equal treatment in 
doing so, but only if they are economically self-sufficient. In other words, while their movement 
is met with a right to equal access to welfare structures such as the police force, public transport, 
libraries, universities or hospitals, it does not extend to a positive obligation to ensure that 
citizens possess sufficient resources to effectively exercise their free movement rights.78  
                                                
75 H. Brunkhorst, ‘Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community’ (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005), 
p. 91, emphasis added. 
76 See section 1.3.3. 
77 See also Brunkhorst, who argues that laissez-passer is implicit in the liberal-democratic tradition. P H. Brunkhorst, 
‘Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community’ (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005), p. 125. 
78 See Directive 2004/38, and especially Article 7 (1)(b) and (c) and Article 24. This conceptual distinction between 
the effective access and effective exercise has also been highlighted in Europe’s economic constitution. Thus, the 
Hungarian producer cannot claim that since toy soldiers may only be sold in specialist shops in Finland, his right to 
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What this conditional obligation really entails becomes much clearer when we look at the 
different demands of justice that aspirational solidarity makes on the home and host state of a 
migrant citizen. The home state, bluntly put, may not make eligibility for welfare benefits 
dependent on residence. In Morgan and Nerkowska the Court has clarified that Member States 
must in principle allow ‘their’ citizens to export (financial) welfare entitlements.79 In Da Silva 
Martins the Court even argued that EU law allows, as a general principle, for the export of 
benefits “especially where those advantages represent the counterpart of contributions which 
[citizens] have paid”.80 The logic here is a negative one. Member States do not need to 
accommodate free movement, for example by leveling up entitlements to meet the level required 
in the host state,81 but may simply not obstruct free movement or penalise its exercise:  
“the opportunities offered by the Treaty in relation to freedom of movement for 
citizens of the Union could not be fully effective if a national of a Member State could 
be deterred from availing himself of them by obstacles placed in the way of his stay 
in another Member State by legislation of his Member State of origin penalising him 
for the mere fact that he has used those opportunities.”82 
 
The justification for this demand of aspirational solidarity is not dissimilar as that employed in 
communitarian solidarity. Just like the latter allows citizens to access social entitlements in the 
host state for which they meet the preconditions of reciprocity; the former allows citizens to 
retain access to social entitlements provided by their home state for which they still meet the 
conditions of reciprocity, regardless of their lack of residence. This direct connection between the 
right to export social benefits and the nature and function of those benefits serves to ensure that 
the aspirations of those who wish to make use of their rights to free movement are bolstered 
without undercutting the stability of the entitlements of immobile citizens. In other words, rights 
under aspirational solidarity are conditional upon the continuous availability of entitlements for 
all citizens.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
aspirational solidarity is infringed. Equally, a Spanish student cannot claim that the United Kingdom should provide 
him with financial support in order for him to exercise his aspirational right to access to a British university more 
efficiently.  
79 See Joined Cases C-11/06 and 12/06, Morgan and Bucher [2007] ECR I-9161 and Case 499/06, Nerkowska [2008] 
ECR I-3993. 
80 See Case C-388/09, Da Silva Martins [nyr], para. 74. 
81 Case C-76/05, Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849, para. 78-80. 
82 Case C-345/09, Van Delft [nyr], para. 97; see also Case C-208/07, Chomier-Glisczinski [2009], ECR I-6095 para. 
82.  
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The conditional obligation of aspirational solidarity means something different in respect of the 
host state to which a migrant moves. The absence of an absolute obligation under aspirational 
solidarity means that economically inactive migrants are in principle not eligible for financial 
entitlements until they meet the degree of reciprocity required for a claim under communitarian 
solidarity. The aspirational commitment to allow citizens to make use of the opportunities 
generated by the rights to free movement does entail, however, a right to access public goods 
such as universities and hospitals. Such goods are in principle non-divisible and non-rival, and 
access by ‘outsiders’ normally neither limits access for ‘insiders’, nor substantially increases the 
costs of such public goods, which are by and large infrastructural. This demand finds its limit, 
again, where the aspirational exercise undercuts the stable access to welfare goods for immobile 
citizens. This limit is important mainly to guard for infrastructural pressures on universities or 
hospitals. It is argued that where such a causal link between access by migrants and lack of 
access for welfare ‘insiders’ can be empirically demonstrated, the rights under aspirational 
solidarity find their limit. As the following chapters will demonstrate, how exactly this 
conditional nature of aspirational solidarity plays out much depends on the nature of the policy 
area to which it attaches.   
 
Europe’s aspirations have always centred on providing its citizens with the preconditions to live 
‘good lives’. More recently, this has been interpreted as requiring the strengthening of the 
capacity of citizens to make use of the opportunities provided by the European Union, and, in 
particular, to make use of their rights to free movement. This section has highlighted the demands 
of solidarity that are implicit in that commitment. It has highlighted that aspirational solidarity 
requires Member States to allow their own citizens to exit their territories without the automatic 
loss of welfare entitlements, and to allow citizens of other Member States to make use of their 
communal welfare structures. Aspirational solidarity does not require, on the other hand, that 
Member States accommodate or stimulate the use of the free movement provisions. Member 
States do not need to alter their normative choices or redistributive decisions in order to secure 
the aspirations of mobile citizens. In making this distinction between the negative obligation to 
allow movement, and the lack of a positive obligation to accommodate such movement, 
aspirational solidarity serves to ensure spatial continuity of welfare entitlements, allowing 
citizens to pursue their ambitions in living, working or studying in other Member States of the 
European Union without endangering the capacity of immobile citizens to internally redistribute 




This chapter has discussed the nature and defined the scope of the three types of transnational 
solidarity that are implicit in the integration process. Market solidarity, it was argued, reflects the 
interdependencies that have emerged by the creation of a transnational market. Communitarian 
solidarity reflects the incipient rights that are attached to the status of an individual as a citizen of 
the Union. Aspirational solidarity, finally, reflects the capacity of the Union to allow its citizens 
to have a better life. Together, the transnational solidarities allow for the integration of the 
different national and transnational assumptions of justice that exist in Europe. Properly 
understood, they not only serve to enhance the capacity of individual Europeans to live a ‘good 
life’, but also insulate the capacity of the Member States to fulfil their social obligation vis-à-vis 
its own citizens by stabilising national redistributive commitments. The creation and elaboration 
of this tiered normative structure is difficult, and demands different emphases depending on the 
nature and structure of different policy areas or welfare entitlements. While the first two chapters 
have analysed which types of solidarities and justice claims exist on the national and 
transnational level, it is exactly their interaction with different welfare goods that will clarify the 
real ethics of justice that characterises Europe’s social dimension. The second part of this thesis 
will therefore assess how the transnational solidarities behave in the context of healthcare 





This chapter discusses the regulation of healthcare in Europe, or rather the interaction between its 
provision on the national level and European rights to free movement.  The first section sets out 
the two different social functions that healthcare provides. While it is, on the one hand, a 
fundamental social good that protects the physical integrity of the citizen, and prevents his 
premature mortality; it is also, on the other hand, a consumable good that allows citizens to 
improve their health (3.1). This chapter analyses how the transnational solidarities have extended 
these two dimensions of healthcare to cover cross-border situations. They inform, first of all, the 
rights that patients have to access healthcare in another Member State (3.2) and, secondly, their 
right to be reimbursed for such cross-border healthcare by the state in which they are insured for 
healthcare (3.3). In doing so, the transnational solidarities attach different rights to cross-border 
healthcare to the different social functions of healthcare. Communitarian solidarity suggests that 
the need to protect the physical integrity of the citizen is such a basic social obligation on each 
Member State that it transcends norms of membership and territoriality, so that patients can 
access reimbursed emergency healthcare wherever they find themselves in the Union. The more 
consumable aspects of healthcare are extended to include cross-border treatments by market 
solidarity, which suggests that such extension must take account of the market transaction that 
underlies the logic of compulsory healthcare insurance; and by aspirational solidarity, which 
suggests that cross-border healthcare can only be limited where required to protect long-term 
access to healthcare for all citizens.  
 
3.1 THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF HEALTHCARE 
Assessing how the public provision of healthcare contributes to the elaboration of justice and to 
the capacity of individuals to live ‘good lives’ requires us to discuss it from two different, 
sometimes conflicting, angles. While access to healthcare can be seen as an individual 
entitlement, it is, at the same time, a communal entitlement, whose continuity and universal 
nature requires certain limitations to be placed on the individual ‘right to be cured’. Article 35 
CFR, for example, highlights that the individual right to healthcare – even if ‘fundamental’ – 
must be understood in relation to its national and territorial limitations: 
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“everyone has the right of access to preventive healthcare and the right to benefit 
from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and 
practices”.1 
 
The first way of approaching healthcare is as an individual right. Good health is of central 
importance for the individual’s physical integrity and his capacity to live a ‘good’ life – or indeed 
any life.2 Medical assistance such as prenatal care, emergency surgery or treatment of infectious 
diseases is ‘fundamental and foundational’ for citizens even to merely survive, let alone to live a 
‘good life’.3 It does not seem farfetched to argue, then, that individuals are reliant on access to 
certain treatments in order to exercise most other rights. The provision of such basic healthcare, 
which according to Rugers should extend to cover treatment meant to ‘avoid premature death and 
escapable morbidity’,4 constitutes, ultimately, a basic moral obligation on any polity – as 
recognized by national, European, and international law.5 
 
The right to healthcare is not limited, however, to treatment options that are necessary for our 
survival. Citizens have increasingly desired treatment to be available in case of a sore throat, 
broken rib, or hernia. The concept of public healthcare has, as a result, grown to include 
treatments which not only serve to increase the lifespan of citizens, but also add to their quality of 
life. In order to meet these healthcare demands, European states generally provide for universal, 
permanent and adequate access to a wide range of high-quality treatment options for its citizens. 
Healthcare, as such, is thus not only an individual right but also has a collective dimension. 
Citizens – bar the very richest – simply cannot ensure access to healthcare on an individual basis. 
In light of the high (and still rising) costs of maintaining a system of healthcare (collectively the 
EU-27 spend € 967 billion/year on healthcare),6 such systems operate on the logic of compulsory 
(semi-public) collective insurance, through which citizens insure themselves and each other 
against physical harm. The costs of such schemes are generally borne by the State (and thus its 
                                                
1 See Article 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2000] OJ C 364/1; 
2 J. Ruger, ‘Health and Social Justice’, (Oxford, OUP, 2009) p. 2-3. 
3 Article 7 (3) of the 1978 Alma Ata Declaration on Primary Health Care defines primary health care as including “at 
least: education concerning prevailing health problems and the methods of preventing and controlling them; (..) 
maternal and child health care, (..) immunization against the major infectious diseases; prevention and control of 
locally endemic diseases; appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries; and provision of essential drugs”.  
4 See J. Ruger, ‘Health and Social Justice’, (Oxford, OUP, 2009), chapter 4.  
5 On the national level (for example, Article 23 of the Belgium constitution, Article 52 of the Bulgarian constitution), 
the European level (Article 35 CFR, Article 11 and 13 of the European Social Charter) and the international level 
(1978 Alma Ata Declaration on Primary Health Care, or Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights). See also B. Toebes, ‘The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law’, in: A. 
Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas (eds.), ‘Economic, Cultural and Social Rights’ (Den Haag, Kluwer, 2001), p. 243ff. 
6 See Commission Impact Assessment for the Directive on Cross-border Healthcare, SEC (2008) 2163, p. 9. 
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citizens), even if it often asks for contributions by individual participants or their employer.7 This 
indicates that the provision of healthcare is not only premised on a basic moral obligation to 
protect the physical integrity of citizens, but also on more territorially-bounded expression of the 
types of healthcare that citizens should be allowed to ‘consume’.  
 
In order to ensure the financial stability and continuity of the systems of collective healthcare, 
Member States impose internal and external limitations on the individual’s right to treatment. 
Internally, it generally limits the list of treatments that it funds, refusing to reimburse, for 
example, cosmetic treatments or dentistry.8 The external limitation to the individual right to 
healthcare reflects the system of insurance that underlies it. Member States in principle refuse to 
subsidise treatment for patients who are not affiliated to their healthcare scheme, and also refuse 
to subsidise treatments that affiliated patients undergo abroad. References to the obligation to 
provide healthcare in international law indeed stress that such obligation rests on each state in 
respect of its own citizens and territory.9 These demands of territoriality are aimed at allowing 
Member States to structurally predict the demand in medical services and match it on the supply-
side. If Belgium knows that it needs to treat on average 500 patients with TB each year, it will 
ensure adequate access for roughly that number. If 500 extra patients from the Netherlands seek 
treatment of that disease in Belgium, the latter’s capacity to treat both Belgian and Dutch patients 
comes under pressure. Likewise, if all Belgian patients seek treatment in the Netherlands, 
Belgium will have wasted precious personal, financial, infrastructural and medical resources on 
providing TB treatment options. This obligation to be treated on the territory of the state to which 
a patient is affiliated is systemically attached to collective insurance schemes, and is often 
perceived as indispensible for the financial and infrastructural sustainability of a system of 
universal healthcare.  
 
Progressively, three quite different regimes have emerged that, independently of each other, 
regulate the rights of patients to cross-border healthcare. While some rights to cross-border 
healthcare can be found in Regulation 883/2004 (and its predecessor 1408/71), different rights 
                                                
7 See A. P. Van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Persons’,  (Oxford, Hart, 2003), p. 223-4 for an explanation of the 
different regulatory styles used by the different Member States. 
8 The Dutch, for example, recently excluded physiotherapy, professional help to stop smoking and most non-
pathological mental illnesses from compulsory reimbursement schemes. See NRC De Week, 6 June, p. 1. See for an 
in-depth and exhaustive study of how the Member States fund, structure and order their systems of healthcare a EP 
working paper: ‘Healthcare systems in the EU: A comparative study’ (SACO 101 EN). 
9 See, e.g. Article 35 CFR or Article 12 of the International Covenant in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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derive from Article 56 TFEU directly, and yet different rights can be found in Directive 2011/24, 
which was adopted to regulate patient’s rights in cross-border situations, but explicitly highlights 
that the other regimes continue to apply.10 This three-track system reflects not only the 
complexity and sensitivity of the issue of cross-border healthcare,11 but also, it will be argued, the 
existence of three quite different normative dimensions that underlie a patient’s individual right to 
healthcare. The first is based on the market interaction between the patient and his state of 
affiliation (that is, the state in which he is covered for healthcare costs). The individual derives a 
contractual right to healthcare in return for his participation in the collective healthcare insurance 
schemes in that state. The solidarity inherent in such a market transaction, it will be argued, 
allows affiliated patients to enforce their contractual rights to healthcare beyond the state’s 
boundaries in situations where the state of affiliation cannot provide the treatments listed in the 
contact of insurance. It will be argued that both the scope of this contractual right to healthcare 
and its extra-territorial effects are expressions of how market solidarity influences the regulation 
of transboundary healthcare. The second normative dimension that underlies the individual’s right 
to healthcare is based on medical need. On this view, and as discussed above, the obligation to 
provide healthcare which is adequate to protect the physical integrity of its citizens is the 
expression of a basic moral demand on each polity. It is argued that this demand finds a 
transnational expression through communitarian solidarity, which extends the patient’s right to 
healthcare to include treatment in another Member State whenever the state of affiliation cannot 
offer treatment adequate to the patient’s medical needs. The third normative paradigm through 
which to assess the individual’s right to healthcare is to see it as an exercise of individual choice. 
Respect for patient autonomy reflects the importance of individual ownership over the decisions 
which affect the patient’s health and body. This aspirational dimension of healthcare, which 
allows patients to choose to access healthcare structures throughout Europe in accordance to their 
personal preferences, must be circumscribed, it will be argued, with reference to the rights to 
healthcare of their fellow citizens. When aspirational patient mobility threatens to limit the 
capacity of Member States to sustain an adequate healthcare system (and thereby limits access to 
such healthcare for ‘immobile’ patients), a strong case can be made to limit its extra-territorial 
effects. This third normative dimension of healthcare – in other words – is much less absolute on 
the transnational level than the other two. 
 
                                                
10 Recital 31 of Directive 2011/24. 
11 It was, for example, excluded from the Services Directive, while Romania, Poland, Portugal and Austria voted 
against the adoption of Directive 2011/24, with Slovakia abstaining. 
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These three normative dimensions of the patient’s individual right to healthcare shape the 
regulation of cross-border healthcare in two ways. First, they inform the integration of migrants 
within criteria of membership. In other words, they regulate which healthcare rights a Spanish 
citizen obtains vis-à-vis the Danish state when he takes up employment or residence in 
Copenhagen (3.2). Second, they offer the reasons for which, and the conditions under which, 
patients may exercise their individual right to healthcare in another Member State that the one to 
which they are affiliated; that is, under which conditions a Spanish citizen who travels to 
Copenhagen in order to be treated must be reimbursed by the Spanish state (3.3).  
 
3.2 RIGHTS TO HEALTHCARE FOR MIGRANTS 
Which healthcare rights do migrants have in their host state? The theory of transnational 
solidarity suggests that this depends both on the connection between the migrant and the political 
community of the host state and on the nature of their claim to healthcare. The table below 
It is argued that migrant workers derive from market solidarity a right to subsidised healthcare on 
equal terms as nationals of the host state. This contractual right is premised on the engagement of 
the migrant worker with the labour market in the host state (3.2.1). Economically inactive citizens 
only derive a moral right to equal access to emergency healthcare in the host state. 
Communitarian solidarity does not require equal treatment in access to non-emergency healthcare 
unless the migrant participates in collective insurance schemes in that state (3.2.2). The 
aspirational solidarity that reflects the patient’s autonomy to choose where and how to be treated 
allows citizens to travel to another state solely in order to obtain healthcare. Their right of access 
to the host state’s treatment options, however, is circumscribed by reference to the need to 
prevent the host state’s own citizens from being crowded out in access to high-quality care. 
Aspirational solidarity, moreover, does not impose an obligation on part of the host state to 
subsidise treatment of ‘healthcare tourists’ (3.2.3). Such obligation, as will be discussed in the 
second part of this chapter, falls on the patient’s state of affiliation. The table below summarises 
how the three transnational solidarities reflect the three quite distinct grounds on which migrants 
obtain healthcare rights in the host state. 
 
 Rights to access subsidised healthcare in the host state? 




Communitarian solidarity All residents have equal access to subsidised emergency 
treatment. Equal access to other subsidised treatments may be 
made conditional upon the patient being insured. 
 
Aspirational solidarity Equal access for non-affiliated patients may only be limited to 
protect universal access to high-quality care; no requirement to 
subsidise healthcare for non-affiliated patients. 
 
 
3.2.1 MARKET SOLIDARITY 
The idea of market solidarity attributes the social responsibility to ‘look after’ migrant citizens to 
the state of employment as soon as, and for as long as, the migrant is in employment (or self-
employed) in that state. Migrant workers obtain a right to equal treatment to social entitlements in 
the state of employment as a ‘juste retour’ for their engagement with the labour market in the 
host state and contribution to the efficient division of labour in that state.12 Indeed, Article 11 
(3)(a) of Regulation 883/2004, which replaced Regulation 1408/71,13 and which seeks to 
coordinate social entitlements for citizens who make use of their rights to free movement, accepts 
that the state of employment has the primary obligation to ‘look  after’ a migrant worker: 
“a person pursuing an activity as an employed or self-employed person in a Member 
State shall be subject to the legislation of that Member State” 14 
 
As long as the worker remains economically active, then, he becomes part of the socio-economic 
contract that underlies the domestic provision of healthcare. He must participate in the collective 
insurance schemes in the state of employment, and that state must subsidise access to healthcare 
for him and his family on equal terms as it provides for nationals. Article 4 of Regulation 
883/2004 lays down this obligation of equal treatment:15 
“persons to whom this Regulation applies shall enjoy the same benefits and be 
subject to the same obligations under the legislation of any Member State as the 
nationals thereof” 
 
Market solidarity, in other words, intersects with the logic of territorial solidarity on the basis of 
which healthcare systems are usually organised. The state of employment remains responsible for 
                                                
12 See section 2.1. 
13 See Article 90 of Regulation 883/2004. 
14 More explicit in old text (Article 13 of Regulation 1408/71): “a person employed in the territory of one Member 
State shall be subject to the legislation of that State even if he resides in the territory of another Member State”. 
15 Previously Article 3 of Regulation 1408/71. See also recital 17 of Regulation 883/2004. 
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the healthcare needs of its workers, regardless of whether these workers are nationals or reside on 
the territory of that state (although, of course, they most often will). In other words, a Spanish 
resident who works in Portugal is included in Portugal’s public healthcare contract, must 
participate in its compulsory insurance schemes, and in return derives the right to subsidised 
healthcare (on the same terms as nationals), regardless of the fact that he lives in Spain. His right 
to access healthcare on equal terms as Portuguese citizens, however, is dependent on him 
remaining in employment in Portugal. Once economic activity seizes, market solidarity no longer 
demands that the state of employment ‘look after’ a citizen, and the obligation to provide 
healthcare in principle reverts to the state of residence (Spain).16 The first way in which EU law 
incorporates the demands of market solidarity in healthcare is thus by allocating the social 
responsibility to look after the healthcare needs of citizens to the state of employment.  
 
3.2.2 COMMUNITARIAN SOLIDARITY 
Economically inactive migrants do not derive a right to equal treatment in respect of all social 
entitlements in the host state. Such unconditional equal treatment is limited to access to those 
social goods whose function is ‘foundational and fundamental’ to the individual’s capacity to live 
a good life. In healthcare, the right to receive emergency treatment clearly falls under this 
category. In other words, it is the economically inactive migrant’s medical need and not his 
participation in the host state’s insurance schemes that warrants the automatic extension of his 
healthcare rights to cover emergency care in that state. This moral right to healthcare appears to 
cover (at least) the care required to avoid premature death and escape morbidity, such as the 
treatment of common diseases and injuries, the provision of essential drugs, immunisation against 
infectious diseases and basic maternal and child care.17 Access to such basic treatment options 
constitutes a basic moral obligation on the state, and the host state must extend access to such 
care to all resident citizens on equal terms, that is, subsidised to the same degree as it is for 
nationals, without the imposition of additional conditions.18  
 
This extension is not really disputed, and was implicitly accepted in Baumbast. In that case, the 
Court discussed the requirement under Directive 2004/38 that economically inactive Union 
                                                
16 See explicitly Case 275/96, Kuusijarvi [1998] ECR I-3419, para. 73. 
17 See B. Toebes, ‘The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law’, in: A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas 
(eds.), ‘Economic, Cultural and Social Rights’ (Den Haag, Kluwer, 2001), p. 243ff. See also J. Ruger, ‘Health and 
Social Justice’, (Oxford, OUP, 2009), chapter 4. 
18 See also Regulation 1231/2010, which extends the application of Regulation 883/2004 to third country nationals.  
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citizens who wish to reside in another Member State must obtain “comprehensive sickness 
insurance”. This is meant to prevent ‘unreasonable’ burdens on the host state’s welfare budget. 
Mr. Baumbast, a German national residing in the UK, had his application for a residence permit 
rejected by the UK authorities on the ground that he was insured for all medical expenses except 
emergency treatment.19 The Court, however, held that the absence of insurance covering 
emergency treatment could not as such impose an unreasonable burden on the public finances of 
the host state, and could therefore not serve as an excuse not to grant Mr. Baumbast a residence 
permit.20 Given that the British healthcare system operates on the basis that treatment is ‘free at 
the point of use’,21 this finding entailed that Mr. Baumbast could indeed demand that the UK 
shoulder the financial burden for his access to emergency treatment.22 This was, in reality, 
already possible under UK healthcare legislation, and appears the norm in many Member States.23 
Even though the Court does not explicitly link the social function of emergency healthcare to the 
question whether or not migrants can impose an unreasonable burden on the welfare state, 
Baumbast serves to strengthen the argument that even in Member States that operate on the basis 
of compulsory insurance, economically inactive migrant Union citizens have an enforceable right 
to be treated equally as nationals when they require emergency healthcare, simply on account of 
their medical need. 
 
The communitarian right to healthcare only covers emergency treatment. Under communitarian 
solidarity economically inactive migrants have no right to full equal treatment until they have met 
the preconditions of reciprocity which underlie access to, say, subsidised physiotherapy. As 
Directive 2004/38 indeed emphasises, economically inactive migrant must obtain 
“comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State”24 before they can legally 
reside in that Member State. This obligation is meant to prevent the migrant from becoming an 
unreasonable burden on that state’s public finances.25 Economically inactive citizens are thus 
simply required to participate in (compulsory) public insurance programs before they are granted 
                                                
19 Case C-413/99, Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091, para. 89. 
20 Case C-413/99, Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091, para. 93. 
21 See for a useful summary of the nature of the NHS and its relation with EU law: Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case 
C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4325. 
22 Case C-413/99, Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091, para. 92-93. 
23 For an overview of the precise rights in each state: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=858&langId=en. 
24 Article 7 of Directive 2004/38.  
25 This demand can be interpreted not only to serve the insulation of national healthcare budgets but also ensure the 
protection of the health of migrants, preventing them from being faced with exorbitant costs of healthcare which they 
cannot defray. 
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access to subsidised or reimbursable healthcare in the host state.26 In the Member States, such as 
the UK, where healthcare is not organised on the basis of compulsory insurance but fully funded 
through general taxation, it may be more difficult to assess at which point an economically 
inactive migrant meets the conditions of generalised reciprocity and diffuse solidarity which 
underlie access to free physiotherapy.27 The UK, for example, makes equal access conditional on 
a residence requirement. Until the migrant has resided within the UK for a year, he is unable to 
access free healthcare (beyond emergency care), and is asked to prove that he is privately insured 
or insured in another Member State for treatment options other than emergency healthcare.28 Such 
a demand seems to roughly reflect the reciprocal commitments that sustains an open system of 
healthcare, and would seem in conformity with the demands of communitarian solidarity. 
 
3.2.3 ASPIRATIONAL SOLIDARITY 
That leaves us with one category of EU citizen: those who temporarily find themselves in the host 
state, or even travel to another state for the sole purpose of obtaining healthcare services. The 
right of such patients to choose to seek healthcare in another Member State than the one to which 
they are affiliated is recognised by the Court and the Union legislator, and greatly expands the 
ownership of the patient over the decisions which affect his body and health. This individual right 
to cross-border healthcare is circumscribed, however, in order to prevent the patients in the state 
of treatment from being crowded out in access to high-quality healthcare.   
 
The aspirational right to equal access in all Member States is almost unconditionally accepted. 
The Court has extrapolated this right from Article 56 TFEU, and the recently adopted Directive 
on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare (‘PRD’) codifies the conditions and limitations of its 
exercise. The normative justification for this right, which allows all European Union citizens, 
regardless of Member State of affiliation, to access healthcare services in all Member States, lies 
both in the need to respect the patient’s autonomy in making decisions that affect his body and 
health and in the social function of healthcare, according to which treating a national with a less 
severe condition before treating a non-resident with a more serious condition would be 
unacceptable:  
                                                
26 In most Member States economically inactive residents are obliged to be publically insured. See, for example, 
Article 2 of the Dutch zorgverzekeringswet.  
27 See chapter 2.2. 
28 See National Health Service Regulations 2010 and Hospital Charging Regulations 2011. 
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“Members States also have to ensure that (..) all patients are treated equitably on the 
basis of their healthcare need rather than their Member State of social security 
affiliation.”29 
 
Until the recent negotiations on the PRD, it was never argued that this right of access could be 
limited. In the negotiations of the PRD, however, the Council successfully pushed for a limit to 
equal access in case the infrastructural stability of the healthcare system in the state of treatment 
was in danger. The justification for this limit is that a state’s obligation to provide for access to 
high-quality healthcare primarily covers its ‘own’ citizens. When such citizens are crowded out in 
access to a finite number of treatments, their right to healthcare comes under pressure. Article 4 
(3) PRD now reads as a textbook example of the theoretical limits to aspirational solidarity: 
“The principle of non-discrimination with regard to nationality shall be applied (..) 
without prejudice to the possibility for the Member State of treatment, where justified 
(..) by planning requirements relating to the aim of ensuring sufficient and permanent 
access to a balanced range of high-quality treatment in the Member State concerned 
or the wish to control costs and avoid, as far as possible, any waste of financial, 
technical and human resources, to adopt measures regarding access to treatment 
aimed at fulfilling its fundamental responsibility to ensure sufficient and permanent 
access to healthcare within its territory” 
 
It seems that in practice, however, this exception reflects political convenience more than a 
significant practical limitation to the aspirational capacity of patients to choose where and how to 
be treated. Patient inflow will, after all, usually not lead to any waste of financial, technical or 
human resources, given that the state of treatment may demand that non-affiliated patients pay the 
full cost of treatment. The argument that patient inflow can undermine access to healthcare for the 
state’s own nationals, moreover, is at best speculative, given that empirical research indicates that 
the exercise of aspirational mobility is most often connected to desire to avoid excessive waiting 
times.30 No Member State has, indeed, either before or since the adoption of the PRD, argued that 
allowing access of non-affiliated patients would undermine its capacity to meet the healthcare 
needs of affiliated patients. The potential use of this exception seems restricted to cases where 
medical resources are simply finite, such as in case of organ transplants (not surprisingly 
excluded from the scope of the PRD).31  
 
                                                
29 Article 4 (3) of Directive 2011/24. 
30 Commission Impact Assessment for the Directive on Cross-border Healthcare, SEC (2008) 2163, p. 68-69. 
31 See Article 1 (3)(b) of Directive 2011/24.  
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The more important question, both from the perspective of the individual’s right to choose where 
to undergo treatment, and from the perspective of the (financial) stability of the healthcare system 
in the state of treatment, is whether that state incurs a responsibility to subsidise or reimburse 
non-affiliated patients for such healthcare. The aspirational right to choose where to receive 
treatment would be significantly limited if reimbursement schemes are only available for 
treatments within the state of affiliation. The theoretical discussion on the scope of aspirational 
solidarity, above, has emphasised that no direct financial obligation rests on the state of 
treatment.32 A Belgian citizen who travels to Lisbon in order to have his hip replaced, in other 
words, must be treated by the Portuguese hospital, but may be asked to pay the full costs of 
treatment. Such citizen simply has no moral claim under EU law to demand that the Portuguese 
state (or rather, its taxpayers and contributors to medical insurance schemes) subsidise his 
aspirational choices as to where to receive healthcare.  In healthcare, financial responsibility for 
cross-border treatment is instead allocated to the state of affiliation. The next section will discuss 
this aspect, that is, the question when, and to which extent, Belgium must cover the costs incurred 
by ‘its’ citizens in Portuguese hospitals. 
 
3.3 RIGHTS TO CROSS-BORDER HEALTHCARE 
The previous section was relatively short, both in length and in contentious issues. Conversely, 
how the transnational solidarities extend the patient’s right to be reimbursed for healthcare 
obtained abroad will prove to be more contentious. What is problematic about the export of 
healthcare funds is that it eschews an individual financial entitlement to subsidised healthcare 
from the logic of its collective and territorial provision. While, in practice, very few patients even 
want to be treated abroad,33 given that domestic healthcare systems, on the whole, produce 
satisfying results for its citizens,34 and in the light of “linguistic barriers, geographic distance, the 
costs of staying abroad and lack of information about the kind of care provided”,35 three very 
different reasons may nonetheless inform the patients’ desire to obtain cross-border healthcare. 
Again, these distinguish between healthcare as need, healthcare as contract, and healthcare as 
                                                
32 See section 2.3.   
33 A recent Commission study shows that just about 4% of patients receive treatment in another Member State, which 
impacts as little as 1% on national insurance schemes. Commission Impact Assessment for the Directive on Cross-
border Healthcare, SEC (2008) 2163, p. 9. 
34 See for statistical data on the unmet need for medical services in different Member States: Commission Impact 
Assessment for the Directive on Cross-border Healthcare, SEC (2008) 2163, p. 68. 
35 See P. Koutrakos, ‘Healthcare as an Economic Service under EC Law’, in: M. Dougan and E. Spaventa (eds.), 
‘Social Welfare and EU Law’ (Hart, Oxford, 2005), p. 122 and Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509, 
para. 95. 
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choice.  The exact scope of the patient’s right to be reimbursed for cross-border healthcare 
depends on the category in which his claim falls. 
 
The first, and strongest, claim that warrants the extension of reimbursement mechanisms to cover 
treatment abroad is where the state of affiliation cannot provide treatment options that adequately 
protect the patient’s physical integrity. This is, in other words, purely a question of medical need. 
A strong case can be made under communitarian solidarity that a patient derives a right to seek 
healthcare abroad when his state of affiliation cannot provide for such adequate medical treatment 
(3.3.1). The second situation in which a patient has a legitimate claim to be reimbursed for 
treatment abroad is where the state of affiliation breaches the contractual obligation which 
underlies systems of collective healthcare insurance. Such insurance is premised on a market 
interaction: the state promises to facilitate access to a number of treatments listed in the 
compulsory insurance legislation in return for the patient ‘buying into’ the scheme. It will be 
argued patients derive a right under market solidarity to seek healthcare abroad when the state of 
affiliation cannot provide the treatments for which it has insured its citizens (3.3.2). The third 
normative justification for claims to reimbursement of cross-border healthcare is simply that a 
patient prefers treatment abroad. The exercise of such aspirational healthcare choices, however, 
is conditional upon the stable and continuous access to healthcare for immobile citizens (3.3.3). 
The table below summarises how the transnational solidarities extend the healthcare rights of 
patients to cover treatment options in other Member States.  
 
 Right to reimbursed treatment abroad?36 
Communitarian solidarity When the state of affiliation cannot provide adequate 
healthcare within medically justifiable time, the cost of 
treatment must be fully reimbursed. 
 
Market solidarity When a patient resides in state of treatment or when the state 
of affiliation cannot provide treatment for which it has insured 
its citizens, the cost of treatment must be fully reimbursed. 
 
Aspirational solidarity Whenever the patient chooses to. May only be limited to 
protect access to high-quality healthcare in the state of 
affiliation. The patient is reimbursed only up to costs of 
equivalent treatment in the state of affiliation. 
 
                                                
36 The reason why this section starts with a discussion of the rights to cross-border healthcare under communitarian 
solidarity instead of market solidarity, as in other chapters, is because it better frames the core distinction between 
healthcare as need and healthcare as choice. 
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As the next section will highlight, the Court’s case law does not accepts the basic premise that the 
individual’s right to cross-border healthcare should depend on his reason to seek such care. It has 
extrapolated all three solidarities from the same legislative instruments, and its case law conflates 
all three reasons and solidarities (sometimes in the very same reasoning). This lack of conceptual 
rigour makes its discussion in three separate sections a tricky business. It is argued, however, that 
breaking down the case law on the basis of the three solidarities, that is, on the basis of the reason 
for which a patient should have a right to seek healthcare abroad, will highlight that the Court’s 
case law at least reflects an intuitive appreciation of the different types of healthcare rights which 
a citizen derives from his state of affiliation.  
 
3.3.1 COMMUNITARIAN SOLIDARITY 
As Article 35 CFR emphasises, all Union citizens have a right to access ‘preventive healthcare’. 
There is a core minimum of healthcare entitlements that all European citizens can claim, even 
against their own state. This has been elaborated by the Court to entail that, in case the state of 
affiliation cannot provide for adequate healthcare treatment within its territory, a patient is 
allowed to receive treatment abroad without losing his right to reimbursement. Two situations 
exist in which a state is unable to meet the basic healthcare needs of its citizens. First, an 
affiliated patient may urgently need treatment while temporarily abroad. Second, the healthcare 
infrastructure in the state of affiliation may simply be inadequate. The Court has recognised the 
right to cross-border treatment (with retention of reimbursement rights) in both instances. 
Incapacity to provide adequate basic healthcare, in other words, is considered such an egregious 
violation of the communitarian duty which polities have vis-à-vis their own citizens that EU law 
sidesteps demands of territoriality in order to secure that individuals can access the healthcare 
appropriate to protect their physical integrity.  
 
The first situation in which communitarian solidarity allows patients to seek reimbursed treatment 
abroad is when medical emergencies arise while the affiliated citizen is abroad (a car accident on 
holiday, say). As the Court already held in Cowan, EU law guarantees its citizens ‘protection 
from harm’ while temporarily in another Member State.37 Indeed, Article 19 of Regulation 
883/2004 emphasises that an insured person who falls ill when on the territory of another state 
                                                
37 Case 186/87, Cowan [1989] ECR 159, para. 17. 
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“shall be entitled to the benefits in kind which become necessary on medical grounds during [the] 
stay”.38 The state providing the emergency treatment can then send the bill to the state of 
affiliation.39 What exactly constitutes a medical necessity is not completely clear. Van der Mei 
has argued that it arises when, “in the view of the doctor in the state of the visit, treatment cannot 
be postponed without endangering the life or health of the citizen concerned”.40 This sounds very 
similar to Ruger’s description of primary healthcare, meant to “avoid premature death and 
escapable morbidity”.41 Regulation 883/2004 adopts a slightly wider interpretation of medical 
necessity. The administrative commission on social security for migrant workers, whose task is to 
implement details of the cooperation between systems of social security, considers that:42 
“the concept of ‘necessary treatment’ cannot be interpreted ‘as meaning that [the 
benefit of that provision is] limited solely to cases where the treatment provided has 
become necessary due to sudden illness. In particular, the circumstance that the 
treatment necessitated by developments in the insured person’s state of health during 
his temporary stay in another Member State may be linked to a pre-existent 
pathology of which he is aware, such as a chronic illness, does not mean that the 
conditions for the application of these provisions are not fulfilled”43 
“in order to determine whether a benefit in kind meets the requirement [of necessity] 
only medical factors within the context of a temporary stay, taking into account the 
medical condition and past history of the person considered, shall be considered”.44 
 
When medical factors indicate a “pressing need for intervention”,45 regardless of the patients’ 
awareness that he could potentially require medical assistance while temporarily in another 
state,46 the state of affiliation must refund treatment undergone. Logically, in light of the medical 
necessity underlying such claim of reimbursement, the state of affiliation should fully reimburse 
the costs of treatment. It seems hardly just that patients should be made to pay for emergency 
treatment simply because they find themselves abroad when illness strikes. The Court, however, 
has recently undercut this assumption.47 In Commission v Spain, it held that the fact that patients 
                                                
38 Previously Article 22 (1)(a) of 1408/71. See Case C-413/99, Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091, para. 89, and Case C-
512/08, Commission v France [2011] nyr, para. 26. 
39 Article 19 of Regulation 883/2004. 
40 A. P. Van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Persons’,  (Oxford, Hart, 2003), p. 252-3.  
41 See J. Ruger, ‘Health and Social Justice’, (Oxford, OUP, 2009), chapter 4.  
42 Case C-211/08, Commission v Spain [2010] nyr, para. 9. 
43 Recital 7 of the preamble to Decision 194 of the Administrative Commission of the European Communities on 
Social Security for Migrant Workers (OJ 2004 L 104, p. 127). 
44 Article 2 of exacting terms of Decision 194 of the Administrative Commission of the European Communities on 
Social Security for Migrant Workers (OJ 2004 L 104, p. 127). 
45 Cf. C-206/94, Paletta [1996] ECR I-2357, para. 20. 
46 Case C-211/08, Commission v Spain [2010] nyr. 
47 See for critique also A. P. Van der Mei, ‘Cross-Border Access to Healthcare and Entitlement to Complementary 
“Vanbraekel” Reimbursement’ 36 ELRev (2011), 431ff. 
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are not fully reimbursed in case of emergency treatment abroad can never constitute a restriction 
to their rights to free movement, exactly because treatment cannot be delayed.48 In other words, 
partial reimbursement will not stop a patient from accessing healthcare abroad when he 
desperately needs such treatment to save his life. This ‘logic’ shows both the bankruptcy of the 
paradigm of restriction as an arbitrator between permissible and impermissible regulatory 
obstacles in Europe and highlights that the Court is still unaware of the normative dynamics 
underlying the rights of patients in extra-territorial contexts.49  
 
The second situation in which medical need allows a patient to seek reimbursed healthcare abroad 
is more contentious. In a number of rulings in the last fifteen years, the Court has carved out a 
communitarian obligation on Member States to provide adequate healthcare within their 
territories. The normative justification for this obligation lies in the fundamental importance of 
health to ‘the good life’. As AG Colomer put it: 
“being a fundamental asset, health cannot be considered solely in terms of social 
expenditure and latent economic difficulties (..) This right is perceived as a personal 
entitlement, unconnected to a person’s relationship with social security”50 
 
The Court and Union legislator have repeatedly emphasised the need for Member States to 
provide a system of “safe, high-quality, efficient and quantitatively adequate healthcare”,51 on the 
basis of “overarching values of universality, (..) equity and solidarity”.52 Starting from its ruling 
in Geraerts-Smit and Peerbooms, the Court has taken this to imply that whenever Member States 
cannot provide for such adequate healthcare within their territory, patients are allowed to seek, 
and be reimbursed for, treatment abroad. It carved out this right to extra-territorial healthcare in a 
subtle a contrario reasoning, stressing that Member States were only allowed to refuse 
reimbursement when: 
“the same or equally effective treatment can be obtained without undue delay at an 
establishment [in the state of affiliation]”.53   
                                                
48 Case C-211/08, Commission v Spain [2010] nyr, para. 65.  
49 A mitigating practical circumstance (if no excuse given the Court’s silence on the issue) may be that, as discussed 
in section 3.2.2. above, the state of treatment may be expected to bear the additional costs for emergency treatment. 
50 Opinion of AG Colomer in Case C-444/05, Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I-3185, para. 40, with reference to the 
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Healthcare (OJ 2003, C 234), p. 36. 
51 Recital 4 of Directive 2011/24. See also Article 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 11 of the European Social Charter. 
52 Recital 21 of Directive 2011/24. See also Council conclusions on common values and principles, 2006/C 146/01. 
53 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smit and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, para. 108. See Case C-173/09, Elchinov [2010] 
nyr, para. 66 for the same a contrario reasoning. 
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In other words, when adequate treatment without undue delay cannot be guaranteed, Member 
States fail to meet their moral obligation towards its citizens, and patients are to be reimbursed for 
the treatment obtained abroad. Confusingly, the Court has couched such rights to adequate 
healthcare in both Regulation 1408/71 (now Regulation 883/2004) and Article 56 TFEU 
directly,54 while its language seems to suggest that it is in fact a citizenship right based on 
medical need alone, which could more convincingly be extrapolated from Article 21 TFEU and 
Article 35 CFR.55 Regardless of this confusion, it is clear that much of the practical relevance of 
communitarian solidarity in healthcare depends on how the terms ‘effective treatment’ and 
‘without undue delay’ are interpreted.  
 
The Court has not explicitly discussed the concept of ‘effective treatment’. The case in which it 
comes closest to defining the concept is Elchinov, which dealt with a Bulgarian national who 
suffered from a malignant oncological disease of the eye. The only treatment option offered by 
the Bulgarian healthcare fund with which he was affiliated was the removal of the eye.56 Instead 
of opting for that procedure, Elchinov sough ‘high-technology radiotherapy’ in Germany (which 
cured the disease and allowed Elchinov to keep his eye) and he subsequently demanded that the 
costs be reimbursed by the Bulgarian healthcare fund.57 Could Mr. Elchinov base a claim to 
reimbursement on the fact that the treatment provided by Bulgaria was simply inadequate, or, 
more precisely, did not constitute ‘effective treatment’? The Court argues that while in principle 
Elchinov cannot rely on EU law to obtain reimbursed treatment abroad when such treatment is 
not offered by his state of affiliation,58 this may be different when “the same or equally effective 
                                                
54 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smit and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, para. 108, couching the obligation in (what is 
now) Article 56 TFEU, and Case C-173/09, Elchinov [2010] nyr, para. 73, finding that it derives from the 
coordination regulation.  
55 Both approaches have been attacked in very dogmatic terms, but it is difficult to argue that such rights would not 
derive from the citizenship provisions anyway. See for critique, however: P. Cabral, ‘The Internal Market and the 
Right to Cross-Border Healthcare’ 29 ELRev (2004), p. 677; and the Opinion of AG Colomer in Case C-157/99, 
Geraets-Smit and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473. 
56 Case C-173/09, Elchinov [2010] nyr. 
57 Arguably on the basis of market solidarity, as the Bulgarian insurer included high-technology radiotherapy for 
oncological and non-oncological treatment’ in its basket but did not offer the treatment. See Opinion of AG Villalón 
in Case C-173/09, Elchinov [2010] nyr, para. 9. And Case C-173/09, Elchinov [2010] nyr, para. 59, 62. 
58 The Court always uses the same phrase: “While it is established that EU law does not detract from the power of the 
Member States to organise their social security systems and that, in the absence of harmonisation at European Union 
level, it is for the legislation of each Member State to determine the conditions for the grant of social security 
benefits, the fact nevertheless remains that, when exercising that power, Member States must comply with EU law 
and, in particular, with the provisions on the freedom to provide services”. See Case C-490/09, Commission v 
Luxemburg [2011] nyr, para. 32; Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré and Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509, para.100; or Case 
C-173/09, Elchinov [2010] nyr, para. 40. 
 88 
treatment”59 is not available in that state. In making this assessment, the Court demands that 
account is taken only of the individual pathological condition of the patient, including the nature 
of the disease and the degree of pain.60 In the case at hand, the Court finds, without giving a real 
interpretation of the medical situation, that given that the treatment options in Bulgaria were not 
equally effective as those offered in Germany (an assessment made by the referring national 
court), Elchinov should be reimbursed for that treatment.61 While the significance of Elchinov is 
difficult to gauge due to the conflation of different strands of case law, this individualised 
assessment, which looks at the healthcare needs of the citizen on the basis of his pathological 
condition alone, is consistent with the obligation under communitarian solidarity to provide for 
‘safe and high-quality’ healthcare for all citizens. In this view, states have to reimburse treatment 
that is vital for the patient’s physical integrity but which cannot effectively be provided at home.  
 
The other variable in the Court’s case law is the term ‘undue delay’. The Court has discussed this 
most explicitly in Watts. In that case, Mrs. Watts, a UK national, required a hip replacement. 
After the diagnosis had been made, however, she was to wait for over a year before such 
treatment could be offered within the UK, leaving her in ‘constant pain’ and unable to work.62 
Instead of waiting for a year, Watts opted to travel to France, where the treatment could be 
offered in a matter of weeks. Once back in the UK, she argued that she should be reimbursed by 
the NHS for the cost of treatment, given that treatment ‘without undue delay’ had not been 
available. The Court indicates that any assessment about whether the delay was medically 
acceptable or not must be made on the basis of the “individual pathological condition of the 
patient”63 alone, including the “current state of health and the probable course of [the patient’s] 
disease”,64 as well as of the “degree of pain or the nature of the patient’s disability” and “his 
medical history”.65 Where waiting times are too long or abnormal, and thereby acerbate medical 
need,66 they “restrict access to balanced, high-quality hospital care”,67 and patients are allowed to 
                                                
59 Case C-173/09, Elchinov [nyr], para 65. 
60 Case C-173/09, Elchinov [nyr], para 66/67. 
61 Case C-173/09, Elchinov [nyr], para 67. 
62 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4325, para. 9 and 15, where the national court 
held that 12 months was ‘clearly undue’. 
63 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4325, para. 87 See also Case C-385/99, Müller-
Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509, para. 92. Case C-173/09, Elchinov [nyr], para 73. Case C-56/01, Inizan [2003] ECR I-
12403, para. 42 and 44, Case C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4352, para. 56-57 
64, Case C-173/09, Elchinov [nyr], para 54. 
65 Case C-56/01, Inizan [2003] ECR I-12403, para. 46, and Case C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4352, para. 62, Case 
C-173/09, Elchinov [nyr], para 66. 
66 The referring national court in Watts had already established that the delay was ‘undue’. See Opinion of AG 
Geelhoed in Case C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4325, para. 15. 
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‘queue jump’ and demand that treatment abroad be funded by the state of affiliation. Medical 
necessity, in other words, trumps any financial or programmatic concern that underlies waiting 
lists.  
 
In elaborating the exact conditions under which patients are allowed to seek treatment abroad to 
compensate for the failures of their own state’s medical system, the Court is arguably (or 
intuitively) looking for instances which constitute an excessively egregious violation of the 
citizens’ fundamental right to access safe and high-quality healthcare. Clearly, the fact that 
cosmetic surgery – as a rule – is not included in the list of refundable treatments, or that a waiting 
list is in place for the removal of tonsils, cannot reasonably constitute a violation of a state’s 
obligation to provide healthcare that is adequate to protect its citizens’ physical integrity, whereas 
a waiting time of a year before a hip could be replaced, leaving the patient in “constant pain”, or a 
refusal to treat malignant oncological disease of the eye (for which the only alternative domestic 
treatment is the removal of the eye!), seems to constitute exactly that.  
 
Whenever a medical emergency occurs while abroad, or the patient’s own state cannot provide 
treatment adequate to protect his physical integrity, the state of affiliation must fully refund the 
cost of treatment provided abroad.68 This makes sense – if communitarian solidarity reflects a 
basic moral obligation and guarantees patients that they will be treated regardless of their state’s 
incapacity to do so, any limitation to their right to reimbursement would have the perverse effect 
of encouraging Member States not to provide adequate healthcare. In Commission v Spain, as 
discussed above, the Court has destabilised the assumption that patients do not have to make any 
financial contribution when they seek healthcare abroad out of medical need, as was previously 
explicitly recognised in Elchinov and Watts.69 This reflects the Court’s conflation of the different 
normative dimensions of cross-border healthcare, and partially undermines its greatest 
achievement in the area of healthcare. Through its case law, after all, access to adequate 
healthcare has become a basic public social right which Union citizens derive by virtue of EU 
law,70 and can be seen as some sort of institutionalized Hippocratic Oath.71 
                                                                                                                                                   
67 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4325, para. 84, see also Case C-372/04, Watts 
[2006] ECR I-4325, para. 63and 70, Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré and Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509, para. 92, or A. 
P. Van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Persons’,  (Hart, Oxford, 2003), p. 305.  
68 Case C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4325, para. 130-131, See Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case C-211/08, 
Commission v Spain [2010] nyr, para. 92. 
69 Case C-173/09, Elchinov [nyr], para. 74-77, and Case C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4352, para. 130. 
70 Contrast with the US approach, where the Supreme Court denied many patients a judicial remedy against the 
denial of healthcare by providers (Aetna Health Inc v Davila, 2004). 
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3.3.2 MARKET SOLIDARITY 
This section describes how the contractual nature of the relationship between the patient and the 
healthcare system to which he is affiliated engenders claims to extra-territorial healthcare. It is 
argued that the market solidarity implicit in such contractual relationship allows for two 
exceptions to the territorial consumption of healthcare. The first is where a citizen who is 
employed in the state of affiliation, and who derives a right to healthcare from that status alone, 
resides in another Member State. The second is where the state of affiliation cannot meet the 
contractual terms of its own healthcare legislation. In both occurrences, the normative 
justification for the extension of healthcare rights to cover extra-territorial treatment lies in the 
interdependent economic relationship between the parties.  
 
The market relationship that exists between a worker and his state of employment has been 
described at length in the first part of this thesis. It was argued that that relationship engenders 
claims of solidarity as a corollary of the interdependence between the parties. This 
interdependence ties the socio-economic status and rights of the migrant worker to that of the 
state of employment. Workers, and their family members, derive a right to healthcare by virtue of 
their economic engagement with the market in the state of employment, regardless of their place 
of residence. In other words, economic activity trumps residence as a connecting factor for 
demands of social solidarity. In healthcare, this entails that the worker is affiliated to the 
healthcare insurance schemes of his state of employment rather than his state of residence. These 
ties of market solidarity entitle a frontier worker and his family members to access healthcare in 
his state of residence, while the bill is sent to his state of employment, where his is insured for 
such treatment. Regulation 883/2004 indeed accepts the need to extend healthcare rights to 
include the worker’s place of residence:  
 “an insured person or members of his family who reside in a Member State other 
than the competent state shall receive in the Member State of residence benefits in 
kind provided, on behalf of the competent institution, by the institution of the place of 
                                                                                                                                                   
71 The Hippocratic Oath reads like a cosmopolitan obligation on each polity. As defined in the Declaration of Geneva 
1948: “I solemnly pledge myself to consecrate my life to the service of humanity; (..) the health of my patient will be 
my first consideration; I will not permit considerations of religion, nationality, race, party politics or social standing 
intervene between my duty and my patient (..)”. 
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residence, in accordance with the provisions of the legislation it applies, as though 
they were insured under the said legislation”72 
 
This extraterritorial effect of market solidarity means that a frontier worker may choose whether 
to access healthcare in his state of employment (say, a routine check after work), or in his state of 
residence (if he needs to be in hospital for a week and wishes to be close to his family). Market 
solidarity, after all, is a prerogative for, rather than an obligation on, the worker. Regardless of the 
worker’s choice where to obtain treatment, the state of employment must bear the full cost of 
treatment. 73 In other words, the patient does not lose out financially depending on his choice of 
the state of treatment. This makes sense: if the objective is to bolster the worker’s contractual 
right to healthcare, it would be strange if workers are worse off simply by virtue of the 
discrepancy in the cost of treatment between the state of employment and state of residence. The 
state of employment, by contrast, gains or loses out financially depending on how the cost of 
treatment abroad relates to the cost of treatment ‘at home’. The extraterritorial effect of market 
solidarity cannot, as a rule, extend to cover medical costs incurred in other states than the 
worker’s state of residence or employment.74 
 
Market solidarity, however, also allows for a more general right to cross-border healthcare. The 
idea of compulsory insurance, which underlies the healthcare systems in almost all Member 
States, is based on a (fictitious) market interaction: citizens insure themselves against a set 
number of injuries or diseases, and can, in return, access the treatment options required to prevent 
or cure such injuries and diseases. In an attempt to ensure that Member States meet their part of 
the bargain, and in order to protect citizens against a breach of their contractual right to 
healthcare, the Court has extrapolated from market solidarity a sort of contractual liability. 
Whenever a state cannot, physically, provide a treatment for which it has insured its affiliated 
patients, market solidarity allows for the enforcement of the ‘healthcare contract’ by granting 
such patients the right to obtain the treatment in another Member State with the retention of 
reimbursement schemes in the state of affiliation. This contractual liability on part of the Member 
                                                
72 See Article 19 (1) of 883/2004. Note that while the provision speaks of an ‘insured person’ it really means worker, 
as economically inactive citizens are automatically insured in state of residence. 
73 Article 21 of Regulation 883/2004 allows for direct reimbursement to the patient, while Article 35 of that 
Regulation provides for the situation where reimbursement is made to the healthcare institution in the state of 
treatment.  
74 A similar logic is at play where pensioners reside in a different state than the one from which they obtain their 
pensions and in which they are insured against sickness (which are often tied). See Case C-345/09, Van Delft [nyr], 
para. 97ff. 
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States can be traced back to the very beginning of the regulation of cross-border healthcare. 
Article 22 (2) of Regulation 1408/71, in its original version, was arguably aimed at the exact 
situation where Member States ‘default’ on their healthcare obligations. It stated that Member 
States must reimburse healthcare abroad when the “treatment in question cannot be provided for 
the person concerned within the territory of the state in which he resides”.75 The Court, in the 
Pierik cases, which involved a Dutch national who underwent hydrotherapy in Germany, and was 
subsequently denied reimbursement by the Dutch authorities on the basis that such treatment was 
not included in their ‘basket’ of healthcare, took Article 22 (2) to entail an obligation of 
reimbursement whenever:  
“the treatment provided in another Member State is more effective than that which 
the person concerned can receive in the Member State where he resides”76 
 
This interpretation appears to move far beyond what is required by market solidarity. The 
Member States were indeedquick to limit this interpretation by inserting a new clause in 
Regulation 1408/71, limiting the instances falling under Article 22 (2) to situations where 
“treatment in question is among the benefits provided for” by the legislation of the state of 
affiliation and such treatment cannot be given “within the time normally necessary for obtaining 
treatment in the Member State of residence”.77 The term ‘time normally necessary’ thus seems to 
allows, in particular in light of the autonomy which Member States retain to decide on their 
basket of healthcare, for waiting lists that inevitably arise in access to finite resources.78 The right 
under market solidarity to enforce a healthcare contract by way of free movement only appears to 
cover instances where treatment “cannot physically be provided” or is “materially and technically 
impossible”, rather than extending to instances where medical need warrants quick treatment.79 
After all, the contractual obligation that Member States enter into is to provide the treatments 
listed, not to ensure a healthcare system that is the most effective in Europe. The state of 
affiliation only breaches its obligations under market solidarity when it is simply incapable of 
providing a treatment for which it has insured its citizens. Only in such circumstances, then, does 
that solidarity extend the contractual right to healthcare to cover the whole of the Union and allow 
the patient to seek, and be reimbursed for, treatment abroad.  
                                                
75 Emphasis added. 
76 Case 117/77, Pierik I [1978] ECR 825, para.22, emphasis added. 
77 Emphasis added. 
78 A. P. Van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Persons’,  (Oxford, Hart, 2003), p. 256 and 305. 
79 Opinion of AG Saggio in Case C-368/98, Vanbraekel [2001] ECR I-5363, para.13. See also Opinion of AG 
Villalón in Case C-173/09, Elchinov [2010] nyr, para. 1. 
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On first sight, this exception appears quite unproblematic. Why would a Member State that 
remains free to exclude certain treatments from its basket of healthcare,80 insure its citizens for a 
treatment that it cannot provide? The reality is a bit more complex than that. Many Member 
States list the treatments against which they insure their citizens in very general terms, either in 
order to keep up with technological developments in medicine, to convince all citizens to ‘buy 
into’ an insurance scheme, or simply to prevent bureaucratic hassle.81 Such wide definitions of 
the precise basket of healthcare that affiliated patients may access at the expense of the state have 
provided fertile grounds for litigation as to the extent of the contractual obligation on states under 
market solidarity. Peerbooms is a good example of such a case.82 The case dealt with a comatose 
Dutch national, whose doctor advised that he undergo intensive therapy using neurostimulation, 
which was, however, not available in the Netherlands.83 Mr. Peerbooms was instead transferred to 
an Austrian hospital where he was treated using neurostimulation, and, eventually, awoke from 
his coma. Upon return to the Netherlands he claimed that the cost of treatment should be 
reimbursed by the Dutch state. The Dutch state, however, argued that such treatment fell outside 
the ‘basket’ of healthcare provided and would, therefore, not be reimbursed. The Dutch 
legislation that defines the content of compulsory insurance schemes does not, however, offer an 
exhaustive list of all subsidised treatments but rather covers all treatments that is medically 
“necessary” and is considered “normal in professional circles”.84 Accordingly, the question to be 
answered in order to assess whether Peerbooms had a right to be reimbursed on the basis that the 
Netherlands could not, physically, provide a treatment for which it had contractually undertaken 
to insured him, was whether neurostimulation was indeed both ‘necessary’ and ‘normal’.  
 
The Court implicitly acknowledges the concept of market solidarity by emphasising that EU law 
allows for the enforcement of the state’s contractual healthcare obligations: 
“[Union] law cannot in principle have the effect of requiring a Member State to 
extend the list of medical services paid for by its social insurance system. 
                                                
80 Case C-173/09, Elchinov [2010] nyr, para. 58.  
81 C. Newdick, ‘Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social 
Solidarity’ 43 CMLR (2006), p. 1662.  
82 Even if the Court did not even consider Article 22 (2) of Regulation 1408/71 in that case, which contains the 
obligation on Member States to reimburse the cost of treatment abroad in case a state of affiliation cannot provide for 
treatments within its territory. AG Colomer does consider that provision in depth.  
83 Neurostimulation was used on an experimental basis in 2 hospitals in the Netherlands, which, however, required 
patients to be under 25. Peerbooms was 35 years old at the time of the accident. 
84 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smit and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, para. 10, 91. Article 10 (a) of the current Dutch 
Zorgverzekeringswet still uses the same conditions: “geneeskundige zorg (..) zoals die door huisartsen en 
verloskundigen placht te geschieden”. 
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[However], a scheme of prior authorization [before treatment abroad is 
reimbursed] cannot legitimise discretionary decisions taken by the national 
authorities. Therefore, in order for a prior administrative authorisation scheme to 
be justified (..) it must, in any event, be based on objective, non-discriminatory 
criteria which are known in advance, in such a way as to circumscribe the exercise 
of the national authorities' discretion, so that it is not used arbitrarily.”85 
 
In other words, whether or not patients have a right to enforce their contractual right to healthcare 
throughout the Union depends on the terms of the contractual relationship between affiliated 
patient and the healthcare administration. The Court then looked at the content of this contractual 
obligation: how must the terms ‘normal’ and ‘necessary’ of the Dutch healthcare contract be 
interpreted? It argues that the term ‘normal’ must take account not only of what is considered 
‘normal’ by Dutch scientists, but must take account of international scientific opinions.86 This 
way, the Court ensures that Dutch patients can actually access treatments that are generally 
considered to fall within the scope of their healthcare insurance, rather than solely those which 
are actually available within the Dutch territory.87 In interpreting the term medically ‘necessary’, 
the Court does not look for medical necessity – as it does under communitarian solidarity – but 
rather whether the cross-border movement was necessary. In its ruling, the Court highlights that 
treatment abroad is always considered ‘necessary’ – and must therefore be reimbursed – when the 
“treatment covered by the national insurance system cannot be provided by a contracted 
establishment”.88 Read together, these interpretations seem to suggest that whenever a treatment 
option can be construed to fall within the ‘basket of healthcare’ in the state of affiliation, but 
cannot be provided on its territory, the patient has a right to access, and be reimbursed for, that 
treatment in another state. The ruling of the Court in Elchinov (even if it essentially deals, as was 
argued, with the demands of communitarian solidarity) seems to confirm this reading:   
“it is for each Member State to decide which medical benefits are reimbursed by its 
own social security system (..) [However], where the list of medical benefits 
reimbursed does not expressly and precisely specify the treatment method applied but 
defines types of treatment (..) prior authorisation cannot be refused on the ground 
that such a treatment method is not available in the Member State of residence of the 
insured person, since such a ground, if it were accepted, would imply a restriction on 
the scope of the second subparagraph of Article 22(2) of Regulation No 1408/71.”89 
                                                
85 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smit and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, para. 86 and 90. 
86 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smit and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, para. 94-97. 
87 See also explicitly Elchinov, where the Court argued that the fact that a certain treatment cannot be provided on the 
territory of a state does not justify a presumption that it is not covered in that state’s lists of treatments.  
88 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smit and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, para. 107, emphasis added. 
89 Case C-173/09, Elchinov [2010] nyr, para. 59 and 62. Article 22 (2) of Regulation 1408/71 is now replaced by 
Article 20 of Regulation 883/2004. 
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Market solidarity thus serves as a tool for patients to enforce access to the basket of healthcare 
that they are insured against under the terms of collective insurance schemes by way of free 
movement. Logically, then, and as accepted by the Union legislator in Article 35 of Regulation 
883/2004,90 the right to reimbursement under market solidarity covers the full cost of the 
treatment obtained abroad. It would indeed be strange if patients are made to pay for the 
inadequacies of the insurance scheme in their state of affiliation. Patient mobility under market 
solidarity is thus financially neutral for the patient,91 while it can in theory be either advantageous 
or disadvantageous for the healthcare institution in the state of affiliation, depending on how the 
costs of treatment abroad compare to the costs of the treatment at home. 
 
Situations in which patients are able to invoke a claim under market solidarity to obtain 
reimbursement for treatment which their state of affiliation cannot provide, remain, however, 
very exceptional. Empirical research suggests that the unmet need of healthcare is very limited 
within the European Union,92 and the situations in which such a clear incongruity between the 
treatments which are insured and those actually offered exists, are likely to be even smaller. 
Rather, the contractual nature of market solidarity highlights that this exception to the principle of 
territoriality is meant to help Member States meet their contractual healthcare obligations. 
Empirical research shows that Member States use these provisions to make up for the lack of 
specialisation or financial and technological resources required to treat rare diseases,93 or to 
balance out a mismatch between the supply and demand of healthcare services among 
neighbouring states.94 In such cases, Member States use cross-border healthcare as a vehicle to 
                                                
90 Article 35 reads: “the benefits in kind provided by the institution of a Member State on behalf of the institution of 
another Member State under this Chapter shall give rise to full reimbursement”. 
91 Opinion of AG Colomer in Case C-56/01, Inizan [2003] ECR I-12403, para. 29. 
92 Commission Impact Assessment for the Directive on Cross-border Healthcare, SEC (2008) 2163, p. 68. 
93 Malta and Luxemburg, for example, simply outsource treatment of such patients to other systems, which frees up 
resources for other treatments. Likewise, it allows less rich Member States to offer treatment options that are (for the 
moment) unavailable at home. See also Opinion of AG Villalón in Case C-173/09, Elchinov [2010] nyr, para. 72: “a 
system such as the Bulgarian system, which seeks to offer a very advanced list of treatment that is paid for by the 
fund, benefits from the knowledge and technology of other Member States which have the technical resources to 
which Bulgaria aspires. If a Member State wishes to be at the cutting edge of medical treatment (which naturally 
takes time), European Union law allows its citizens to receive in another Member State treatment which the former 
State wishes to make available domestically, although not at present in a position to do so.” 
94 Commission Impact Assessment for the Directive on Cross-border Healthcare, SEC (2008) 2163, p. 42: “Belgium 
has had larger patient flows for planned care than most other Member States, in particular with Dutch patients being 
treated in Flanders through contracts between Dutch health insurers and Belgian providers. In this case study, the 
researchers consider that as well as being convenient for patients, this is more efficient for both the Dutch insurers 
(providing care that is faster and cheaper, as well as being perceived as technologically advanced and of high 
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meet the healthcare needs of their affiliated citizens that they are – for whatever reason – not 
capable of themselves. 
 
3.3.3 ASPIRATIONAL SOLIDARITY 
Can a citizen choose to receive treatment abroad when similar treatment is available ‘at home’, 
and still demand that his state of affiliation refund this treatment? The Court and Union legislator 
have indeed recognised this aspirational right to be in control over the development of one’s own 
body, even if it has been circumscribed in order to prevent distributive asymmetries from 
undermining the domestic provision of universal, adequate and permanent access to a balanced 
range of high-quality healthcare. After all, one individuals’ exercise of cross-border healthcare 
should not deprive access to such care for other individuals.  
   
Already in the late ‘70s, the Court first attempted to ensure the rights for all Union citizens to 
seek reimbursed healthcare abroad, independently of medical need or contractual terms. In the 
Pierik cases, it argued that Regulation 1408/71 offered citizens the unconditional ‘opportunity’ to 
seek healthcare abroad. The Member States, however, evidently displeased with the Court’s 
ruling, amended the Regulation to restrict the right to cross-border healthcare to cases where 
healthcare could not be offered ‘at home’.95 About two decades later, the Court had another go, 
against the opinion of AG Colomer,96 this time finding that the aspirational right to cross-border 
healthcare could be directly derived from Article 56 TFEU. In Decker, Kohll, and Müller-
Fauré,97 cases which all dealt with demands for reimbursement for medical services which could 
equally effectively have been provided on the territory of the state of affiliation, the Court 
acknowledged the right of patients to seek healthcare abroad out of choice rather than need as a 
new right to cross-border healthcare, which exists independently from,98 and in addition to, the 
rights under Regulation 883/2004 and the right to timely healthcare under communitarian 
solidarity.99 
                                                                                                                                                   
quality) and the Belgian providers (helping to overcome overcapacity in the acute hospital sector by treating patients 
from abroad).” 
95 Case 182/78, Pierik II [1979] ECR 1977, para. 17. 
96 Opinion of AG Colomer in Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré and Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509, para. 56 and 61. 
97 Case C-158/96, Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931, para. 34-35, Case C-120/95, Decker [1998] ECR I-1831, para. 35-36. 
98 Recitals 28 and 31 of Directive 2011/24. 
99 Which also explains an apparent paradox in the Court’s case law which some commentators have picked up. The 
Court had, on the one hand, held that the requirement of prior authorisation under Regulation 883/2004 does not limit 
the right to free movement, but indeed facilitates it; (See Case C-56/01, Inizan [2003] ECR I-12403, para. 22) while 
that very same requirement is now held to be contrary to Article 56 TFEU. This, however, makes perfect sense: while 
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Both the Court and the Union legislator have since cemented the aspirational right to seek out 
treatment abroad with retention of reimbursement mechanisms. The PRD clearly couches the 
right in aspirational terms,100 as contributing to the individual’s capacity to live a ‘better life’101 
by allowing him choose healthcare which is cheaper, faster, better,102 closer to home,103 or simply 
his “preferred choice”.104 In solidifying the legal aspirational right to cross-border healthcare, the 
Court has come up with a clever trick, which has now been codified in the PRD. It simply 
reversed the burden of proof for the actual exercise of cross-border healthcare: 
“the Member State of affiliation shall ensure that costs incurred by an insured person 
who receives cross-border healthcare are reimbursed, if the healthcare in question is 
among the benefits to which the insured person is entitled in the Member State of 
affiliation” 105 
 
Rather than the patient having to argue why his treatment abroad should be reimbursed, the state 
of affiliation must now show that the patient’s movement would cause (significant) problems for 
its capacity to sustain a system of high-quality healthcare – not simply that the same treatment 
was available ‘at home’. As the theoretical discussion on the scope of aspirational solidarity has 
highlighted, however, it is not unconditional but can instead be limited where it undercuts the 
capacity of Member State to ensure access to medical treatment for its own citizens. Member 
States have typically brought forward two arguments of this type. These concerns touch on the 
infrastructural and financial stability of the healthcare system in the state of affiliation, and 
ultimately relate to the need to guarantee universal, sufficient and permanent access to a balanced 
range of high-quality treatment for that state’s immobile citizens. The infrastructural argument 
runs a bit like this: mass patient mobility will lead to a waste of technical and financial resources, 
and, potentially, a decrease in investment on cost-intensive treatments; leaving ‘immobile’ 
                                                                                                                                                   
a system of prior authorisation in the Regulations does not limit the right to market solidarity (and indeed implements 
it), it does limit the right to aspirational solidarity which citizens derive from Article 56 TFEU directly.  
100 See information obligations and duty of care obligations, Opinion of AG Colomer in Case C-56/01, Inizan [2003] 
ECR I-12403, para 30. 
101 For example Opinion of AG Colomer in Case C-56/01, Inizan [2003] ECR I-12403, para 6: “patients are entitled 
to benefit from scientific and medical advances achieved in other European states”. 
102 Consider the difference in survival rates for certain diseases. Survival rates for bladder cancer range from 47% in 
Poland and Estonia to 78% in Austria; and for breast cancer from 60 % in Slovakia to 82,6 % in Sweden. See 
Commission Impact Assessment for the Directive on Cross-border Healthcare, SEC (2008) 2163, p. 21, referring to 
ROCARE 3 SUMMARY: Annals of Oncology 14 (supplement 5): v128-v149, 2003. 
103 Recital 39 of Directive 2011/24.  
104 Commission Impact Assessment for the Directive on Cross-border Healthcare, SEC (2008) 2163, p. 8. 
105 See Article 7 and recital 38 of Directive 2011/24.  
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patients in the state of affiliation with a qualitatively impoverished health service.106 The 
infrastructural exception to aspirational solidarity has been interpreted quite narrowly by the 
Court, which requires that Member States objectively and empirically107 demonstrate the 
existence and scope of infrastructural pressures,108 that equally effective and timely treatment is 
indeed available at home,109 and that a causal link exists between the exercise of free movement 
and the concerns of the quality of available healthcare.110 In practice, and as codified by the PRD, 
it appears that this exception is meant to primarily protect those treatments which “requires use of 
highly specialised and cost-intensive medical infrastructure or medical equipment”,111 and whose 
availability is more contingent on continuous investments and thus more sensitive to patient 
outflow.112 Any assessment will therefore ultimately be based on the projected number of mobile 
patients, the amount invested in a certain piece of technology, its operating costs, and whether or 
not it is specialised equipment,113 and not, as suggested in earlier case law and doctrine, on the 
somewhat simplistic distinction between hospital and non-hospital care.114 The Commission’s 
capacity to control the use of this exception by the Member States115 has been bolstered 
significantly by the obligation on Member States to notify the Commission on the types of 
treatment that they consider should fall under this exception.116  
 
The second way in which complete patient mobility could potentially undercut access of all 
citizens to high-quality healthcare is by causing financial asymmetries. Bluntly put, allowing 
patients to choose where to obtain healthcare could create an incentive for patients to seek out 
more expensive treatment abroad, and force the healthcare institutions in poorer Member States to 
                                                
106 Even accepted by Sharpston, who did not recognise the analogous situation in respect of education (see section 
3.4.1. above). See Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-512/08, Commission v France [2011] nyr, para. 78. 
107 This argument appears quite tenuous and speculative, given that aspirational movement by patients is (at least) 
equally likely to lead to more efficient provision of healthcare for those patients who prefer to ‘stay at home’, by 
limiting waiting times and creating incentives for healthcare systems to provide high-quality care. See Commission 
Impact Assessment for the Directive on Cross-border Healthcare, SEC (2008) 2163, p. 44-45, and 63. Even a 
conservative estimate has shown that it would save €180 million (taking account of compliance costs), and allow 
780,000 extra patients to be treated.  
108 See list used by France in Case C-512/08, Commission v France [2011] nyr, para. 9; Case C-56/01, Inizan [2003] 
ECR I-12403, para. 57. See also recital 44 of Directive 2011/24.  
109 PRD 8 (5) and (6) (d) and Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré and Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509, para. 89-92. 
110 Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré and Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509, para. 83-85. 
111 Article 8 (2) of Directive 2011/24.  
112 E.g. Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smit and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, para. 106, or Case C-385/99, Müller-
Fauré and Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509, p. 90-92. 
113 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-512/08, Commission v France [2011] nyr, para. 79ff. 
114 Case C-512/08, Commission v France [2011] nyr, para. 34. In Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré and Van Riet [2003] 
ECR I-4509, the Court still made this sharp distinction. 
115 Case C-512/08, Commission v France [2011] nyr, Case C-211/08, Commission v Spain [2010] nyr, Case C-
490/09, Commission v Luxemburg [2011] nyr. 
116 See Articles 8 (2) and Article 7 (11) of Directive 2011/24.  
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shoulder the costs, thereby diverting finite financial resources from “less vocal, and often already 
underempowered, categories of patients”117 towards more mobile patients.118 It has even been 
argued that mass exercise of the individual right to aspirational healthcare could lead to the 
collapse of national healthcare systems as a result of such distortion of distributive choices.119 
This argument is not only empirically tenuous, given that even a conservative estimate indicates 
that patient mobility would be financially beneficial for the Member States,120 but also 
conceptually flawed. At no point does the exercise of aspirational solidarity allow patients to ask 
for reimbursement of the full cost of treatment undergone in another Member State. As repeatedly 
highlighted throughout this thesis, the obligations under aspirational solidarity are limited to a 
negative obligation on Member States to allow free movement, not a positive obligation to 
encourage or financially facilitate its exercise.121 In other words, the Member State of affiliation 
is only obliged to reimburse the patient up to the level that it would have granted in case the 
treatment had taken place ‘at home’.  
 
The Court has accepted this financial limitation on the exercise of patient mobility, thereby 
alleviating the financial concerns of Member States without limiting the capacity of patients to 
seek healthcare abroad. In Decker, the first case dealing with the right of cross-border healthcare 
as purely an exercise of patient autonomy, Luxemburg, the state with which Decker was 
affiliated, provided a flat-rate fee for the purchase of spectacles. Logically, then, extending 
reimbursement to cover spectacles purchased in Belgium by affiliated patients could hardly be 
said to undermine the financial structure of the Luxembourgeois healthcare fund.122 Equally, in 
Kohll, decided on the same day, the claimant sought to have the costs of orthodontic treatment in 
Germany reimbursed by the same Luxemburg fund. He only claimed, however, reimbursement 
up to the rate he would have received if the treatment had taken place in Luxemburg.123 Again, 
reimbursement up to that level could not logically lead to financial problems for Luxemburg: it 
would have to refund up to that level either way.124 The Court has since maintained this logic, 
                                                
117 C. Murphy, ‘An effective right to cross-border healthcare? On patients, primacy and procedural autonomy: 
Comment on Elchinov’ 36 ELRev (2011), p. 555. 
118 C. Newdick, ‘Citizenship, Free Movement and Healthcare: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social 
Solidarity’ 43 CMLR (2006), p. 1645ff. 
119 C. Murphy, ‘An effective right to cross-border healthcare? On patients, primacy and procedural autonomy: 
Comment on Elchinov’ 36 ELRev (2011), p. 555. 
120 Commission Impact Assessment for the Directive on Cross-border Healthcare, SEC (2008) 2163, p. 34-36 and 55. 
121 Section 2.3. 
122 Case C-120/95, Decker [1998] ECR I-1831, para. 38-40.  
123 Case C-158/96, Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931, para. 40. 
124 Case C-158/96, Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931, para. 42. 
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extending the right to be reimbursed only up to the level that the patient would have received if 
treated in the state of affiliation.125 The PRD now codifies this limit:   
“The costs of cross-border healthcare shall be reimbursed or paid directly by the 
Member State of affiliation up to the level of costs that would have been assumed by 
the Member State of affiliation, had this healthcare been provided in its territory”126 
 
In other words, cross-border healthcare is financially neutral for the state of affiliation – in 
contrast to situations under market solidarity and communitarian solidarity, where it is financially 
neutral for the patient – and cannot therefore possibly detract from the capacity of that state to 
provide universal access to high-quality healthcare. Any argument to that effect either has to 
assume that sick patients ‘miraculous’ recover if (threatened to be) treated in the state of 
affiliation, or, rather the opposite, die before they are treated. Only in these situations, after all, 
would the reimbursement of healthcare obtained abroad have financial implications for the state 
of affiliation.127  
 
The patient, on the other hand, could theoretically lose out or gain financially from his movement, 
depending on how the cost of treatment in the state of affiliation compares to the cost in the state 
of treatment. This financial (dis)advantage presumably becomes one of the considerations on the 
basis of which a patient chooses where and how to be treated for his healthcare needs. In 
Vanbraekel, the Court indeed accepted that the principle of financial neutrality for the state of 
affiliation implies that the patient could make money by being treated in a state where treatment 
is cheaper: 
 “Article [56 TFEU] is to be interpreted as meaning that, if the reimbursement of 
costs incurred on hospital services provided in a Member State of stay, calculated 
under the rules in force in that State, is less than the amount which application of the 
legislation in force in the Member State of registration would afford to a person 
receiving hospital treatment in that State, additional reimbursement covering that 
difference must be granted to the insured person by the competent institution.”128 
                                                
125 See Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré and Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509, para. 98: “In any event, it should be borne in 
mind that it is for the Member States alone to determine the extent of the sickness cover available to insured persons, 
so that, when the insured go without prior authorisation to a Member State other than that in which their sickness 
fund is established to receive treatment there, they can claim reimbursement of the cost of the treatment given to 
them only within the limits of the cover provided by the sickness insurance scheme in the Member State of 
affiliation.” 
126 Article 7 (4) and recitals 4, 13 of Directive 2011/24.  
127 In response to the argument made by Newdick in ‘Citizenship, Free Movement and Healthcare: Cementing 
Individual Rights by Corroding Social Solidarity’ 43 CMLR (2006), p. 1645ff. 
128 Case C-368/98, Vanbraekel [2001] ECR I-5363, para. 45. AG Saggio, in the same case, had come to the same 
conclusion (para. 25). See also Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4325, para. 118. 
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More recently, the Court and the Union legislator have become uneasy with this situation, 
possibly because it may seem somewhat perverse for patients to make money by choosing to 
obtain cheaper (and possibly less good) healthcare abroad.129 It seems, however, that not too 
many patients want to be treated abroad in order to gain some extra cash,130 and, even if they did, 
it would still have no effect on the capacity of immobile citizens to access high-quality care.131 
Nevertheless, the case law of the Court, as codified by Article 7 (4) PRD, now limits the right to 
reimbursement to the level applicable in the state of affiliation, and in any case not exceeding the 
“actual costs of healthcare received”, offering as an explanation that patients “should, in any 
event, not derive a financial advantage from the healthcare provided in another Member State”.132  
 
One concern remains unaddressed by the Court. Above, it was argued that aspirational solidarity 
finds its limit where it skews national distributive or normative choices. In the field of healthcare, 
one such possibility still exists. While it has not been empirically demonstrated yet, it appears 
possible that the almost unconditional right to export healthcare funds could divert a more 
substantial part of investment poured into healthcare from ‘immobile treatments’, such as cancer 
research, to more ‘mobile treatments’, such as kidney transplants or hip replacement, for which 
patients are more likely and able to seek treatment abroad. If and when such situation arises, the 
Court should carefully assess the extent to which political choices must be insulated from the 
dynamics of aspirational solidarity.133 That solidarity, after all, imposes a conditional obligation 
on Member States to allow the exercise of free movement, not a positive obligation to adapt 
distributive choices to facilitate such movement. The Court has, so far, indeed been quite 
consistent in its imposition of only negative obligations on Member States. Member States are, 
for example, free to decide whether or not to reimburse patients for the travel and accommodation 
costs which they incur while seeking treatment. However, if they offer such refunds for treatment 
                                                
129 This relates to the idea of healthcare as a medical need: people cannot opt out of vital healthcare choices. See for 
other possible reasons A.P. Van der Mei, ‘Case note on Commission v France and Elchinov’, (2011) 48 CMLR, p. 
1308. 
130 Commission Impact Assessment for the Directive on Cross-border Healthcare, SEC (2008) 2163, p. 11; and 
recital 39 of Directive 2011/24.  
131 Moreover, any potential trickle-down effect on domestic infrastructural investments can be prevented by 
application of  the first limitation of aspirational solidarity. 
132 Recital 32 of Directive 2011/24, see also Case C-512/08, Commission v France [2011] nyr, para. 52: 
reimbursement “within the limits of the costs actually incurred by the person insured”. See also Case C-208/07, 
Chamier-Glisczinski [2009] ECR I-6095. 
133 See for the same argument in education, see section 4.4.1. 
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within the state of affiliation, they must also do so for treatment abroad.134 Equally, it is 
completely acceptable for Member States to make reimbursement conditional on the patient 
consulting a GP before treatment is obtained,135 or limit reimbursable healthcare to that obtained 
in public institutions,136 as long as such rules apply regardless of the place of treatment. 
 
In aspirational solidarity, the Court and Union legislator seem to have found the balance defended 
in the theoretical part of this thesis: that of supporting the capacity of individual citizens to choose 
how, where and why to obtain healthcare without detracting from the capacity of immobile 
citizens to enjoy high-quality healthcare at ‘home’, and without imposing additional financial 
burdens on healthcare schemes in the state of affiliation. The communal dimensions of healthcare 
are thereby insulated from the ‘dark side’ of the individual entitlements under aspirational 
solidarity without significantly restricting the capacity of European citizens to decide on matters 
that affect their bodies and health.   
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described how the transnational solidarities allocate the responsibility to provide 
adequate access to high-quality healthcare between different Member States; and, more 
specifically, how the different social functions that underlie the individual’s right to healthcare 
serve to structure the cross-border dimension of such rights. It has highlighted how the 
transnational solidarities serve to strengthen the patient’s rights by allowing them to move around 
freely through the territory of the Union without losing their healthcare entitlements, and, what is 
more, to employ their rights to free movement in order to secure their healthcare rights. In doing 
so, the Union legislator and Court have been careful to prevent the capacity of mobile patients to 
assert their healthcare rights from limiting access of immobile patients to high-quality healthcare. 
They have not, however, explicitly articulated the assumptions of justice that underlie the 
different cross-border healthcare rights. Rather, the Court and the Union legislator conflate 
different normative arguments by use of similar legislative instruments and interchangeable 
rhetoric.137 This lack of conceptual rigour makes it frustrating and unclear for commentators and 
                                                
134 Case C-8/02, Leichtle [2004] ECR I-2641, para. 48. 
135 Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré and Van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509, para. 106.  
136 Opinion of AG Colomer in Case C-444/05, Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I-3185, para. 42 and 59; see also Case C-
444/05, Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I-3185, para. 26 and 38. 
137 Most evidently in Commission v Spain, which dealt with the extent to which Spanish citizens should be 
reimbursed for healthcare abroad, in which both the Opinion of AG Mengozzi (para 78) and the Court’s ruling (57-
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national actors to appreciate the sophistication of the Court’s work. More explicit reference to, 
and careful determination of, the reason why any particular patient should be allowed to access 
reimbursed healthcare in other Member States would help to convince those actors that EU law 
indeed has the best intentions of both patients and healthcare administrators at heart.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
59) manage to conflate all three solidarities. Case C-211/08, Commission v Spain [2010] nyr. See also Article 20 of 
Regulation 883/2004, which manages to do the same.  
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4 EDUCATION 
This chapter analyses the dynamic between national justice norms and transnational solidarities in 
the sphere of education. The capacity of education to enhance the individual’s potential to live a 
‘good’ life is quite clear. It not only allows for the social integration of the citizen, by teaching 
him the capabilities required to live a dignified and autonomous life; but also facilitates the 
upward social mobility of the citizen.1 This chapter will argue that specific social function of the 
different educational welfare entitlements has important consequences for the degree to which 
migrants – to whom reciprocal normative commitments within a polity usually do not extend – 
can access them.  
 
The first section (4.1) of this chapter briefly discusses the role of education in the creation of a 
‘just’ society, and highlight that educational policy fulfils two distinct social functions. Whereas 
access to compulsory education plays a fundamental and indispensible foundational role in the 
individual’s capacity to live a ‘good life’; access to tertiary education and the financial incentives 
that promote such access are much closer linked to the relationship between the individual student 
and the commitments to promote social mobility undertaken by a specific polity. The Court, it 
will be argued, has to a large extent incorporated such nuances. It has extended all educational 
benefits to cover economically active migrants and their children in accordance with the logic of 
market solidarity (4.2). Communitarian solidarity is incorporated by differentiating access for 
Union citizens in accordance with the social function of the different educational benefits, 
extending access to compulsory education to all resident Union citizens while demanding thicker 
commitments of reciprocity before education-related financial benefits are extended (4.3). 
Finally, the Court has also incorporated demands of aspirational solidarity by stressing that host 
Member States must allow students to access their universities, while home Member States must 
allow for the export of education-related financial benefits (4.4). By incorporating the different 
demands of transnational solidarity, the Court has developed a transnational educational space 
that simultaneously encourages individuals to make use of their free movement rights, while 
allocating the costs of such movement equitably between the different Member States.  
                                                
1 According to Bertrand Russell, three theories of the role of education in social construction exist: “of these [three 
theories] the first considers that the sole purpose of education is to provide opportunities of growth and to remove 
hampering influences. The second holds that the purpose of education is to give culture to the individual and to 
develop his capacities to the utmost. The third holds that education is to be considered rather in relation to the 
community than in relation to the citizen, and that its business is to train useful citizens. (…) All three in varying 
proportions are found in every system that actually exists.” B. Russell, ‘Education and the Social Order’ (London, 
Unwin, 1977), p. 21. 
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4.1 THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF EDUCATION 
Generally speaking, education can be seen to perform a justice function on both the individual 
and the communal level.2 On the individual level, education helps develop the individual’s 
identity and capacity for self-determination, enabling him to discover, and effectively pursue, his 
personal aspirations and ambitions. It enables individuals to be ‘more free’ by preparing them for 
the demands and possibilities of life and society. At the same time, education solidifies communal 
ties that link the individual to more general societal development. For example, education can be 
seen as generating across-the-board welfare,3 its core curriculum as raising cultural awareness, 
solidifying ethno-cultural identity ties, promoting trust in communal determination or preventing 
repetition of human suffering. It fosters the transcendental appreciation of the nature and intensity 
of pain and happiness in other citizens, and thereby strengthens the commitment to equality and 
freedom that underlie the modern welfare state.   
 
At the same time, with the possible exception of the wealthiest of citizens, education is not a 
‘good’ that can be provided and administered on an individual basis. In order to disperse such 
elementary welfare good to all citizens, an important task lies with the state in ensuring its public 
provision. The exact scope and nature of this task depends on the diverse welfare functions 
provided by the different aspects of national educational policy. This diversity has important 
consequences for the degree to which such benefits must be extended to migrant citizens. It is 
crucial therefore to highlight the distinct social functions provided by educational systems from 
the outset. Naturally, a first intuitive distinction is between private education and public 
education. Whereas the latter serves primarily a social function, that is, its objective is to meet the 
social obligation incumbent on the state vis-à-vis its citizens,4 the former is conceived as fulfilling 
an important economic function as well.5 This distinction, however, is of little consequence for 
our discussion given that access to private education is generally premised on the willingness of 
                                                
2 See B. Russell, ‘Education and the Social Order’ (London, Unwin, 1977), p. 9-11. 
3 Economic analysis shows that mandatory schooling leads to higher incomes for both the rich and the poor. See A. 
Glazer and M. Gradstein, ‘Appropriation, Human Capital and Mandatory Schooling’ CESifo WP No. 538 (2001), p. 
12. 
4 Case C-76/05, Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849, para. 39: “The Court thus held that, by establishing and maintaining 
such a system of public education, financed as a general rule by the public budget and not by pupils or their parents, 
the State did not intend to involve itself in remunerated activities, but was carrying out its task in the social, cultural 
and educational fields towards its population.” 
5 Case C-76/05, Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849, para. 39-41. 
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the student to pay for it, rather than his ties with a political community.6 It appears, in fact, that 
the distinction solely plays a role in the assessment of the legality of the export of national grants 
meant for public education towards foreign private educational establishments.7 
 
A much more important basis of distinction lies in the social function performed by the different 
educational benefits. The first educational benefit that can be distinguished is primary and 
secondary education, which forms part of the core entitlement that must be provided by any state. 
Such elementary education is a vital procedural precondition for citizens to be ‘free from need’ 
(e.g. be able to read, write and qualify for paid work) and ‘free to aspire’ (discover and pursue 
one’s own preference as to what to do the rest of one’s live). As Terzi has argued, compulsory 
education “is both fundamental and foundational to the capabilities necessary to well-being, and 
hence to lead a good life” and it therefore constitutes a “fundamental entitlement”,8 which – in 
her opinion9 – extends to cover knowledge of, or ability in, literacy, numeracy, sociality and 
participation, learning dispositions, physical activities, science and technology, and practical 
reason.10 Nussbaum more generally argues that compulsory education, as a prerequisite for the 
individual’s freedom and social integration, should extend until “the capability to make valued 
choices” is developed.11 The general acceptance of education as pivotal in a person’s capacity to 
live a ‘good life’ is reflected in the fact that the provision and consumption of education is 
compulsory until the pupil has reached a certain age, which lies roughly around sixteen in 
Europe.12 The crucial nature of this minimum obligation on the state is underlined by its 
                                                
6 As will become clear in this chapter, access to all educational establishments – whether private or public – must in 
principle be extended on equal terms to all Union citizens. Nor can a real distinction be made between public and 
private education when it comes to financial support systems. Whereas Member States remain completely free to 
limit such assistance to students who attend public schools, or to extend them to cover all educational establishments, 
the equal treatment obligations implicit in both the freedom to provide services (covering private education) and in 
Union citizenship (covering public education) demand that such internal policy decisions have an extra-territorial 
application. 
7 See Case C-76/05, Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849. 
8 L. Terzi, ‘The Capability to be Educated’, in: M. Walker and E. Unterhalter (eds.), ‘Amartya Sen’s Capability 
Approach and Social Justice in Education’, (New York, Palgrave, 2007), p. 24, 30-33. 
9 Sen, for example, is not in favour of rigid lists of core entitlements, as these fail to accommodate changing 
democratic demands, although he repeatedly emphasizes that primary education falls unmistakably within that 
category. See, for example, A. Sen, ‘Inequality Reexamined’, (Oxford, OUP, 1992), p. 44.  
10 L. Terzi, ‘The Capability to be Educated’, in: M. Walker and E. Unterhalter (eds.), ‘Amartya Sen’s Capability 
Approach and Social Justice in Education’, (New York, Palgrave, 2007), p. 37-39. 
11 M. Nussbaum, ‘Political Liberalism and Respect: A Response to Linda Barclay’ 4 Nordic Journal of Philosophy,  
(2003), p. 42. See for a powerful critique of the ruling in Wisconsin v Yoder et al, in which Old Order Amish parents 
were allowed to take their children from school after grade eight, thus disabling them for live outside (and the choice 
to live outside) such communities, R. Hardin, ‘Group Boundaries, Individual Barriers’, in: D. Millar and S. Hashmi, 
‘Boundaries and Justice’ (Princeton, PUP, 2001), p. 281. 
12 B. Peck, ‘Compulsory Schooling in the Europe’, 76 Phi Delta Kappan (1995), p. 616-622. 
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constitutional entrenchment in all Member States,13 and its codification in international law as a 
human right:14 
“States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and (…) shall, in 
particular make primary education compulsory and available free to all; encourage 
the development of different forms of secondary education, including general and 
vocational training.” 
 
Likewise, the Charter of Fundamental Rights reads: 
“Everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and 
continuing training. This right includes the possibility to receive free compulsory 
education.”15 
 
The vital nature of compulsory education for the very status of an individual as a ‘free person’ 
indicates that this obligation on the state transcends the usual membership limits of welfare. It 
appears, in other words, that the state’s obligation includes all residents, whether nationals, Union 
citizens, third-country nationals or even illegal migrants.  
 
A second type of educational entitlement that can be distinguished is tertiary education. Rather 
than ensuring that all citizens can be ‘free’, it serves primarily an aspirational welfare function 
that facilitates upward social mobility, and can be best typified as a (widely dispersed) public 
good. Its provision is both universal and non-divisible, in the sense that individual access to 
university or vocational training courses is unrelated to its provision. The marginal costs per 
individual access are, moreover (with the possible exception of medical studies) relatively low, 
given that most costs relate to structural aspects such as libraries, lecture halls and professors. Its 
aspirational nature lies in its potential to allow individuals to achieve professional objectives. This 
logic, however, also implies that the public good of tertiary education is not consumed by all 
                                                
13 See Article 14 of the Austrian Constitution, Article 24 of the Belgian Constitution, Article 53 of the Bulgarian 
Constitution, Articles 18 and 20 of the Cypriot Constitution, Article 16 and 33 of the Czech Constitution, Article 76 
of the Danish Constitution, Article 37 of the Estonian Constitution, Article 16 of the Finnish Constitution, Article 34 
of the French Constitution (if only implicit), Articles 5 and 7 of the German Constitution, Article 16 of the Greek 
Constitution, Article 16 of the Hungarian Constitution, Article 42 of the Irish Constitution, Articles 33 and 34 of the 
Italian Constitution, Article 112 of the Latvian Constitution, Articles 40 and 41 of the Lithuanian Constitution, 
Article 23 of the Luxembourg Constitution, Articles 10 and 11 of the Maltese Constitution, Article 23 of the Dutch 
Constitution, Article 35 of the Polish Constitution, Articles 73 and 74 of the Portuguese Constitution, Article 32 of 
the Romanian Constitution, Article 42 of the Slovakian Constitution, Article 57 of the Slovenian Constitution, Article 
27 of the Spanish Constitution, Articles 2 and 21 of the Swedish Constitution, and Article 2 of the British Human 
Rights Act. 
14 See for example Articles 13 and 14 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
Articles 24 and 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
15 See Article 14 CFR. 
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citizens. After all, while young adults wanting to become doctors or accountants will have to 
attend universities, which serve a gate-keeping function for access to those professions, 
youngsters aspiring to become professional football players or firemen do not require such 
continued education. As a consequence of this aspirational character, the normative validation for 
the provision of public tertiary education cannot be based on its status as a human right. Rather, 
its validation must come from the electorate, which shoulders the substantial financial and moral 
burden for its provision. The United Kingdom, for example, spent £12.9 billion on tertiary 
education in 2010.16 Such cost is thus primarily justified by the bounds of reciprocity between the 
student and the polity providing for tertiary education. While almost all Member States impose 
qualitative (diploma’s or entrance exams) as well as quantitative (tuition fees) entry criteria for 
access to university,17 many differences exist. For example, the United Kingdom considers it 
‘just’ that students contribute £9000 annually towards the cost of their education rather than 
burdening the taxpayer with the costs of educating future bankers and lawyers;18 while other 
Member States such as Austria consider it ‘just’ that education be completely publically funded, 
in order to enable all citizens to pursue their ambitions without the constraints imposed by the 
financial situation of the student’s parents and without the impact that the subsequent student debt 
may have on the choice of degree.19  
 
The third type of educational benefit is of a strictly financial nature. Given that access to tertiary 
education is often tied up with temporary voluntary or compulsory withdrawal from the labour 
market, Member States will usually intervene to a greater or lesser extent to cover the temporary 
economic dependence of students in order to encourage wide and democratic access to such 
system of tertiary education. This can take form of financial grants meant to cover tuition or 
registration fees, ensuring equal access; or grants to cover maintenance costs such as 
accommodation, books, transport and living expenses. Again, idiosyncrasies in the institutional 
                                                
16 See Spending Chart on ukpublicspending.co.uk. See also C. Belfield, ‘Economic Principles of Education’, 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2000). 
17 See http://www.euroeducation.net/ for a detailed overview of the entry requirements of higher education across 
Europe 
18 In the United Kingdom a university degree is on average worth £100,000 over a lifetime. See speech by Vince 
Cable, Secretary of State for BIS, at London Southbank University: http://www.bis.gov.uk/news/speeches/vince-
cable-higher-education. See also B. Wigger, ‘Higher Education Financing and Income Redistribution’ CESifo WP 
No. 527 (2001), who argues that “it is now a well-documented fact that public involvement in higher education 
financing constitutes redistribution from the poorer to the richer part of the population”, although he arguably 
discounts the influence of progressive taxation systems after the student has finished his education. 
19 Especially this emphasis on free choice is interesting in the light of the above discussion on freedom. Such 
arguments were also forcefully raised by Dutch political parties in opposition to the proposal to increase the 
obligation of self-financing on students. See: ‘Handen af van de Studiefinanciering’, Volkskrant, 21/5/2010, p. 13.  
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welfare make-up of Member States entails that the precise scope, nature, duration and level of 
such support mechanism differ widely between the different Member States.20 Rather than a non-
divisible public good, financial assistance mechanisms is a strongly individualised entitlement, 
dependent not simply on membership to a polity but on the strength and nature of inter-personal 
parochial solidarities. Its provision is premised on a reciprocal commitment by the members of a 
set political community that such redistribution is essential for the attainment of ‘national justice’, 
and reflects retrospective and prospective commitments alike.  
 
Even if the competences of the Union in the sphere of education are closely circumscribed by the 
Treaty,21 and jealously protected by national institutions, this neither means that the Union does 
not contribute to the improvement of national educational structures,22 nor that the Member States 
retain full autonomy over the structure of, and access to, their educational policies. Not only do 
both Member States and the Union support transnational movement student mobility, for reasons 
of economic potential and personal growth of the student,23 but migrant workers, their children, 
as well as economically inactive Union citizens all derive a right to free movement from EU law. 
This chapter analyses to what extent the transnational solidarities that are tied to the rights to free 
movement require that such movement be accommodated within the structure of eligibility for 
national educational benefits. Such careful and theoretically coherent allocation is important 
especially given the particular nature of educational mobility in Europe. Due to asymmetrical 
migration, certain Member States (notably, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Austria) who are 
net importers of students face increasing strains on their capacity to fund higher education. The 
transnational solidarities, it is argued, offer a convincing conceptualisation of the different 
                                                
20 See O. Golynker, ‘Student loans: the European concept of social justice according to Bidar’ 31 ELRev (2006), p. 
394. 
21 Article 165 TFEU: The Union shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging 
cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully 
respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education 
systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity 
22 See S. Garben, ‘EU Higher Education Law: The Bologna Process and Harmonisation by Stealth’, (Kluwer, Den 
Haag, 2011).  
23 The Commission is busy facilitating student mobility through citizenship programs, the Socrates program, and 
financial contributions for transnational research. Member States act projects such as ERASMUS and the Bologna 
process, which harmonises the degree structure, credit systems and the recognition of qualifications throughout 
Europe in order to encourage transnational mobility. At the same time, it appears that the Member States’ general 
encouragement of student mobility is premised on the empirical knowledge that not many students do move between 
Member States. Due to cultural, linguistic, administrative and financial obstacles, the large majority of students still 
study in their ‘home’ Member State. See Eurostat Datasets TPS00062 and TPS00064, which suggest that in 2007, the 
last year for which data is available, 188.842.000 students were enrolled in tertiary education, of which 4.879.000 
studied abroad, amounting to a mere 2.58%. See also Eurobarometer # 260: ‘Students and Higher Education 
Reform’, p. 29. 
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obligations of Member States in the educational sphere. As discussed in the chapter two, the 
demands of transnational solidarity are essentially dependent on both the relationship between the 
individual and a particular polity and on the function of the educational benefit requested. As this 
chapter will show, the three different social functions of educational benefits find a different 
expression depending on the transnational solidarity to which they attach. The table below 
indicates how one would expect the transnational solidarities to interact with the different 
educational benefits.24  
 




Equal treatment for the 
worker and dependent 
family members as 
long as economic 
activity continues  
 
Equal treatment for the 
worker and dependent 
family members as long 
as economic activity 
continues  
 
Equal treatment for 
the worker and 
dependent family 






Equal treatment for all 
Union citizens from the 
moment of residence 
(Equal treatment for all 
Union citizens upon 
social integration in the 
host state) 25 
 
Equal treatment for 
all Union citizens 
upon social 





(Equal treatment for all 
Union citizens unless it 
limits access for host 
state citizens)26 
Equal treatment for all 
Union citizens unless it 
limits access for host 
state citizens 
 
No obligation of 
equal treatment on 
host state, but 
obligation on home 
state to allow export 
 
Market solidarity is an absolute demand: as soon as a migrant is economically active, he and his 
family are equally entitled to all educational benefits (4.2). Communitarian solidarity is a 
differentiated type of solidarity. It requires different things depending on the nature of the welfare 
good and the extent to which the migrant can reproduce the domestic demands of reciprocity that 
                                                
24 The reader will notice that two boxes are put between brackets. This indicates that a stronger claim to equal 
treatment is possible on the basis of one of the other transnational solidarities. 
25 A claim under aspirational solidarity is more favourable. The only relevance of communitarian solidarity for access 
to tertiary education is that socially integrated nationals are considered equal as nationals in matters of quota or 
possible numerus clausus. 
26 Theoretically this can be restricted in case of serious infrastructural limitations, which are very unlikely to take 
place. Practically, claims on the basis of communitarian solidarity are much stronger as they are absolute, albeit that a 
demand of communitarian solidarity presupposes residence in the host state. Aspirational solidarity in respect of 
access to compulsory education is thus only relevant for access to foreign private schools, or where parents wish to 
send their children to school in another Member State then where they reside and work, which takes place 
predominantly between the Netherlands and Belgium, Belgium and France, and Germany and Austria.   
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underlie the different educational benefits. As such, it demands full equal access to compulsory 
education, given that its provision is premised on a basic moral demand. Before equal treatment 
to financial entitlements such as student benefits is extended to economically inactive migrants, 
however, such migrants have to demonstrate much stronger ties linking them to the host state’s 
society (4.3). The aspirational nature of transnational education is clearly reflected in the 
obligations that Member States incur under aspirational solidarity. This entails that host states 
must open up access to their universities to migrant students, while home states must allow the 
export of financial benefits (4.4). It is argued that this proposed interpretation of the scope of, and 
limits to, the transnational solidarities allocates the social responsibility in the area of education in 
a reasonable and equitable manner between the ‘host’ and the ‘home’ state of the individual 
citizen, taking into account the importance and relative merit of concepts such as social 
belonging, reciprocity, nationality, financial participation and residence, while incorporating 
potential strains on the level and nature of the provision of educational entitlements throughout 
Europe. It allows European citizens to move freely throughout the Union without endangering the 
sustainable delivery of educational benefits. 
 
4.2 MARKET SOLIDARITY 
As developed in the chapter two, host states owe migrant workers equal access to welfare benefits 
in recognition of their engagement with that state’s economy.27 Originally, access to education 
and education-related benefits was excluded from the scope of the Treaty,28 and Member States 
retained complete autonomy in deciding whether, and under which conditions, to grant migrant 
workers access to their national educational facilities.29 In the 60s, however, the logic of market 
solidarity was codified by the Community legislator in Regulation 1612/68, which was adopted in 
order to ensure that “the worker is guaranteed the possibility of improving his living and working 
conditions and promoting his social advancement”,30 and which enabled economically active 
migrants to claim equal access regarding “social and tax advantages” that are available for 
national workers, including, explicitly, educational benefits.31 This regulation has recently been 
                                                
27 Section 2.1.  
28 The sole references related to collaboration in the setting up of occupational training schemes, as this was thought 
to promote the market efficiency. See Articles 118 and 128 EEC, and T. Hartley, ‘Equal Treatment in Education’, in: 
N. Green, T. Hartley, and J. Usher, ‘The Legal Foundations of the Single European Market’ (Oxford, OUP, 1991), p. 
175. 
29 A.P. Van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Persons within the European Community’ (Oxford, Hart, 2003), p. 347.  
30 Recital 3 of the preamble to Regulation 1612/68. 
31 Article 7 (3) of Regulation 1612/68. 
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replaced by Directive 2004/38, which contains a general and unconditional equal treatment clause 
for migrant workers and their family members.32 Together, these provisions ensure that migrant 
workers can access primary, secondary and tertiary education, as well as financial benefits such 
as student grants.33 This demand of full equal treatment reflects the unconditional nature of 
market solidarity, which “imposes responsibility in the social sphere on each Member State with 
regard to every worker who is a national of another Member State and established in its territory 
as far as equality of treatment with nationals is concerned”,34 especially, the Court would later 
add, as regards “advantages (…) for improving their professional qualifications and promoting 
their social advancement”.35 
 
This right under market solidarity extends to cover the worker’s family members. Article 12 of 
Regulation 1612/68 guarantees equal access to all levels of education for the children of 
economically active migrants.36 The Court has consistently interpreted this provision extensively, 
so as to include not only access to education, but also covering all measures meant “to enable 
such children to attend these courses under the best possible conditions,”37 including all study-
related grants.38 In other words, as soon as a worker is economically active in the host Member 
State, both the worker himself, the spouse39 and children have access to all levels of education 
and all financial support systems related to such access on the same terms as nationals of the host 
state. 
 
The Court has often couched the justification for the extension of educational benefits in terms of 
promoting the migrant’s integration in the host state.40 In Echternach and Moritz, for example, 
the Court held that “children must be eligible for study assistance from the [host] state in order to 
make it possible for them to achieve integration in the society of the host country.”41 Yet, the real 
justification for equal treatment is the mutually advantageous nature of the economic interaction 
                                                
32 Article 24 of Directive 2004/38. 
33 See Article 7 (2) of Regulation 1612/68. See for overview A.P. Van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Persons within 
the European Community’ (Oxford, Hart,  2003), p. 358-64 and 350-1. 
34 Case 235/87, Matteucci [1988] ECR 5589, para. 16. 
35 Case 39/86, Lair [1988] ECR 3161, para. 22. 
36 Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68. 
37 Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68. 
38 Case 9/74, Casagrande [1974] ECR 773, and Joined Cases 389/87 and 390/87, Echternach and Moritz [1989] 
ECR 723. 
39 See Case 316/85, Lebon [1987] ECR 2811, para 13 and A.P. Van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Persons within the 
European Community’ (Oxford, Hart, 2003), p. 364. 
40 See also recital 5 of the preamble to Regulation 1612/68. 
41 Joined Cases 389/87 and 390/87, Echternach and Moritz [1989] ECR 723, para 35. 
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between migrant worker and the host state’s society. In other words, it is because the worker 
engages with host state’s economy that he is entitled to equal treatment in, for example, 
educational policy. Cases like Meeusen and Di Leo clearly show that the Court’s case law is 
premised on the engagement with the economy of a state rather than in terms of the workers’ (or 
their children’s) integration in that society. In Meeusen, the Court allowed the child of a Belgian 
worker, whose parents lived in Belgium but worked in the Netherlands, to claim student benefits 
from the Dutch state in order to study in Antwerp.42 The student in question had no personal 
connection whatsoever with the Netherlands, nor had her parents any link beyond their economic 
activity. The Court, nevertheless, found that the imposition of the additional criterion that the 
student should reside within the Netherlands was contrary to the equal treatment obligation of 
Article 7 (2) of Regulation 1612/68. In Di Leo, the daughter of an Italian national working in 
Germany applied for a study grant to study medicine in Siena. The Court rejected Germany’s 
argument that it should not have to extend such grants given that they did not contribute to the 
migrant workers’ or the child’s integration in the host state society. Instead, it simply held that it 
is essential that the child of a migrant worker has “the opportunity to choose a course under the 
same conditions as a child of a national of that State”.43 In these cases the Court has highlighted 
that market solidarity is premised exclusively on the migrant workers’ engagement with the 
labour market in the host state. A migrant worker and his children accrue social entitlements to 
education immediately from the moment that the worker starts his employment.44 The Court will 
soon have a chance to clarify its case law in an infringement procedure against the Netherlands, 
which conditions access to student grants for the children of economically active migrants to the 
condition of having resided in the Netherlands for three out of the last six years. While this 
condition is legitimate in respect of economically inactive citizens, as the sections on 
communitarian and aspirational solidarity will show, the absolute nature of market solidarity does 
not allow for it.45  
 
Conversely, one would expect the worker and his dependent family members to lose such 
entitlements when the economic activity is interrupted. However, both the Union legislator and 
                                                
42 Case C-337/97, Meeusen [1999] ECR I-3289. 
43 Case C-308/89, Di Leo [1990] ECR I-4185, para. 16. Note that both in Meeusen and Di Leo the children were 
allowed to export because host state nationals were also allowed to export. Exportability was not (yet) an 
autonomous right. 
44 Case 39/86, Lair [1988] ECR 3161, para. 42. 
45 This is also the reading of AG Sharpston. See Opinion in Case C-542/09, Commission v Netherlands (pending), 
para. 72ff. 
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the Court have long grappled with the rights under market solidarity of unemployed citizens who 
still retain some engagement with the domestic labour market. In the area of education this 
appears to occur where the student has temporarily suspended his economic activity in order to 
pursue education or retraining that is related to their engagement with the labour market. That 
includes, for example, where the degree is a continuation of a previous job,46 or where the 
(involuntarily) unemployed worker pursues vocational training that adapts him to the demands on 
the labour market.47 In such circumstances, after all, the temporary economic inactivity can be 
seen as bolstering the mutually advantageous nature of the interaction between migrant worker 
and host state’s society that underlies organic market solidarity, the assumption being that such 
worker will make a (more efficient) return in the labour force of the host state after completion of 
the program of tertiary education. Initially, in its decisions in Lair and Brown, the Court seemed 
sympathetic to the idea that migrant students derived a right to equal treatment under market 
solidarity if the degree was a continuation of previous employment.48 More recently, in Ninni-
Orasche and Förster, the Court appeared to reject this possibility,49 even if in the meantime 
Union legislator had codified this extension of market solidarity.50 The latter case dealt with a 
German national who had enrolled in a course to become a primary school teacher, and in a 
course on educational theory, both at the Hogeschool Amsterdam. She had a number of jobs in 
the first few years as a student, which qualified her as a ‘worker’ and she was consequently 
eligible for the studiefinanciering (Dutch student grants). From October 2002 until June 2003, 
Förster completed a paid work placement in a Dutch school providing secondary education to 
pupils with behavioural and/or psychiatric problems, after which she did not take up another job 
until July 2004.51 After a routine check, the IB-Groep (the Dutch body regulating study grant 
entitlements) found that as Förster had not been gainfully employed in the last six months of 
2003, she had to repay the awarded grants for that period. Förster, rather logically, claimed that 
since she was attending a vocational course that directly related to her previous employment; she 
                                                
46 Article 7 (3) (d) of Directive 2004/38. 
47 Case C-413/01, Ninni-Orasche [2003] ECR I-1027, and Case C-158/07, Förster [2008] ECR I-8507. See also  
Forster, see also T. Hartley, ‘Equal Treatment in Education’, in: N. Green, T. Hartley, and J. Usher, ‘The Legal 
Foundations of the Single European Market’ (Oxford, OUP, 1991), p. 183. 
48 Case 39/86, Lair [1988] ECR 3161, para. 37; Case 197/86, Brown [1988] ECR 3205, para. 27-28; and T. Hartley, 
‘Equal Treatment in Education’, in: N. Green, T. Hartley, and J. Usher, ‘The Legal Foundations of the Single 
European Market’ (Oxford, OUP, 1991), p.  185. 
49 Case C-413/01, Ninni-Orasche [2003] ECR I-1027, para. 43-44. 
50 See Article 7 of Directive 2004/38. 
51 Opinion of AG Mazak in Case C-158/07, Förster [2008] ECR I-8507, para. 21-28. 
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still qualified as a ‘worker’ and should be entitled to receive studiefinanciering.52  AG Mazak 
forcefully argued in favour of such interpretation:  
“In applying the criterion of continuity, it should also be borne in mind that, as the 
Court has already alluded in Lair, continuous careers are less common in today’s 
working environment than was formerly the case. In particular, younger people at 
the beginning of their professional lives are, for a number of reasons, often expected 
or even forced by the conditions in the job markets to show flexibility with their 
education and training as well as their first steps in employment. The requirement of 
continuity should therefore not be interpreted too strictly, in order to avoid excluding 
a substantial part of working students from the benefits of their rights as Community 
workers despite the fact that they have already been economically active and have 
entered the employment market of the host Member State.”53 
 
The Court declined Mazak’s invitation to reconstruct the extent to which market solidarity can 
still trigger equal access to education once the student has stopped being economically active. 
Instead, it (correctly) structures market solidarity as a sort of ‘all-or-nothing’: when employed, 
migrant citizens have full right to equal treatment; but when they are no longer employed, they 
lose all such entitlements. The u-turn of the Court, which for decades had interpreted the scope of 
‘worker’ (and thereby market solidarity) expansively so as to include economically inactive 
migrants, but now strictly conditions its scope on continuous economic engagement, can be 
explained by the recent emergence of the concept of communitarian solidarity, which grants 
different and autonomous rights to economically inactive migrants.54 While the Court has 
generally embraced the logic of market solidarity, extending educational rights, both regarding 
access and financial support structures, to cover workers and their families; it seems very 
reluctant to extend such solidarity beyond instances where the mutually advantageous nature of 
financial reciprocity is evident. This more restrictive interpretation can be justified by the 
theoretical requirement of continuous engagement that underlies the organic nature of market 
solidarity, but has yet to be fully and explicitly embraced by the Court – which might be 
problematic in light of the extension of market solidarity to temporarily economically inactive 
citizens under Directive 2004/38.55 
 
                                                
52 Opinion of AG Mazak in Case C-158/07, Förster [2008] ECR I-8507, para. 76-90  
53 Opinion of AG Mazak in Case C-158/07, Förster [2008] ECR I-8507, para. 85. 
54 See also S. O’Leary, ‘Developing an Ever Closer Union Between the Peoples of Europe?’, Edinburgh Mitchell 
Working Papers 6/2008. 
55 See Article 7 of Directive 2004/38. 
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4.3 COMMUNITARIAN SOLIDARITY  
Migrant citizens who are not economically active can, as discussed in the second chapter, 
nevertheless rely on a degree of communitarian solidarity. It was argued there that the status of 
Union citizen entitles them to access the welfare benefits for which they meet the demands of 
reciprocity that underlie them. Within the scope of education, this means, bluntly put, that Union 
citizens can access compulsory education wherever they reside, and can access financial 
educational benefits whenever they have resided in a certain state for a number of years. 
 
The Court, in the cases of Ibrahim and Teixeira, has accepted that access to primary and 
secondary education is a fundamental welfare entitlement that behaves independently from 
reciprocal and parochial ties of solidarity, and must therefore be extended to all resident Union 
citizens.56 Both cases involved a child of migrant Union citizens, who had started primary 
education at the time when (one of) the parents were economically active in the host state, in this 
case the United Kingdom. After a number of years, such activity stopped. While the main 
questions in the cases dealt with the parent’s right of residence as a corollary of the child’s right 
to education,57 both the opinions by AG Kokott and AG Mazak, as well as the Court’s ruling, 
discuss the basis upon which a Union citizen is entitled to access compulsory education in a host 
Member State once he is legally resident there.  
 
In both cases, claims of equal access to primary education could not be premised on market 
solidarity. The economic activity of the parent, from which such right was derived in accordance 
with Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, had, after all, stopped.58 Both AG Mazak and AG Kokott 
– apparently convinced of the required outcome but unsure about a legal reasoning – appear in 
two (or even three) minds about the type of solidarity that the retention of the right to education 
notwithstanding the lack of economic activity would imply. AG Mazak’s assessment seems stuck 
between the language of market solidarity and the logic of aspirational solidarity, focusing on the 
worker’s aspirational right to movement: 
“In my view, if the children of a Union citizen who is a former Community worker 
were effectively prevented from continuing their education in the host Member State 
on the basis that they had not attended school there for a some minimum duration, 
this may dissuade that citizen from exercising the rights to freedom of movement laid 
                                                
56 Case C-480/08, Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107; and Case C-310/08, Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065. 
57 See C. O’Brien, ‘Case note on Teixeira and Ibrahim’, 47 CMLR (2011), 203ff. 
58 Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-480/08, Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107, para. 39, Case C-480/08, Teixeira [2010] 
ECR I-1107, para. 49, Opinion AG Mazak in Case C-310/08, Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065, para 34. 
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down in Article 39 EC and would therefore create an obstacle to the effective 
exercise of that freedom”59 
 
AG Kokott seems to follow Mazak’s approach, albeit in clearer terms of market solidarity: 
 “[a] migrant worker would have far less incentive to exercise his right to freedom of 
movement if he could not be sure that his children could obtain an education in the 
host Member State and complete that education successfully.”60 
 
Yet, in the very same paragraph, Kokott moves towards an arguably much stronger and 
autonomous reason for extending the right to education beyond the period during which the 
parent of the child is economically active: 
 “If every interruption or cessation of the migrant worker’s employment in the host 
Member State also resulted in the automatic loss of his children’s right of residence 
and, accordingly, they were obliged to interrupt their education, there is a risk of 
disadvantage in relation to their educational and career development. The children 
might, in those circumstances, be compelled to continue their education abroad, 
which, in view of the differences between national education systems and the 
languages of instruction used, could lead to significant problems.”61  
 
The Court agrees with the outcome advocated by the two AGs, without explicitly discussing the 
moral basis for its demand of equal treatment. The rulings indicate that once a child has been 
‘installed’ in the Member State (i.e. legally entered that state as a family member of a worker) 
and has started compulsory education in that Member State,62 the right to equal access to such 
education behaves independently from the economic (in)activity of his parents: 
“the right of children to equal treatment in access to education does not depend on 
the circumstance that their father or mother retains the status of migrant worker in 
the host Member State.”63  
 
In other words, and as highlighted by the fact that the right to education for a child even 
comprises a right to residence for his primary carer,64 the right to education is not premised on 
any degree of financial or social reciprocity, but constitutes an autonomous right attached to the 
                                                
59 Opinion AG Mazak in Case C-310/08, Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065, para 33. 
60 Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-480/08, Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107, para. 44. 
61 Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-480/08, Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107, para. 44. 
62 Case C-310/08, Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065, para 38, Case C-480/08, Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107, para. 45. 
63 Case C-310/08, Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065, para 37, 39 and 45, and more explicitly Case C-480/08, Teixeira 
[2010] ECR I-1107, para. 50. 
64 Case C-310/08, Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065, para 30-31, and Case C-480/08, Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107, para. 
38-39. 
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status of a Union citizen who has legally entered another Member State.65 Unlike in other aspects 
of welfare, the Court does not condition the equal treatment of Union citizens upon a criterion of 
social integration, which is a clear indication of its implicit acceptance that the mere status of 
legally resident Union citizen in a host Member State automatically implies equal access to core 
welfare entitlements such as compulsory education.66  
 
Communitarian solidarity does not extend to unconditional equal treatment for economically 
inactive citizens. Whereas access to core benefits such as compulsory education may be premised 
merely on the migrant’s status as a Union citizen, access to educational benefits that are more 
closely tied to the individual’s participation in society, such as benefits of a financial nature, 
remains dependent on the migrant’s capacity to show that he can reproduce the reciprocity ties 
that underlie access to such benefits. After all, even though a Belgian and a Swedish student are 
equal in the sense that they are both Union citizens, they are fundamentally unequal in terms of 
their (reciprocal) social relationship with the Swedish citizenry and state. Dougan summarises as 
follows: 
“the shared identity which derives from common Union citizenship might well permit 
[migrant students] to make certain demands of financial solidarity upon the host 
society, but it cannot necessarily entitle them to claim full membership of the political 
community, and thus establish a legitimate expectation of equal treatment with 
domestic students across the entire educational sphere”.67 
 
In the area of educational policy, the precise scope of communitarian solidarity has primarily 
been tested in regard of financial assistance mechanisms that exist to compensate students for 
their temporal economic inactivity. Such grants usually entail financial support towards meeting 
tuition fees or maintenance expenses, and are, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, 
premised on inter-personal reciprocal commitments by the members of a polity, which reflect 
both past contributions by the student’s parents, expected future contributions by the student to 
society, and an even more intangible commitment to allow youngsters to flourish. Logically, then, 
student benefits cannot automatically extend to all Union citizens that reside on the territory of 
                                                
65 Case C-310/08, Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065, para 48 and 56-58, and Case C-480/08, Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107, 
para. 59.  
66 The Court may give further indications in a similar case which is pending at the moment. See Joined Cases C-
147/11 and C-148/11, Czop and Punakova [pending]. 
67 M. Dougan, ‘Fees, Grants, Loans, and Dole Cheques: Who Covers the Costs of Migrant Education within the EU?’ 
42 CMLR (2005), p. 954, emphasis added. 
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the host state. The Court discussed the matter in Bidar.68 Dany Bidar, a French national, moved to 
the United Kingdom in 1998 to live with his grandmother. He finished the last three years of his 
secondary education in the United Kingdom without having recourse to social assistance. In 
2001, he enrolled in a course on economics at University College London. He applied for 
financial assistance to cover his tuition fees and for financial assistance to cover his maintenance 
costs. While the former was granted in accordance with the rulings in Lair and Brown (which will 
be discussed below),69 the latter was denied in accordance with the Student Support Regulations 
2001, which required a student to be ‘settled’ in the United Kingdom before he became eligible 
for such maintenance support. It was common ground, however, that nationals of other Member 
States could never, in their capacity as students, obtain the status of ‘being settled’ in the United 
Kingdom.70 This difference in treatment was, according to the Court, in principle incompatible 
with Bidar’s status as a Union citizen, given that  
“citizenship of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to receive 
the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality”71 
 
Yet, as emphasised in the second chapter, such equality in regard of financial assistance is only 
required if the citizen, in addition to his status of Union citizen, can show that he can reproduce 
the reciprocal commitments which underlie student grants. This precise requirement was the real 
issue in Bidar.72 The Court held that: 
“In the case of assistance covering the maintenance costs of students, it is legitimate 
for a Member State to grant such assistance only to students who have demonstrated 
a certain degree of integration into the society of that State (..) [T]he existence of a 
certain degree of integration may be regarded as established by a finding that the 
student in question has resided in the host Member State for a certain length of 
time.”73 
                                                
68 Case C-209/03, Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119. 
69 Below, section 4.4.2. 
70 Case C-209/03, Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, para. 18. 
71 Case C-209/03, Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, para. 31. 
72 In Bidar, the scope of equal treatment was still based on the material scope of the Treaty. Opinion of AG Geelhoed 
The Court primarily relied on the insertion of competences in the area of education in the Treaty of Maastricht, which 
were actually intended to limit the impact of EU law on national educational systems, as an indication that the 
obligation of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality extend to cover maintenance fees. Yet, as already implicit 
in AG Geelhoed’s opinion, and later accepted by the Court, reliance on material scope of the Treaty to define the 
extent of the obligation of equal treatment is a completely artificial exercise. The Court has, rightfully, moved to 
attach such right to the mere exercise of free movement, so that any Union citizen who moves to another Member 
State has a prima facie right to be treated equally in the host state regarding all regulatory measures. See Case C-
158/07, Förster [2008] ECR I-8507, para. 36-37, and Case C-209/03, Bidar [2005] ECR-2119, para. 34-53 and 57-
59. 
73 Case C-209/03, Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, para. 57 and 59. 
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In other words, the Court argued that the commitments which underlie access to student grants, 
which seem to be based in part on the financial efforts of the (parents of the) student, in part on 
the projected future contributions by the students to the state’s society, and in parts on the desire 
to grant autonomy and individual ownership to the student about the decisions which influence 
their lives,74 can be distilled into a condition of previous residence. In consequence: 
“[the additional condition of being settled] prevents a student who is a national of a 
Member State and who is lawfully resident and has received a substantial part of his 
secondary education in the host Member State, and has consequently established a 
genuine link with the society of the latter State, from being able to pursue his studies 
under the same conditions as a student who is a national of that State and is in the 
same situation.”75 
 
Full membership rights in the educational sphere, beyond the ‘human’ rights to compulsory 
education, are thus acquired when the student can prove a strong enough attachment to the host 
state, that is, when he is socially integrated in that state.76 In Bidar the Court, without further 
elaboration, held that a requirement of three years of residence was acceptable as a test for such 
degree of integration.77 
 
The question of the factors to be taken into account when establishing the “degree of integration” 
which serves as a shorthand to gauge the extent to which the migrant student can reproduce the 
demands of reciprocity that underlie student grants, was again explicitly discussed in Förster.78 
The Dutch Hoge Raad, clearly uncertain about the legality of a blanket five-year residence 
requirement, which excluded individual circumstances from being taken into account, specifically 
asked the Court “which residence duration may be required” and whether individual factors 
which “indicate a substantial degree of integration into the society of the host Member State” are 
to be taken into account.79 AG Mazák’s reasoning is very clear and convincing: 
“Member States are obviously allowed to some extent to apply general conditions 
which require no further individual assessment, such as the three years’ residence 
requirement at issue in Bidar. However, the case-law of the Court also suggests that 
                                                
74 O. Golynker, ‘Case note on Förster’, 46 CMLR (2009), p. 2033. 
75 Case C-209/03, Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, para. 62. 
76 Including all aspects of educational policy, such as the right to export student grants, or to be considered a 
‘national’ in quota systems. 
77 Case C-209/03, Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, para. 60. 
78 Case C-158/07, Förster [2008] ECR I-8507. 
79 Questions 3 (d) and 4 respectively. 
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the condition imposed may not be so general in scope that it systematically excludes 
students, regardless of their actual degree of integration into society, from being able 
to pursue their studies under the same conditions as nationals of the host Member 
State. In other words, the criterion used must still be indicative of the degree of 
integration into society. 
In my view, that is not the case with a five-year residence requirement, since it can 
reasonably be assumed that a number of students may have established a substantial 
degree of integration into society well before the expiry of that period.”80  
 
Mazak is spot on – both in his emphasis on the procedural commitment to connect eligibility for 
student grants to the links of reciprocity that sustain them; and in his factual assessment that a 
residence requirement of five years seems to go beyond that. The Court was not convinced, 
however, and ‘reasoned’ that: 
“a condition of five years’ continuous residence cannot be held to be excessive 
having regard, inter alia, to the requirements put forward with respect to the degree 
of integration of non-nationals in the host Member State.”81 
 
While this circular reasoning can hardly count as judicial reasoning, the Court’s motive for 
validating a five-year residence requirement is plainly obvious. Between its ruling in Bidar and 
its ruling in Förster, Directive 2004/38 had been agreed by the Member States. Article 24 (2) of 
the Directive explicitly excludes any right to equal treatment as regards maintenance fees for 
Union citizens who have been resident on the host Member States’ territory for less than five 
years.82 In other words, migrants who have resided in a host state for five years are presumed to 
meet the conditions for access to all welfare benefits, and must as such, after that period of 
residence, be granted access to those benefits on equal terms as nationals. This deferral to the 
Union legislator and the lack of engagement with the specific function and nature of student 
benefits is unfortunate; not in the least in light of the pivotal role which the Court has played in 
the development of an autonomous notion of Union citizenship and communitarian solidarity, and 
the inadequacy of the political process on the European level to capture such notions. While it 
may be true that the reciprocal commitments that underlie student grants are difficult to translate 
to the transnational level, the exclusive reliance on past residence seems too simplistic an 
instrument.  
 
                                                
80 Opinion of AG Mazak in Case C-158/07, Förster [2008] ECR I-8507, para 129 and 130. 
81 Case C-158/07, Förster [2008] ECR I-8507, para.  54. 
82 Article 24 (2) of Directive 2004/38. 
 122 
The Court’s recognition that communitarian solidarity demands different things depending on the 
nature and function of the different educational goods is encouraging. However, it has – in its 
objective of preventing the imposition of unreasonable burdens on the national welfare state – 
interpreted the demands of communitarian solidarity somewhat narrowly. While equal treatment 
with regard to compulsory education for all legally resident Union children is neither financially 
nor morally strenuous on the national welfare state, the Court clearly realises that a wide 
interpretation of communitarian solidarity in the area of financial support for university access 
would be more problematic for the national welfare state, both financially and politically. After 
all, such rights are premised not on the basic obligation to facilitate social integration, but on a 
reciprocal commitment between members of a polity towards social mobility. Access to such 
reciprocal welfare structures should thus imply, as the Court has correctly emphasised, a higher 
degree of social participation and reciprocity on the part of the student. Yet, the Court’s lack of 
courage in developing the normative core of this requirement and give a fully autonomous 
meaning to the notion of communitarian solidarity is disappointing. Rather than deferring to the 
national biases inherent in Article 24 (2) of Directive 2004/38, it is argued that the Court should 
face its reprogramming exercise with the conscientious attitude with which it developed the 
notion of Union citizenship in the first place.  
 
4.4 ASPIRATIONAL SOLIDARITY 
After the discussion of the scope of market solidarity and communitarian solidarity in the area of 
education, one important question (perhaps the most important question) has remained 
unanswered. What about the ‘real’ student, that is, a student who moves from his home state to a 
host state for the main purpose of enrolling into a university degree there? Can an Italian student 
who moves to London study at LSE on the same conditions and with the same financial benefits 
as UK nationals? This section will discuss these two issues separately. First, it will be argued that 
whereas the logic of aspirational solidarity seems to entail complete equal treatment as regards 
access to universities, the Court correctly highlights that such demand is not unlimited, even if it 
misconstrues that limit (4.4.1). Second, it will be argued that the Court misinterprets the demands 
of aspirational solidarity in the area of financial assistance towards students. Rather than 
extending aspirational solidarity to cover financial assistance of the host state towards tuition 
fees, it should shift the burden to financially support the student more readily towards the home 
state of the student (4.4.2).  
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4.4.1 ACCESS TO EDUCATION 
The preamble of the Treaty already highlights the aspirational role of education in the 
development of the integration process, by aiming to “promote the development of the highest 
possible level of knowledge for their people through a wide access to education”. More 
specifically, it appears that one of the most explicit aspirational functions of the Union is to make 
transboundary access to tertiary education available for its citizens. As the Sorbonne Declaration 
puts it:  
“Universities were born in Europe, some three-quarters of a millennium ago (..) In 
those times, students and academics would freely circulate and rapidly disseminate 
knowledge throughout the continent. Nowadays, too many of our students still 
graduate without having had the benefit of a study period outside of national 
boundaries.”83 
 
Even if the Court has increasingly couched its case law on the free movement of students in 
aspirational terms, it still struggles to equitably pit this right of transboundary access against the 
legitimate concern of the Member States that such access should not reduce its capacity to meet 
the aspirational promise towards its own citizens. The first implicit indications of the use of 
aspirational solidarity in promoting transboundary access to education can be traced all the way 
back to Forcheri. In that case the Court extended equal access to education beyond the 
economically active migrant to cover his spouse, not on the basis of Article 45 TFEU or 
Regulation 1612/68, but directly on the basis of Article 18 TFEU, which lays down a prohibition 
of discrimination on the basis of nationality.84 The right to access was thus not premised on 
‘market solidarity by proxy’ but on a different, autonomous, type of solidarity. The language used 
by the Court makes it easy – in hindsight – to detect the seeds of aspirational solidarity used to 
justify the extension of solidarity: 
“the common vocational training policy must have certain fundamental objectives 
which are inter alia, to bring about conditions which will guarantee adequate 
vocational training for all and to offer to every person, according to his inclinations 
and capabilities, working knowledge and experience, the opportunity to gain 
promotion or to receive instruction for a new and higher level of activity. 
                                                
83 Sorbonne Declaration, available at: http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/pdf/Sorbonne_declaration.pdf. 
Interestingly, this process took place outside the Union framework, even if it could have been adopted by the Union. 
See for that argument S. Garben, ‘EU Higher Education Law: The Bologna Process and Harmonization by Stealth’, 
(Den Haag, Kluwer, 2011). 
84 Case 152/82, Forcheri [1983] ECR 2323. See also T. Hartley, ‘Equal Treatment in Education’, in: N. Green, T. 
Hartley, and J. Usher, ‘The Legal Foundations of the Single European Market’ (Oxford, OUP, 1991), p. 178. 
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It follows that although it is true that educational and vocational training policy is 
not as such part of the areas which the Treaty has allotted to the competence of the 
Community institutions, the opportunity for such kinds of instructions falls within the 
scope of the Treaty.”85 
 
The Court built on this aspirational capacity of tertiary education in a string of cases in the 80s. In 
Gravier and Blaizot, the Court redrew both the personal and material boundaries of the Treaty, so 
as to include economically inactive students as well as the conditions to access to all levels of 
education within the scope of the obligation of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality as 
laid down in Article 18 TFEU,86 while in Raulin, this right to transboundary access was (rather 
logically) extended to include a right to reside in the host state, thereby completing the right to 
equal transboundary access. As a justification the Court had highlighted in Gravier that: 
“access to vocational training is in particular likely to promote free movement of 
persons throughout the Community, (…) by enabling them to complete their training 
to develop their particular talents in the Member State whose vocational training 
programmes include the special subject desired”.87 
 
The logic of aspirational solidarity that was present in Forcheri can again be traced here. In 
Gravier, even if decided on a different legal basis, the Court again explicitly highlights the 
enabling capacity of the use of Europe’s regulatory diversity, allowing students to find the 
“special subject desired” in order to “develop their particular talents”. Even though the Court’s 
legal technique, redrawing both the personal and material scope of the Treaty in order to include 
transboundary access for student within the equal treatment obligation, has been criticised for 
being contrived and opportunistic, it does again emphasise the emergence of a relatively 
autonomous notion of aspirational solidarity. The legal basis for such claims of aspirational 
solidarity has since been strengthened by their codification in Directives 93/96 and 2004/38.  
 
As the theoretical discussion on aspirational solidarity has highlighted, its demands are not 
unconditional. Where the host state’s capacity to sustain internal normative choices is undercut, 
aspirational solidarity finds its limit. Ultimately, this limit is premised on the understanding that 
                                                
85 Case 152/82, Forcheri [1983] ECR 2323, para. 16-17. 
86 Case 152/82, Forcheri [1983] ECR 2323, Case 293/83, Gravier [1985] ECR 593, Case 357/89, Raulin [1992] ECR 
I-1027 and Case 24/86, Blaizot [1988] ECR 379. See A.P. Van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Persons within the 
European Community’ (Oxford, Hart, 2003), p. 367-73 for an excellent overview of the case law. See also, also M. 
Dougan, ‘Fees, Grants, Loans, and Dole Cheques: Who Covers the Costs of Migrant Education within the EU?’ 42 
CMLR (2005), p. 945-8. 
87 Case 293/83, Gravier [1985] ECR 593, para. 24. 
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in regard of non-divisible public goods, nationals and non-nationals are simply not fully equal, as 
they do not meet the reciprocal commitments that underlie funded university access to the same 
extent. While transnational individual access is usually non-consequential for its provision, and 
cannot therefore constitute an unreasonable burden for the national welfare state, this is different 
where mass access entails that a Member State can no longer sustain normative commitment vis-
à-vis its own citizens. That commitment is, after all, not only premised on a degree of aspirational 
opportunity but also on an obligation to facilitate social mobility, which does not automatically 
extend to include ‘welfare outsiders’.88  
 
The question as to the precise scope of aspirational solidarity in access to university has been 
discussed most explicitly in reference to the systems of tertiary education in Belgium and Austria. 
Both Member States have opted to provide complete free access for its nationals. Yet, both are 
faced with a big neighbouring Member State (France and Germany, respectively), which has 
opted for a more restrictive access policy in, mostly, medical studies. Their imposition of such 
numerus clausus regulations has generated a quite considerable migration of students from these 
Member States towards their smaller neighbours,89 where, conveniently, the language of 
instruction is the same. Accordingly, both Member States have tried to limit access of foreign 
EU-students to certain specific medical degrees by requiring applicants to be included in the 
numerus clausus in their own Member State90 and setting explicit quota for the number of foreign 
students allowed to enter certain specified degrees.91 Both measures were challenged by the 
Commission,92 which, however, suspended the infringement procedures for five years in 2007 
(for political reasons).93 The suspension, however, did not halt the quota systems from being 
                                                
88 See chapter 1, section 2.3. As such, positively discriminating own nationals seems allowed as their social 
relationship with their state is presumed by the very fact that they are a national. See K. Lenaerts and T. Heremans, 
‘Contours of a European Social Union in the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice’, 2 European Constitutional 
Law Review (2006), p. 107, and AG Mazak in Case C-158/07, Förster [2008] ECR I-8507, para. 67. 
89 Austria indicated that it received up to five times as many foreign as home students in certain degrees, whereas in 
Belgium the percentage of foreign students in veterinary degrees amounted to 86%. See C-147/03, Commission v 
Austria (university access) [2005] ECR I-5969, para. 64 and section B12.1 of the referring court’s ruling. Cour 
Constitutionelle, l’Arrêt n° 12/2008 du 14 février 2008, Numéros du rôle: 4034 et 4093. 
90 The Belgian case is not particularly relevant since the Belgian government failed to submit justifications for its 
legislation. See Case C-65/03, Commission v Belgium [2004] ECR I-6427. 
91 Articles 4 and 7 of the Decree of the French Community of 16 June 2006 which regulates the number of students 
in certain programmes in the first two years of undergraduate studies in higher education (Moniteur belge of 6 July 
2006, p. 34055). D. Damjanovic, ‘The Austrian education system and European law’ in B. De Witte and H. Miklitz 
(eds.), ‘The ECJ and the autonomy of the Member States’ (forthcoming). 
92 RAPID Press Release, Free movement of students: the Commission sends letters of formal notice to Austria and 
Belgium, 24 January 2007, Reference: IP/07/76. 
93 RAPID Press Release, Access to higher education: the Commission suspends its infringement cases againstAustria 
and Belgium, 28 November 2007, Reference: IP/07/1788. While officially intended to allow the Member States to 
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challenged before the Court. Only months after the armistice, the Belgian Constitutional Court 
referred a challenge led by Bressol and 59 other students and employees to Luxemburg.94  
 
The fact that an obligation of aspirational solidarity exists, requiring Member States to allow 
access for foreign nationals on equal terms as home nationals, was not disputed in the cases. As 
the Court put it, it covers:   
“the opportunity for students coming from other Member States to gain access to 
higher education, an opportunity which constitutes the very essence of the principle 
of freedom of movement for students.”95 
 
What was at stake rather is whether or not such solidarity can be limited in light of the impact 
which it has on the sustainability of the provision of the underlying right to education of a state’s 
own citizens. The Court appreciates that the demand to accommodate foreign students should not 
lead to Member States being unable to provide tertiary education (due to financial effects)96 or 
decent healthcare (due to a shortage of doctors).97 Accordingly, it argues that where it can be 
empirically demonstrated that the whole system of financing of education is jeopardised98 by 
allowing unrestricted access to ‘foreign’ students, or that such access directly leads to the absence 
of sufficient medical personal within the territory of the Member State concerned;99 Member 
States are allowed to limit the amount of foreign students admitted on equal terms as ‘home’ 
students. The Court thus imposes a very high empirical threshold before the demands of 
aspirational solidarity can be classified as having unreasonable consequences for the national 
welfare state.100 The Court’s approach is generally convincing, as is the imposition of very high – 
                                                                                                                                                   
supply more detailed and accurate empirical evidence on the necessity of their restrictive policy, it has been argued 
that the suspension is the result of the political pressure exercised by Austria in the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty. 
See also S. Garben, ‘The Belgian/Austrian Education Saga’ Harvard European Law Working Paper 2008/1, p. 9. 
94 Case C-73/08, Bressol [2010] ECR I-2735. 
95 Case C-73/08, Bressol [2010] ECR I-2735, para. 79. 
96 See also section B12.1 of the referring court’s ruling. Cour Constitutionelle, l’Arrêt n° 12/2008 du 14 février 2008, 
Numéros du rôle: 4034 et 4093. 
97 Up to (78-86%) in certain courses, according to referring court. See also section B12.1 of the referring court’s 
ruling. Cour Constitutionelle, l’Arrêt n° 12/2008 du 14 février 2008, Numéros du rôle: 4034 et 4093. See also see 
also S. Garben, ‘The Belgian/Austrian Education Saga’ Harvard European Law Working Paper 2008/1, p. 11. 
98 C-147/03, Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969, para. 65-67. In Bressol this was not a relevant argument, as 
the financing of higher education in the French Community of Belgium takes place through a ‘closed envelope’ 
system, whereby the numbers of students have no impact on the allocation of funds. Case C-73/08, Bressol [2010] 
ECR I-2735, para. 50. 
99 Case C-73/08, Bressol [2010] ECR I-2735, para. 72-3. 
100  In Bressol, the Court demands that the national court establish the maximum possible number of foreign students 
to be possibly admitted, and that the causal link between non-resident students and shortage of personnel be clearly 
established before a quota system is declared compatible with Union law.  See Case C-73/08, Bressol [2010] ECR I-
2735, para. 72-3. 
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or even impossibly high101 – empirical thresholds before financial or public health considerations 
can limit the demands of aspirational solidarity.102 As AG Jacobs and AG Sharpston clarify, 
financial contribution by the host state is, after all, implicit both in the logic of regulatory 
movement and in the non-divisible nature of the public good,103 and arguments on the basis of the 
protection of public health are generally premised on the mere presumption that students would 
return to their home state upon graduation,104 as well as logically incoherent.105 Such concerns 
cannot limit the student’s aspirational right to pursue a ‘good life’ through transnational access to 
universities (which are, after all, the most aspirational welfare structures of all). 
 
The Court’s approach is, however, not convincing in so far as it fails to discuss the arguably 
strongest claim by Belgium and Austria, namely that the demand of equal access undercuts the 
normative policy aim of ensuring free and democratic access to higher education.106 A coherent 
interpretation of aspirational solidarity would, as argued above, limits its effects in this precise 
circumstance. Both AG Jacobs and AG Sharpston have picked this point up in their 
argumentation, and have both argued in favour of a more formal and mechanical logic of equal 
treatment, whereby any educational policy aim must be attained in a non-discriminatory manner. 
AG Jacobs thus accepts that the demands of aspirational solidarity could skew national 
redistributive choices: “clearly, the adoption of less discriminatory measures [governing access to 
Austrian universities] would require changes to the current system of unrestricted public 
access”.107 Equally, AG Sharpston argues that student surplus may be an inherent consequence of 
                                                
101 A. Somek, 'Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European citizenship' 32 ELRev (2007), p. 799-800. 
102 Sharpston helpfully carried out an empirical assessment in a later education case, to emphasise how we should 
understand proportionality in aspirational solidarity. See Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-542/09, Commission v 
Netherlands (pending), para. 117ff. 
103 AG Jacobs and AG Sharpston both implicitly make use of the distinction which is inherent in the notion of 
aspirational solidarity, and reflected in Directive 2004/38, between the negative obligation that forces Member States 
to allow access to education and the lack of a positive obligation to facilitate such access through eligibility for 
financial support systems. The scope of policies focusing on the latter can be restricted for financial reasons, those 
dealing with access cannot. See See Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-73/08, Bressol [2010] ECR I-2735, para. 
92-94, and Opinion of AG Jacobs in C-147/03, Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969, para. 42-44. 
104 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-73/08, Bressol [2010] ECR I-2735, para. 115 and 119.   
105 According to the figures mentioned in Bressol, between 200 and 250 veterinarians a year used to enrol in the 
course. Supposedly this number matches the need for veterinarians on the Belgian territory. The influx of non-
resident students has increased the numbers of students (over the six years of the course) from 1233 to 2343 between 
1996 and 2003. Surely the fact that it trains 750 students per year instead of 250 students per year contributes to 
solving this lack of medical personnel? 
106 Section B12.1 of the referring court’s ruling. Cour Constitutionelle, l’Arrêt n° 12/2008 du 14 février 2008, 
Numéros du rôle: 4034 et 4093. 
107 Opinion of AG Jacobs in C-147/03, Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969, para 53. 
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the choice to have an open system of higher education, and that it cannot be remedied by 
discriminatory measures.108 After all, Sharpston argues,  
“if student numbers are a problem, they are not more or less problematic depending 
on where the extra students come from. The problem is an excess of student numbers 
per se, not an excess of non-resident student numbers. It seems, rather, that the 
intention of the Decree was to preserve unrestricted access to higher education for 
Belgians, while making it more difficult for those foreign students (coming mainly 
from France) for whom the higher education system in the French Community 
constitutes a natural alternative to access that system.”109 
 
It is true that in a course on Russian literature or political theory, a student surplus can only be 
problematic for the excess of student numbers per se, and can be solved by employing more 
teachers or expanding the number of students per class. Yet, in medical studies, where the number 
of available places is finite, a student surplus is more or less problematic depending on where the 
students come from. Especially in medical studies, after all, infrastructural constraints exist in the 
provision of training. As aptly put by the Belgian constitutional court, it is “not easy to provide 
for more childbirths and live animals to be tended to”.110 Only so many students have a chance to 
receive practical experience each year, an experience that evidently is central in a student’s 
training as a doctor or veterinarian. By allowing equal access for foreign students, Belgian 
students enter in competition for the available places, which could lead (and did lead) to such 
students being excluded from their chosen program.111 A more nuanced interpretation of 
aspirational solidarity would entail that in areas where training capacities are intrinsically limited 
(only so many babies are born and sick animals need care) and where a Member State is trying to 
sustain a system of open access for all its nationals (as opposed to a system of numerus clausus), 
the obligation of equal treatment can be limited to ensure the Member State’s capacity to allow its 
citizens to live a ‘good life’ in accordance with national justice perceptions. Aspirational 
solidarity does not require Member States to adapt their normative redistributive choices.112 
Rather, it seeks to protect their capacity to offer its citizens the positive welfare entitlements that 
                                                
108 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-73/08, Bressol [2010] ECR I-2735, para. 100 – 113. 
109 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-73/08, Bressol [2010] ECR I-2735, para. 104. 
110 See also section B12.1 of the referring court’s ruling. Cour Constitutionelle, l’Arrêt n° 12/2008 du 14 février 
2008, Numéros du rôle: 4034 et 4093. 
111 In fact, for a number of years Belgium held a competition for the available spaces. In 2005, of the 795 applicants 
only 192 possessed a secondary school degree from the territory of Wallonia, while only 34 of the 250 successful 
candidates did so, partially due to a preparatory course that French students undertake but Belgian students do not. 
See S. Garben, ‘The Belgian/Austrian Education Saga’ Harvard European Law Working Paper 2008/1, p. 11. 
112 See section 2.3. 
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those citizens desire. Somek has highlighted why the Court’s rulings could lead to significant 
adaptations of national normative choices in Austria:  
 “An admission policy that signals to students who graduated from a high school that 
they are welcome cuts deeply into the lives of adolescents since they are given leave 
to grow up and to enjoy their youth without having to worry too much about their 
scholastic performance (..) Young people can explore life without internalising the 
notorious nerdish obsession with how they perform in the eyes of their superiors. In 
fact, overcoming such a slavish concern is part of what it means to become an adult. 
Moreover, young people do not experience grades as determining their peer-group 
standing and, beyond that, their value as members of society. This type of 
egalitarianism makes people more free than a comparatively more “competitive” 
system because the educational system forgets (and hence forgives ) what they have 
done in the past.”113 
 
Whether Somek’s normative argument is valid is neither here nor there at this point. The concern 
he correctly expresses is that it is hardly satisfactory to solve a clash between justice norms on the 
national level (‘free access for all Austrian residents’) and on the transnational level (‘equal 
access for all Union citizens’) by demanding unconditional deferral of the former to the latter, and 
thereby negate the distributive and normative choices made on the national level. Rather, the 
conditional obligation that aspirational solidarity expresses is premised on the basic logic that 
nationals and non-nationals are unequal in access to positive welfare entitlements. The latter can 
only access such entitlements if such access does not go to the detriment of access for the former. 
While the Court mentions – in passing – that full equal treatment might threaten the 
‘homogeneity’ of the Belgian educational system,114 it does not follow that concern to its logical 
conclusion. In Bressol, indeed, the Court brushes past any normative concerns about the 
sustainability of the Belgian policy of ‘open and democratic access’, and essentially challenges 
the normative conception of a Belgian or Austrian ‘good life’. This is perhaps unsurprising given 
the strong aspirational nature of tertiary education and the tendency of the Court to employ a 
mechanical logic of equality in matters of regulatory access, but highlights that the Court has not 
yet grasped the precise nature of aspirational solidarity and its implicit theoretical differentiation 
between the rights of national and non-nationals. 
 
                                                
113 A. Somek, 'Solidarity decomposed: being and time in European citizenship' 32 ELRev (2007), p. 817, emphasis in 
orginal.  
114 Case C-73/08, Bressol [2010] ECR I-2735, para. 53. 
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4.4.2 ACCESS TO FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The dynamics of aspirational solidarity, it was argued above, do not extend to a positive 
obligation on the host state to treat economically inactive students equally as regards financial 
benefits.115 Such benefits are premised on reciprocal normative commitments entered into by the 
electorate in order to for the social mobility of their ‘members’, which cannot be extended to 
migrants that do not meet such conditions of reciprocity without endangering their availability. 
This interpretation of aspirational solidarity is, it could be argued, highly unsatisfactory in 
practice. Without entitlements to financial support which facilitate access to university, the 
granting of equal transboundary access seems largely rhetorical and, more worryingly, elitist. 
Given that the host state is not responsible for such financial support, the student would require 
private financial means to support his stay in the host state. However, the logical flipside of the 
fact that migration does not entail that the migrant enters within the social responsibility of the 
host state, and that such obligation in mainly connected to retrospective commitments by the 
student,116 is that such responsibility is incumbent on the student’s home state. As argued in the 
second chapter, aspirational solidarity applies both vis-à-vis the state to which a student migrates, 
as well as vis-à-vis the state from which the student migrates. It is argued that the obligations 
incumbent on the students’ home state by virtue of aspirational solidarity extend to allow that 
student to export financial student benefits to any other Member State. 
 
The Court’s case law shows a gradual shift in the allocation of the financial responsibility for the 
education of students from the host state to the home state. In the 80s, in Lair and Brown, the 
Court construed aspirational solidarity to entail that students who move to a host Member State in 
order to gain access to its educational system have equal access to study grants meant to cover 
tuition fees, albeit not those meant to cover maintenance costs.117 The Court reached this 
distinction on the basis of the material scope of the equal treatment obligation in the Treaty, 
which was held to cover financial assistance towards meeting tuition fees, but not maintenance 
expenses.118 The distinction made, however, is clearly artificial. Aspirational solidarity does not 
behave within the limits of the material scope of the Treaty, but its workings is dependent on the 
nature of the welfare good rather than a mechanical interpretation of equality or the scope of the 
Treaty. As defended repeatedly, aspirational solidarity does not include any obligation to provide 
                                                
115 Section 2.3. 
116 See section 4.3. 
117 Case 39/86, Lair [1988] ECR 3161, para. 14-15 and Case 197/86, Brown [1988] ECR 3205. 
118 Case 39/86, Lair [1988] ECR 3161, para. 15. 
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financial benefits on the host state until migrants have met the demands of reciprocity that 
underlie such benefits. Rather, it stresses that financial entitlements that reflect past commitments 
by migrants can be exported from the home state. 
 
The Court has indeed recently accepted, since D’Hoop, Nerkowksa and Tas-Hagen, that 
aspirational solidarity prima facie invalidates the territorial limitations imposed by the home state 
of the student on the consumption of welfare benefits. In other words, a home state cannot, in 
principle, restrict the export of financial benefits. This logic was tested in two cases in the area of 
education. While the factual circumstances differ significantly, the Court took the same approach 
in both cases, and these can be discussed in concert. In Morgan and Bucher,119 a German 
provision that entitled all German nationals to student maintenance support on condition that they 
enrol in educational establishments within the German territory was challenged. Export of study 
grants was only allowed in very limited circumstances.120 The case concerned two German 
nationals whose entitlement to student grants was revoked by virtue of their choice to register 
with foreign tertiary education establishments instead of  universities on the German territory.121 
In Schwarz, a national provision that offered tax relief for the cost incurred by parents sending 
their children to private schools within Germany, but not for those outside the German territory, 
was challenged.122 The Schwarz family enrolled two of their children in a Scottish school, but 
were unable to deduct the costs from their taxable income, as they could have done had they send 
their children to a private school on the German territory. Clearly, in both cases, the regulatory 
movement was of a strong aspirational nature. This is exemplified by the fact that both Rhiannon 
Morgan and Iris Bucher enrolled in degrees (applied genetics and ergotherapy, respectively) that 
were not provided by German educational establishments, and that the Schwarz family opted to 
send their children to the Cademuir School in Scotland, which specialised in the education of 
‘especially gifted students’.123 The Court indeed recognises that intra-national regulatory 
movement primarily serves to empower the individual Union citizen.124 Logically, the right to 
                                                
119 Joined Cases C-11/06 and 12/06, Morgan and Bucher [2007] ECR I-9161. 
120 See Article 5 (1) and 5 (2) of the BAfoG, which allow export when the individual remains in his permanent 
residence on the German territory and travels from there, on a daily basis, abroad to the educational establishment; 
or, in case the individual migrates to the host state when attendance to the new program is beneficial for the student’s 
degree, is with a recognised institution, and the program attended abroad constitutes the continuation of the students’ 
prior enrolment of at least one year with a German tertiary education establishment. 
121 One of the students decided to study applied genetics in Bristol (UK) and another ergotherapy in Heerlen (NL). 
122 Case C-76/05, Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849. 
123 Case C-76/05, Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849, para. 6. The school has since gone bankrupt. 
124 Case C-76/05, Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849, para. 66; Joined Cases C-11/06 and 12/06, Morgan and Bucher 
[2007] ECR I-9161, para. 31. 
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movement should be extended to include benefits, in order to prevent – in the words of AG 
Colomer – the student having to choose between “foregoing entirely the education (…) they had 
planned to attend in another Member State and losing entirely their entitlement to an education or 
training grant.”125    
 
Germany, however, argued against such interpretation of the demands of aspirational solidarity. 
Its primary defence was that the degree of reciprocity that warrants access to welfare entitlements 
is absent in case of extra-territorial consumption of such benefit.126 This ties in with the 
discussion above in Bidar. Transnational access to welfare entitlements may, the Court ruled in 
that case, be limited to those citizens that can demonstrate a degree of reciprocity towards the 
state. An analogous interpretation, Germany argued, would entail that citizens who leave the 
territory of the state cannot retain a right to student grants, or tax benefits, as they cut their link of 
reciprocity by moving outside the territory of the political community.127 The reliance on Bidar, 
however, appears contradictory. In that case, after all, the Court emphasises that the social nature 
of financial assistance is closely tied up with membership to a polity and complex retrospective 
dynamics of participation, rather than with current residence on the territory of that polity. While 
one could indeed imagine examples whereby a national loses rights to welfare entitlement by 
virtue of having left the territory of his ‘home state’ decades ago,128 in the case of Schwarz 
family, Rhiannon Morgan and Iris Bucher the welfare entitlements were denied solely on the 
basis of regulatory movement. Had they stayed within the German territory, there is no doubt that 
they would have been entitled to the financial benefits, not necessarily on the basis of their 
residence (after all, a Greek student who has just arrived in Heidelberg cannot claim such 
maintenance support) but as a reflection of their relationship with the German citizenry and 
political community in general. In other words – if Germany considers it ‘reasonable’ and in 
conformity with its social responsibility that Rhiannon Morgan and Iris Bucher be aided 
financially in their aspirational access to tertiary education, or that the Schwarz family be able to 
deduct money spent on the private education of their children – this cannot be ‘unreasonable’ 
simply be virtue of the fact that they decide to access education abroad (ceteris paribus). It is 
                                                
125 Joined Cases C-11/06 and 12/06, Morgan and Bucher [2007] ECR I-9161, para. 39. 
126 Case C-76/05, Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849, para. 74. 
127 Joined Cases C-11/06 and 12/06, Morgan and Bucher [2007] ECR I-9161, para. 42. 
128 Although not necessarily. It does not seem discriminatory for Member States to assert that all its nationals are 
entitled to certain entitlements notwithstanding lack of integration. See K. Lenaerts and T. Heremans, ‘Contours of a 
European Social Union in the Case-Law of the European Court of Justice’, 2 European Constitutional Law Review 
(2006), p. 107, and AG Mazak in Case C-158/07, Förster [2008] ECR I-8507, para. 67.  
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unsurprising, therefore, that the Court rejected Germany’s arguments, and accepted the 
aspirational logic that financial benefits in the educational sphere to which home nationals are 
entitled within the territory of their home state can be exported. Some commentators have 
construed the obligations under aspirational solidarity that are reflected in Morgan and Bucher 
narrowly, to argue that Member States would still be allowed to completely limit the right to 
export student grants. Such narrow interpretation cannot, however, be normatively defended. The 
rights of citizens under aspirational solidarity behave independently from the Member States’ 
decision whether or not to allow partial export. 
 
The Court might soon clarify its case law in an infringement procedure brought against the 
Netherlands. Export of Dutch student benefits is restricted for citizens who have not lived in the 
Netherlands for at least three out of the past six years. While the case focuses on the rights of 
(children of) economically active citizens, for which such condition can clearly not be posed, AG 
Sharpston’s more general discussion as to the idea of reciprocity that is implicit in granting 
student fees is interesting. She essentially argues that since the reciprocal connection that 
warrants access to student grants is a prospective one, access can thus be limited to students who 
are “likely to use their experience abroad to enrich Netherlands society and (possibly) the 
Netherlands employment market”.129 In consequence, she argues, a retrospective criterion of past 
residence cannot correctly reflect that type of reciprocity.130  While Sharpston’s explicit search to 
connect eligibility for welfare to the reciprocity implicit in a particular good is encouraging, it 
seems that she interprets the reciprocity implicit in student grants quite narrowly, discounting past 
contributions and a more general connection to the society, which sits uneasily with the case law 
in Bidar and Förster.  
 
The Court, in both Morgan and Bucher and Schwarz, seems to conform to the theory of 
aspirational solidarity defended in this thesis. While it demands that the home state allow their 
citizens to make use of the opportunities generated by free movement, it does not impose a 
positive obligation on that state to accommodate such exercise. In other words, while Morgan and 
Bucher are allowed to export their student grants, and the Schwarz family are allowed to send 
their children to foreign private schools with retention of tax benefits, Germany does not need to 
compensate for, for example, the higher tuition fees levied by British universities or the higher 
                                                
129 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-542/09, Commission v Netherlands (pending), para. 135. 
130 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-542/09, Commission v Netherlands (pending), para. 147. 
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maintenance costs that living in the United Kingdom implies, nor does it require Germany to 
allow a higher tax deduction for private schools abroad by virtue of the fact that those are more 
expensive than their German counterparts.131  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION   
This chapter has discussed to what extent the theory of transnational solidarity expands the social 
function(s) of educational benefits to cover the whole of the European Union. Access to 
compulsory education, which serves the elementary social function of providing an individual 
with the tools to integrate in society with the retention of his autonomy and dignity, has been 
extended to cover all Union citizens regardless of their nationality or place of residence. The 
different, more aspirational function of university education (and the financial incentives that 
facilitate access) entails that while students are free to choose where exactly to pursue their 
university education; the costs for such education are shared between the host and the home state 




                                                
131 As helpfully highlighted by the Court. See Case C-76/05, Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849, para. 78-80. 
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5 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
While social assistance and social security benefits both provide the financial entitlements that 
serve to mitigate the hardship encountered in life, a crude distinction can be drawn between the 
function of social assistance, which is to provide financial entitlements for those citizens who 
need help in generating the funds necessary to live their lives with a minimum of dignity and 
autonomy; and the function of social security, which is to insure the citizen against life’s risks. 
Even if this distinction is helpful in understanding the different way in which social assistance 
and social security benefits are extended to cover transnational situations; few entitlements can be 
classified as belonging exclusively to either category (5.1). Rather, as this chapter will show, the 
specific social function of a particular benefit directly determines, much more than in the other 
policy areas considered, to what extent it must be provided to migrant citizens. Read together, the 
three transnational solidarities allocate the responsibility of granting access to social assistance 
and social security benefits between the migrant’s home and host state in accordance with the 
reciprocal obligations that underlie such benefits. Market solidarity suggests that migrant workers 
are protected from life’s risks by their state of employment, regardless of their place of residence 
(5.2). Communitarian solidarity (5.3) and aspirational solidarity (5.4) serve to allocate the 
responsibility to protect the migrant citizen between his home and host state; stressing that the 
former should allow for the export of social security benefits, while the latter must provide all 
resident citizens with a bare minimum level of resources required to live a dignified life. 
Together, the transnational solidarities create a continuous spatial network of entitlements to 
social security and social assistance, which ensures that European citizens are guaranteed access 
to the funds necessary to live an autonomous and dignified life and to the benefits that insulate 
them from life’s risks, regardless of their exercise of the rights to free movement.  
 
5.1 THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
The terms social security and social assistance cover a whole array of social benefits. They 
generally share the objective of insulating the capacity of citizens to live their lives with dignity 
and autonomy. Eligibility is often tied to the citizens’ incapacity to participate in the generation 
and distribution of wealth through the market – either temporarily (unemployment or student 
benefits) or more permanently (disability benefits, pensions). Systems of social security and 
social assistance are typically organised on the basis of eligibility criteria which require both 
membership to the political community providing it and residence within the territory of that 
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polity.1 This exclusive nature primarily results from the territorial nature of national political 
systems and the desire to galvanise the solidaristic commitments that exist within closed political 
communities. Until recently, this exclusive nature was somewhat obscured by the capacity of 
Member States to simply refuse entry to so-called ‘needy foreigners’; giving the impression that 
is operated on the premise of territoriality alone. Migration policies have indeed historically 
constituted the first line of defence to prevent that needy foreigners would destabilise the 
solidaristic and reciprocal commitments which underlie internal sharing mechanisms.2 
 
Through the emergence and strengthening of rights to free movement, the Union has partially 
challenged the closed nature of the national welfare state. Member States, however, have 
remained very hesitant to allow free movement rights for ‘needy citizens’, fearing that it could 
trigger ‘welfare tourism’. As a compromise, the right to residence in another Member State has 
been made conditional upon the migrant having: 
“sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a 
burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period 
of residence”3   
 
The solution found, in other words, was to prevent ‘needy’ citizens from being able to establish 
lawful residence in the host state in the first place, so that their claims to social security and social 
assistance in that state could not pose problems to the internal sustainability of the welfare state. 
Article 8 (4) of Directive 2004/38 indeed explicitly links the right of residence to the insulation of 
domestic mechanisms of social assistance:   
“Member States may not lay down a fixed amount which they regard as "sufficient 
resources", but they must take into account the personal situation of the person 
concerned. In all cases this amount shall not be higher than the threshold below 
which nationals of the host Member State become eligible for social assistance, or, 
where this criterion is not applicable, higher than the minimum social security 
pension paid by the host Member State.” 
 
                                                
1 The demand of residence, which is often attached to social benefits, is meant to both ensure continuous contribution 
by the citizen (through the payment of taxes, or employment-related levies, for example) and serves a purpose in the 
effective administration of such benefits. Given that many benefits are calculated on the basis of factual evidence 
such as records of contribution, financial need and the local costs of subsistence, authorities generally refuse to 
extend eligibility to non-resident nationals.  
2 A. Christensen and M. Malmstedt, ‘Lex Loci Labori versus Lex Loci Domicilii – an Inquiry into the Normative 
Foundations of European Social Security Law’, 2 European Journal of Social Security (2000), p. 69ff; and C. 
Joppke, ‘Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity’, 11 Citizenship Studies (2007), p. 38. 
3 Article 7 (1)(b) of Directive 2004/38. 
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Citizens must already possess what is considered a minimum of resources to live a dignified and 
autonomous life in the host state before they can establish lawful residence. At the same time, 
Member States may only take account of the level of resources at the time of entry in the Member 
State,4 must include resources from family members or sponsors in the host state,5 and 
subsequent loss of sufficient resources may not lead to the expulsion of migrants from the host 
state.6 In other words, migration policy no longer serves as a defence for the sustainability of 
social assistance and social security once the Union citizen has established lawful residence in the 
host state.  
 
The gradual opening up of the borders has shown that the real normative fault line lies not so 
much in criteria of residence, but in vaguer demands of belonging and membership. These 
internal ‘defences’ of the welfare state are also under pressure by EU law. The rights to equal 
treatment that migrants derive from EU law apply to social security and social assistance, thereby 
de facto limiting the capacity of states to exclude citizens on the basis of nationality or residence 
alone. In interpreting the precise demands of equal treatment, the Union legislator and Court face 
the complicated task of incorporating previously obscured notions of domestic reciprocity and 
bounded solidarity within the transnational context. The three transnational solidarities serve as a 
useful conceptual framework for this incorporation. They help allocate the responsibility to look 
after citizens between the citizens’ home and host state in a way which both protects the citizens’ 
capacity to live a ‘good life’ and the willingness of citizens in bounded political communities to 
redistribute resources and aspirations. In making this assessment, the obligations of transnational 
solidarity differ depending on the nature and function of the welfare benefit at stake. Within the 
scope of social assistance and social security entitlements, more than in the other chapters, this 
exercise requires a detailed analysis of such characteristics. Given the strictly individual and 
financial nature of social assistance and social security benefits, the extension of their access 
beyond the group of ‘deserving’ citizens can much quicker lead to distributive asymmetries than 
in the areas of education or healthcare.7  
                                                
4 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193. 
5 See, for example, Case C-408/03, Commission v Belgium [2006] ECR I-2647. 
6 Case C-456/02, Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573. 
7 Beyond the emphasis on the nature and the function of a certain social security or social assistance benefit, a third, 
more practical, aspect must be taken into account when discussing the transnational regulation of social security and 
social assistance. In light of the autonomy that Member States still have to decide on the conditions for access to their 
social benefits, transnational coordination must be both unitary and exhaustive. It needs to prevent situations in 
which migrants fall between two stools; or, rather the opposite, are eligible for the same benefit in two states. Neither 
situation is desirable from the perspective of justice. 
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The following sections discuss how the transnational regulation of social security and social 
assistance for mobile Union citizens by the Union legislator and the Court has incorporated the 
three types of transnational solidarity. It will be argued that market solidarity is reflected by 
attaching access to both social security and social assistance benefits for the migrant and his 
family to the migrant’s status as an economic agent alone. The economic engagement by the 
migrant worker with the host state’s society suffices to meet the conditions of reciprocity in 
access to all benefits, regardless of their nature and function (5.2). Traces of communitarian 
solidarity are also evident: as soon as economically inactive, legally resident, migrants can prove 
that they meet the preconditions of reciprocity which underlie access to a certain social benefit in 
the host state (in light of its function and nature), they are included in the group of ‘members’ for 
which that benefit has to be made available. This means for example that access to elementary 
subsistence benefits – which is premised on, and sustained by, a basic moral duty – must be 
extended to all legally resident citizens, regardless of economic status or nationality (5.3). 
Aspirational solidarity, as far as social security and social assistance are concerned, is the mirror 
image of communitarian solidarity. Just as communitarian solidarity allows migrants to access the 
benefits for which they meet the preconditions of reciprocity in their host state, aspirational 
solidarity allows migrants to retain access to entitlements from their home state (that is, export 
them) as long as they continue to meet the conditions of reciprocity which are constitutive of 
those entitlements (5.4).  
 
 Rights to benefits? 
Market solidarity Equal treatment in access of social benefits of the state of 
economic activity for the worker and dependent family as 
long as such activity continues 
 
Communitarian solidarity All residents have equal access to minimum subsistence 
benefits in the host state. Access to other benefits is 
dependent on the migrant meeting the conditions of reciprocity 
that are constitutive of the different benefits.  
 
Aspirational solidarity Citizens are allowed to export those entitlements for which 
they meet the conditions of reciprocity in their home state. 
 
 
Together, the three transnational solidarities create a seamless web of access to social security 
and social assistance benefits between home and host state which conditions access solely on the 
 139 
migrant meeting the conditions of reciprocity implicit in a specific entitlement, rather than on 
conditions of membership and residence. The table above summarises these findings. 
  
This chapter generally deals with all forms of social assistance and social security. A few 
exceptions have to be made, though. First, sickness insurance and student grants are excluded by 
virtue of the fact that they are discussed elsewhere in this thesis.8 Old age pensions, on the other 
hand, are excluded both in light of the technical nature of their regulation and the exhaustive 
character of their coordination on the European level.9 Most attention in the subsequent sections 
will be focused on unemployment benefits and minimum subsistence benefits. Their complex 
nature and multi-dimensional function allows for a very interesting analysis of how ideas of 
market, communitarian and aspirational solidarity play out in practice.  
 
5.2 MARKET SOLIDARITY 
Migrants citizens who are economically active, that is, who are in employment or self-employed 
in another Member State, derive from that economic status alone a right to equal access to social 
security and social assistance benefits in that state. Their engagement with the labour market in 
the host state dissolves requirements of membership in access to local spaces of social sharing.10 
It is the scope of market solidarity, rather than its existence, however, that is contentious. 
Especially in respect of social assistance mechanisms, Member States have vigorously contested 
access for family members of the worker, non-resident workers, and (in)voluntary unemployed 
migrants. Such contestations are based on the specific nature and function of those benefits, and 
stress that the link between the applicant for social benefits and the employment market of the 
host state is too tenuous to warrant access. It will be argued, however, that the obligations under 
market solidarity are absolute: once a migrant can demonstrate engagement on the market in the 
host state, all social entitlements, regardless of their nature and function, must be extended to him 
and his dependent family members.  
 
The existence of obligations of market solidarity in access to social benefits is uncontested. Both 
Article 7 (2) of Regulation 1612/68 and Article 11 (3) of Regulation 883/2004 indicate that 
                                                
8 See, respectively, chapters 3 and 4. 
9 See for discussion on the transnational coordination of pensions, which mainly deals with the aggregation of 
benefits: F. Pennings, ‘European Social Security Law’, (Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2010), p. 179-197.  
10 See section 2.1. 
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economic engagement with a society trumps nationality or residence as a connecting factor for 
access to sharing mechanisms in that state:11 
“a person pursuing an activity as an employed or self-employed person in Member 
State shall be subject to the legislation of that Member State” 
  
This competence rule is more than that – it not only obliges workers to contribute to, and 
participate in sharing mechanisms in the host Member State,12 but also, by assimilating them to 
‘members’ of that state, entitles them to equal treatment in respect of social security and social 
assistance. From the moment at which the economic activity starts, and for as long as it lasts, the 
worker has a right to access the same social security and social assistance schemes as nationals,13 
and the host state is precluded from demanding additional criteria, such as periods of residence, 
or minimum financial resources, to be met.14 The Levin case emphasises this absolute and 
unconditional character of market solidarity, and also shows that the reason for equal treatment is 
not so much the financial contribution of the migrant to the host state’s finances, but rather his 
engagement with, and participation in, the economic life of the host state. The Levin case dealt 
with a British national who resided and worked in the Netherlands – but earned less than the level 
that the Netherlands considered as the minimum required for subsistence. The Netherlands argued 
that, in consequence, Mrs. Levin could not be classified as a worker and would therefore not 
qualify for social assistance on equal terms as Dutch nationals. In other words, what the 
Netherlands argued was that the right to equal treatment for workers (market solidarity) depended 
on their individual contribution to the host society, rather than their engagement with the market 
and their status as an economic agent alone.15 The Court held, however, that the only relevant 
requirement was one of engagement with the host state’s economy, thus including all workers 
whose activities could be classified as ‘effective and genuine’, and excluding workers who 
performed ‘marginal and ancillary’ activities.16 The individual contribution of a migrant worker 
to the state’s public purse was immaterial. Accordingly, the concept of worker, including its 
privileges of equal treatment, extends to cover even those workers whose income is less than the 
minimum required for subsistence – which thus possibly entails an obligation on the host state to 
                                                
11 See for more F. Pennings, ‘Inclusion and Exclusion of Persons and Benefits in the New Co-ordination Regulation’, 
in: M. Dougan and E. Spaventa (eds.), ‘Social Welfare and EU Law’, (Oxford, Hart, 2005), p. 253. 
12 Case C-160/96, Molenaar [1998] ECR I-849, para. 40. 
13 Article 4 of Regulation 883/2004. 
14 Case C-292/89, Antonissen [1991] ECR 745; Case C-258/04, Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275, para. 36. See also A.P. 
Van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Persons within the European Community’ (Oxford, Hart, 2003), p. 130. 
15 Case 53/81, Levin [1982] ECR 1035. 
16 Case 53/81, Levin [1982] ECR 1035, para. 17. See also Case C-138/02, Collins [2004] ECR I-2703, para. 26, Case 
C-456/02, Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, para. 15, Case 66/85, Lawrie-Blum [1987] ECR 2121, para. 16-17. 
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grant social assistance.17 This was more recently confirmed in Trojani, which dealt with a French 
national who had obtained a job as part of a reintegration program with the Salvation Army in 
Brussels. The Court held that the pivotal test was not whether the job undertaken was part of the 
labour market, but rather than it was “capable of being regarded as forming part of the normal 
labour market”.18 In other words, it is not the functional contribution of the migrant worker, but 
his personal engagement with the labour market in the host state that counts. As the Court put it:   
 “neither the sui generis nature of the employment relationship under national law, 
nor the level of productivity of the person concerned, the origin of the funds from 
which the remuneration is paid or the limited amount of the remuneration can have 
any consequence in regard to whether or not the person is a worker for the purposes 
of [Union] law”. 19 
 
This conforms to the theoretical discussion on the scope of market solidarity, above, where it was 
argued that it is the interdependence between the worker and the host state in the division of 
labour which engenders a normative obligation on the latter to extend all social entitlements to 
cover the worker – regardless of their nature or function.20   
 
This absolute obligation of equal treatment on part of the state of employment – as laid down in 
Article 4 of Regulation 883/2004,21 is implemented differently for social security and social 
assistance. Equal treatment in matters of social security (such as benefits issued in case of 
unemployment, old age or occupational diseases) is ensured by way of assimilation rules. Article 
6 of Regulation 883/2004 is a good example of this approach. It forces host states whose 
legislation requires the completion of a period of insurance, employment or residence before 
access is given to social security benefits to take account of the insurance record which the 
migrant worker has built up in other Member States. The state of employment thus pretends that 
the past insurance records of the workers were accrued in the state of employment, thereby 
ensuring complete equal treatment of migrant workers with nationals. For benefits that are less 
directly connected to the insurance record of the worker, such as disability or maternity benefits, 
Article 5 of Regulation 883/2004 provides another assimilation rule:  
                                                
17 Case 53/81, Levin [1982] ECR 1035, para. 15; Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, Vatsouras [2009] ECR 4585, 
para. 28. 
18 Case C-456/02, Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, para. 24, emphasis added. 
19 Case C-456/02, Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, para. 16. 
20 See section 2.1. 
21 Article 4 of Regulation 883/2004 reads: “Unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation, persons to whom 
this Regulation applies shall enjoy the same benefits and be subject to the same obligations under the legislation 
of any Member State as the nationals thereof”. 
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“where, under the legislation of the competent Member State, legal effects are 
attributed to the occurrence of certain facts or events, that Member State shall take 
account of like facts or events occurring in any Member State as though they had 
taken place in its own territory.” 
 
Finally, in situations falling outside the personal or material scope of Regulation 883/2004, the 
migrant worker can fall back on the ‘catch-all’ rule in Article 7 (2) of Regulation 1612/68, which 
extends the right to equal treatment to cover all ‘social and tax advantages’. In other words, all 
benefits that can be classified as social security and social assistance are extended, under one 
legal regime or the other, to cover migrant workers. That much is uncontroversial: a worker who 
resides in the host state has equal access to all social security and social assistance benefits. Most 
of the discussions on market solidarity, however, do not deal with its existence, but with the 
question whether the scope of market solidarity includes the worker’s family members (5.2.1), 
non-resident workers (5.2.2) or (in)voluntarily unemployed migrant workers (5.2.3). In all these 
situations, the link between the benefit requested and the engagement of the applicant with the 
host state’s economy is tenuous, and the existence of a right to equal treatment under market 
solidarity thus questionable. The Court has traditionally been receptive for such expansive 
interpretations of the scope of market solidarity. The emergence of communitarian solidarity, 
however, which grants different but autonomous rights to residence and equal treatment to 
economically inactive citizens, has led to a re-assessment of the scope of market solidarity.22   
 
5.2.1 THE WORKER’S FAMILY MEMBERS  
The first question is whether a migrant worker’s engagement with the host state’s society 
constitutes a reason for extending equal treatment to social security and social assistance benefits 
to his family members. Does the unemployed child of a migrant worker have a right to jobseeker 
allowance in the host state? Regulation 883/2004 only explicitly extends the right to equal 
treatment to include family members in respect of sickness benefits23 and family benefits.24 The 
‘catch-all’ provision in Regulation 1612/68, which entitles the worker to the same “social and tax 
advantages as national workers”,25 has therefore been used to argue that the right to equal 
                                                
22 See for a (convincing) argument of how this has confused the Court’s case law: S. O’Leary, ‘Developing an Ever 
Closer Union Between the Peoples of Europe?’, Edinburgh Mitchell Working Papers 6/2008.  
23 Article 17 of  Regulation 883/2004. 
24 Article 67 of Regulation 883/2004. 
25 Article 7 (2) of Regulation 1612/68. 
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treatment for family members should be extended to cover all social benefits.26 This line of 
reasoning is contingent on establishing a connection between the worker and the social benefit. In 
other words, it must be argued that, say, a jobseeker allowance for an unemployed child is a 
social advantage for the worker,27 or, more precisely, that the engagement of the worker with the 
host state’s economy warrants access to entitlements for family members who are economically 
dependent on him. Indeed, in Lebon the Court excluded benefits for independent family members 
from the scope of the obligation of equal treatment in Regulation 1612/68.28 Such benefits have 
no effect on the worker’s economic position, which he can therefore not derive from market 
solidarity. Independent family members who are economically inactive can only derive rights to 
social benefits in the host state under communitarian solidarity or aspirational solidarity. 
Conversely, it appears that social benefits meant to alleviate the economic burden of taking care 
of dependent family members do fall within the scope of market solidarity. This view seems 
congruent with the logic underlying market solidarity. Its purpose is to both reward and protect 
the worker’s engagement with the host state by financially compensating for social risks and 
responsibilities. This would indicate that market solidarity stretches to include all social 
advantages that have a direct effect on the worker’s financial situation. This line seems to have 
been accepted by the Court in Hartmann, which dealt with the question whether a child-care 
allowance constituted a ‘social benefit’ for the worker. The Court emphasised that such an 
allowance:  
 “enables one of the parents to devote himself or herself to the raising of a young child, 
by meeting family expenses, [and] benefits the family as a whole, whichever parent it is 
who claims the allowance. The grant of such an allowance to a worker’s spouse is 
capable of reducing that worker’s obligation to contribute to family expenses, and 
therefore constitutes for him or her a ‘social advantage’”.29 
 
The real test, then, seems to be a factual assessment of whether or not the benefit affects the 
economic position of the worker, either by meeting the expenses which he would cover, or 
substitute his support of other family members.30 The right to equal treatment under market 
                                                
26 In the early Michel S, Cristini and Even cases the Court moved from one end of the spectrum to the other, first 
finding that only the benefits which “are to benefit the worker themselves” were covered by Regulation 1612/68, 
(Case 76/72, Michel S. [1973] ECR 457, para. 9) and later that they “include all social and tax advantages, whether or 
not attached to the contract of employment”, (Case 32/75, Cristini [1975] ECR 1085, para. 13) before finding a 
middle ground in its interpretation, including social advantages which “are generally granted to national workers 
primarily because of their objective status as workers or by virtue of the mere fact of residence on the national 
territory” (in Case 207/78, Even [1979] ECR 2019, para. 22). 
27 Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, para. 25. 
28 Case 316/85, Lebon [1987] ECR 2811, para. 13. 
29 Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, para. 26. 
30 See also very explicitly Case 316/85, Lebon [1987] ECR 2811, para. 22 and 24.  
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solidarity, in other words, can only be extended to cover the worker against the social risks that 
have struck dependent family members.31  
 
5.2.2 FRONTIER WORKERS  
The unconditional nature of market solidarity has also been challenged in respect of workers who 
reside in another Member State – typically frontier workers. It seems that the fact that a worker 
does not reside within the territory of his state of employment should not detract from his 
entitlement to social security and social assistance benefits, given that such entitlements are solely 
dependent on his engagement with the market in that state. In return for his economic 
participation, the state of employment undertakes to protect him from life’s social risks.32 The 
rights that a worker derives under market solidarity are thus attached to his employment contract, 
not his personal choices. Rights obtained in his state of employment follow the worker wherever 
he resides. Regulation 883/2004 indeed ensures that, regardless of place of residence, workers 
obtain, from their state of employment, sickness benefits,33 benefits in respect of accidents at 
work and occupational diseases,34 invalidity benefits,35 and family benefits.36 In its case law on 
Regulation 1612/68, moreover, the Court has always followed, and recently confirmed, this prima 
facie presumption of exportability.37 
 
It is all the more strange, then, that the Court has recently indicated that workers cannot export 
certain benefits. The Court took its cue (if not its conceptual rigour) from AG Geelhoed, who has 
repeatedly argued for a dissociation of “the migrant citizen as a person from what he represents in 
economic terms”.38 Geelhoed essentially argues that the frontier worker is – for lack of residence 
– nothing but an economic agent in his state of employment, and should only be allowed to access 
social benefits meant to cover risks related to his status as a worker. This is really an argument on 
                                                
31 See also Article 1 (i) (2) and (3) of Regulation 883/2004, which highlights the dependence criterion. 
32 Case Case C-160/96, Molenaar [1998] ECR I-849,, para. 43. 
33 Articles 21 and 35 of Regulation 883/2004. See Case C-160/96, Molenaar [1998] ECR I-849, para. 43, and 
(explicitly) Case 41/84, Pinna [1996] ECR 1.  
34 Articles 36 and 41 of Regulation 883/2004. 
35 Article 44 of Regulation 883/2004. 
36 See very explicitly Article 67 of Regulation 883/2004: “A person shall  be entitled to family benefits in accordance 
with the legislation of the competent Member State, including for his family members residing in another Member 
State, as if they were residing in the former Member State.” See also Case C-312/94, Hoever & Zachow [1996] ECR 
I-4895.  
37 Case C-206/10, Commission v Germany [nyr], para 34ff. See also Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303; 
Case C-57/96, Meints [1997] ECR I-6689, para. 49-50. 
38 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, para. 41. 
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the allocation of social responsibility on the basis of the nature and function of the benefit: while 
the state of employment is responsible for employment-related benefits, for which the worker has 
insured himself by his participation in sharing schemes; the state of residence should cater for 
other social benefits, such as child-care benefits.39 Such benefits, and the reciprocity that they 
express, so the argument runs, are inextricably tied to territorial policy objectives, such as 
demographic concerns, and should therefore not be exportable from the state of employment.40 
While it is not disputed that child-raising benefits express a territorial, rather than economic 
solidarity, as argued by Geelhoed, such assessment is immaterial for the worker’s right to equal 
treatment in respect of all social benefits, which is only derived from his engagement with a 
state’s labour market. Indeed, as will be argued below, child-care benefits cannot be exported by 
economically inactive citizens for exactly this reason.41  
 
In Hendrix and Geven, the Court, possible confused by the relationship between obligations under 
market solidarity and those under communitarian solidarity,42 followed Geelhoed’s approach and 
indeed limited the scope of market solidarity. The latter case is particularly instructive. It 
concerned a Dutch national, who resided in the Netherlands and worked in Germany for between 
three and fourteen hours a week. While, the Court argued, this classified her as a ‘worker’ under 
Regulation 1612/68,43 it did not necessarily entitle her to have a right to equal treatment to all 
social advantages. The Court allowed Germany to impose an additional requirement of ‘more 
than minor’ employment, before the child-raising allowance could be exported.44 In other words, 
if Geven had lived in Germany her ‘minor employment’ would not have barred her from 
accessing the child-care benefit. The sole reason for this additional requirement of ‘more than 
minor’ employment, the threshold for which the Court even allowed Germany to impose 
unilaterally,45 was to prevent its export. This interpretation simply denies the existence of market 
solidarity. It fails to recognise that the obligation of equal treatment is only premised on 
engagement of the worker with the labour market of a Member State and not on his actual 
contribution or residence. 
                                                
39 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, para. 51. 
40 See, explicitly, Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, para. 66 and 69. 
41 See below, section 5.3. 
42 As convincingly argued by S. O’Leary, ‘Developing an Ever Closer Union Between the Peoples of Europe?’, 
Edinburgh Mitchell Working Papers 6/2008. 
43 Case C-213/05, Geven [2007] ECR I-6347, para. 17. 
44 Case C-213/05, Geven [2007] ECR I-6347, para. 23-28. 
45 Case C-213/05, Geven [2007] ECR I-6347, para. 29; thereby overturning its ruling in Case 53/81, Levin [1982] 
ECR 1035, para. 11; and Case 139/85, Kempf [1986] ECR 1741, para. 15, see also Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case 
C-213/05, Geven [2007] ECR I-6347, para. 36. 
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The absolute nature of market solidarity defended here, which essentially entails that once a 
migrant is classified as a worker, his right to equal treatment is immediate, absolute and not 
conditional on the nature and function of the benefit, finds one very particular legislative 
limitation. Regulation 883/2004 provides that special non-contributory minimum subsistence 
allowances cannot be exported by migrant workers.46 Frontier workers can, instead, access such 
benefits in their state of residence. This partial exception to market solidarity, then, is meant to 
prevent the overlap of benefits that a frontier worker derives from the state of employment and 
the state of residence.47 The priority of state of residence over state of employment in this 
particular case can be explained by reference to the specific function and nature of minimum 
subsistence allowances. Bluntly put, such allowances are closely linked to the economic and 
social situation of the actual place of residence of the person,48 and while a Romanian allowance 
may be meant to provide a ‘decent’ income for a citizen in Bucharest, it will not go very far in 
achieving that objective if the recipient lives in Stockholm. At the same time, in Hendrix – the 
sole case in which a worker received such minimum subsistence benefits from his state of 
employment which he would not receive from his state of residence – the Court was visibly ill at 
ease in limiting the absolute nature of market solidarity and instead expressly required the 
national court to come to a ‘fair’ outcome, regardless of the express prohibition of exportability in 
the regulation.49 Properly understood, then, it seems that this exception to market solidarity is not 
a denial of the existence of a right under market solidarity, but simply a suspension of its 
expression when two entitlements to the same minimum subsistence benefit exist. Only when a 
frontier worker is eligible for the same benefit in his state of employment and his state of 
residence, and the nature and function of that benefit require an assessment of the applicant’s 
living expenses, can the absolute right under market solidarity be limited.  
 
5.2.3 UNEMPLOYED WORKERS 
Given that the right to equal treatment in matters of social security and social assistance is 
functionally tied to the migrant’s status as an economic agent in the host state, one would expect 
                                                
46 Article 70 (2)(a) of Regulation 883/2004. 
47 The importance of the prevention of overlap was highlighted in Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, 
para. 23. See more generally Article 10 of Regulation 883/2004, which emphasises that the Regulation “shall neither 
confer nor maintain the right to several benefits of the same kind”. 
48 Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-287/05, Hendrix [2007] ECR I-6909, para 63. 
49 Case C-287/05, Hendrix [2007] ECR I-6909, para. 57. 
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that the loss of such status would automatically have consequences for the social benefits 
enjoyed. In theory, economically inactive citizens have no claim at all under market solidarity to 
enjoy social benefits in their state of employment. In case of unemployment the social 
responsibility to provide social benefits falls on the state of residence of the citizen under 
communitarian solidarity.50 Yet, the Union legislator and Court has repeatedly emphasised that 
market solidarity can, in certain instances, have effects beyond the period of employment.51 Two 
situations can be envisaged where claims might be based on the engagement of the migrant 
citizen with the labour market in the host state without the citizen actually being employed. The 
first is when a migrant becomes unemployed. Can he claim social benefit on the basis of prior 
engagement with the market? The second is jobseekers. Does their potential future engagement 
with the labour market in the state in which they make themselves available for work constitute a 
reason to grant them equal access to social benefits?  
 
The allocation between the state of (former) employment and state of residence in the provision 
of unemployment benefits for frontier workers is instructive in showing the limits to the scope of 
market solidarity. Wholly unemployed citizens, who have no continuous economic connection 
with the state of (former) employment, have no right to unemployment benefits from that state. It 
is the state of residence, instead, which must provide such benefits. Partially unemployed frontier 
workers, who retain links to the employment market in the state of employment, for example by 
continuing to work intermittedly or “a part-time basis, while remaining available for work on a 
full-time basis”,52 on the other hand, can obtain unemployment benefits from their state of (partial 
employment) rather than the state of residence.53 In other words, access to social benefits is again 
conditional upon continuous engagement with the labour market of that state.54 This requirement 
has recently been confirmed by a Decision by the administrative commission for the coordination 
of social security systems, which distinguishes between wholly and partially unemployed workers 
(and thus determines the scope of market solidarity) on the basis of:  
                                                
50 Below, section 5.3. And, explicitly, Case 275/96, Kuusijarvi [1998] ECR I-3419, para. 73. 
51 See Article 7 (3) of Directive 2004/38; Case C-57/96, Meints [1997] ECR I-6689, para. 40 and Case 39/86, Lair 
[1988] ECR 3161, para. 36. See F. Pennings, ‘Inclusion and Exclusion of Persons and Benefits in the New Co-
ordination Regulation’, in: M. Dougan and E. Spaventa (eds.), ‘Social Welfare and EU Law’, (Oxford, Hart, 2005), 
p. 256. 
52 Case C-444/98, De Laat [2001] ECR I-2229, para. 37. 
53 Article 65 of Regulation 883/2004. 
54 See also Case C-43/99, Leclere [2001] ECR I-4265, para. 58-59. 
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“whether or not any contractual employment link exists or is maintained between the 
parties, and not on the duration of any temporary suspension of the workers’ 
activity”55 
 
A second group of economically inactive citizens who have made claims under market solidarity 
are jobseekers. In essence, their claim is based on their potential future engagement with the 
labour market in a certain state. Market solidarity, however, does not allow for such anticipated 
claims. The Court has, albeit somewhat cryptically, confirmed this view in Collins and Ioannidis. 
Both cases dealt with migrants who sought work in another Member State, and demanded that 
that state grant them a jobseeker allowance. The Court paradoxically argued that in light of the 
emergence of Union citizenship, jobseeker allowances could no longer be excluded from the 
scope of Article 45 TFEU.56 Even though Collins and Ioannidis could not be qualified as 
‘workers’, it seemed, they had a claim to equal treatment as aspirant workers because of their 
status as a member of the European political community. This assumption is very difficult to 
square with the theoretical foundation of market solidarity, which makes a strict separation 
between the rights that migrants derive from their economic engagement in the labour market in 
the host state and those derived from their communal status as Union citizen. It would appear, 
however, that the Court’s case law is simply rhetorically conflated. In its actual assessment of the 
rights which migrant jobseekers have in a host state, the Court demanded that Collins and 
Ioannidis demonstrate that they meet the preconditions, such as a demand of periods of residence 
and availability for work, which are constitutive of the jobseeker allowances requested.57 This, as 
will be discussed at length in the next section, is a demand that is attached to claims under 
communitarian solidarity. Market solidarity, on the other hand, as has become clear in this 
section, is absolute: once the migrant can establish that he engages with the labour market of the 
host state, his right to equal treatment is immediate and behaves autonomously from the nature 
and function of a good.58 Migrants who have not yet established, or have lost such connection 
with the labour market have no claims under market solidarity. 
 
                                                
55 Decision U3, OJ C106/45, 2010. 
56 Case C-138/02, Collins [2004] ECR I-2703, para. 63, Case C-258/04, Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275, para. 22. 
57 Case C-258/04, Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275, para. 31. See also M. Dougan, ‘The Court helps those who help 
themselves… The legal status of migrant work-seekers under Community law in the light of the Collins judgment’, 1 
European Journal of Social Security (2005), p. 15. 
58 This difference is explicitly addressed by the Court in Case C-258/04, Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275, para. 36. 
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5.3 COMMUNITARIAN SOLIDARITY 
The solidarity that migrant citizens can demand in their host state simply because of their status 
as a Union citizen is not strong enough to warrant full and automatic equal treatment. It neither 
allows ‘needy’ citizens to choose where to live, nor does it entitle economically inactive migrants 
to claim social benefits wherever they live. Yet, while Member States may demand that 
economically inactive migrants demonstrate sufficient resources on the moment of entry, such 
migrants may subsequently find themselves in financial need and require social assistance. Which 
precise demands of equal treatment can such lawfully resident but economically inactive Union 
citizens make? Even if, at first sight, Regulation 883/2004 appears to grant full equal treatment in 
access to social security benefits to economically inactive migrants by emphasising that the state 
of residence is primarily responsible for such benefits,59 a more in-depth analysis of the Court’s 
case law shows that such full and automatic equal treatment is required neither within the scope 
of Regulation 883/2004 nor under the citizenship provisions in the Treaty.  
 
This section argues that communitarian solidarity carves out an obligation on Member States to 
draft their criteria of eligibility for social security and social assistance entitlements in accordance 
with the nature and the function of those entitlements. Such an obligation serves to contextualise 
the demands of migrant citizens within the structures that sustain welfare entitlements on the 
national level. A claim on the basis of communitarian solidarity, in other words, forces Member 
States to assess how local benefits are normatively constructed and sustained, and to draw 
eligibility criteria to catch all residents – whether nationals or not – who fall within such 
normative structures.  The central point in assessing the scope of communitarian solidarity is, 
then, whether the applicant can meet the preconditions of reciprocity that are constitutive of the 
benefit requested.60 As summarized by AG Geelhoed:  
“depending on the nature of the benefits concerned, the Member States may lay down 
such objective conditions as are necessary to ensure that the benefit is provided to 
persons who have a sufficient link with its territory”61 
 
                                                
59 Article 11 (3)(e) of Regulation 883/2004. 
60 See also AG Geelhoed in Case C-209/03, Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, para. 67, and AG Mazak in Case C-158/07, 
Förster [2008] ECR I-8507, para. 129: “the criterion used must still be indicative of the degree of integration into 
society”. See also C. O’Brien, ‘Real links, abstract rights and false alarms: the relationship between the ECJ’s “real 
link” case law and national solidarity’, 33 ELRev (2008), p. 653ff. 
61 Case C-209/03, Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, para. 33. 
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The ethos of this test, which connects the function and nature of the social benefit requested to the 
reciprocity demonstrated by the migrant Union citizen, is that the migrant must meet his ‘part of 
the bargain’ before accessing sharing arrangements in the host state. This demand is translated in 
legal terms through use of a test of proportionality, which transcends both Regulation 883/2004 
and the case law of the Court. Under communitarian solidarity, in other words, equal access to 
social benefits for migrants may only be denied when it is proportional in light of the social 
function of a certain welfare benefit.62 Logically, then, communitarian solidarity is a 
differentiated type of solidarity. Economically inactive migrant do not derive an automatic and 
immediate right to welfare entitlements that reflect past commitments, whether in the form of 
personal insurance (such as pensions) or more intangible socio-cultural attachment (student 
grants). On the other hand, they can access benefits whose function is to prevent human need or 
which are inextricably linked to territorial objectives from the moment of entry. Access to such 
benefits, after all, is premised on the materialisation of need or physical presence on the territory 
of the state rather than on past commitments. The following sections will discuss three very 
different benefits in order to find out whether the Court indeed links the function and nature of a 
social benefit to the eligibility criteria that Member States are allowed to set. It will be argued that 
benefits that serve to prevent individual suffering, such as minimum subsistence benefits (5.3.1), 
and benefits that are closely linked to the presence of the citizen on the territory, such as family 
benefits (5.3.2) must be extended to all lawfully resident Union citizens. The extension of 
benefits that more strongly reflect past individual commitments and prior periods of insurance, 
such as unemployment benefits, is more complicated and requires the Court to explicitly tease out 
the demands of reciprocity which the nature and function of such benefits imply (5.3.3). 
 
5.3.1 MINIMUM SUBSISTENCE BENEFITS 
Minimum subsistence benefits ensure that citizens have access to sufficient financial resources to 
obtain the bare minimum commodities, such as shelter and food, required to live a dignified and 
autonomous life, and, indeed, ‘survive’. The delivery of such social goods, which are 
‘foundational and fundamental’ for a citizen’s capacity to live their lives is based on a basic moral 
demand that citizens, and by inference polities, must ‘save’ fellow humans in dire need. Any 
political system that is normatively premised on the alleviation of human needs and the 
facilitation of human aspirations cannot but provide such guarantees of minimum dignity and 
                                                
62 Section 2.2. 
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autonomy.63 Even if organised within national spatial boundaries, then, the type of reciprocity 
that underlies it is very diffuse and not particularly parochial. It connects to the status of the 
applicant as a human being and his need rather than his status as a member of a certain political 
community. In consequence, minimum subsistence entitlements must be extended to all legally 
resident Union citizens who fall below the level of resources set by the applicable national 
legislation. The reason is – to repeat the vocabulary used above – that the social function of 
minimum subsistence benefits does not speak to membership, but to personal need. It is thus 
exactly because the moral obligation upon which minimum subsistence benefits are based 
transcends the confines of parochialism and membership that all resident Union citizens 
automatically meet the conditions of reciprocity required for their access. The European 
Convention on Social and Medical Assistance, to which fifteen Member States are signatories,64 
already expresses this basic moral obligation: 
“Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to ensure that nationals of the other 
Contracting Parties who are lawfully present in any part of its territory to which this 
Convention applies, and who are without sufficient resources, shall be entitled 
equally with its own nationals and on the same conditions to social and medical 
assistance”65 
 
In Grzelczyk the Court has had the opportunity to expand on this logic. The case dealt with a 
French student who had resided in Belgium for a number of years and in his final year of study 
applied for a Belgian minimex, which is meant to provide a minimum level of resources required 
for subsistence.66 The Court, without much explanation, argued that a residence requirement of 
five years before economically inactive migrants were eligible for such benefit was unlawful.67 
The lack of normative elaboration makes an assessment of the reason for this finding difficult. It 
is not unlikely that it was premised on an intuitive appreciation that Grzelczyk, a hard-working 
student, ‘deserved’ access. At the same time, the ruling of the Court itself does not leave much 
space for limitations to the right of legally resident Union citizens to access minimum subsistence 
benefits. The Court seems to argue that any difference in treatment between legally resident 
citizens in eligibility for the minimex is prohibited. This approach ties in with the Court’s and 
legislator’s decision in Article 70 (2) of Regulation 883/2004 to allocate the responsibility for the 
                                                
63 See section 1.1. 
64 On the 1st December 2011, Belgium, Demark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom were signatory states. 
65 Article 1 of the European Convention of Social and Medical Assistance.  
66 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para. 8.  
67 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193. 
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provision of special non-contributory social benefits which are meant to provide minimum 
subsistence income exclusively to the state of residence of the citizen.68 That state is both under 
the moral obligation and in the position to assess the need of citizens and tailor access to social 
assistance mechanism to meet that need. Lawful residence, in other words, is sufficient to 
establish a right to equal treatment in matters of minimum subsistence benefits.69 Migrants who 
are in need of social assistance upon entry in the host state, however, can still be denied a right to 
residence.  
 
5.3.2 TERRITORIAL BENEFITS 
A similar dynamic, whereby Member States are forced to link the eligibility criteria for a benefit 
to the nature and function of that benefit, is visible in the regulation of childcare allowances. In 
Geven and Hartmann, the Court was forced to unpack the normative assumptions that underlie 
the rules of Regulation 883/2004, which provides that family benefits are provided by the state of 
residence. In those cases, as was argued above, the Court made the conceptual mistake of 
limiting the absolute nature of market solidarity.70 Regardless, its reconstruction of the social 
function of childcare benefits, and its assessment of the link between migrant and state which is 
required before access must be extended, are particularly useful in explaining the mechanics of 
communitarian solidarity in respect of family benefits. The first step that both AG Geelhoed and 
the Court undertook was to explicitly define the nature and social function of childcare benefits:  
“German child-raising allowance constitutes an instrument of national family policy 
intended to encourage the birth-rate in that country.”71 
 “The legislature’s motive is also the underlying idea that raising a child in Germany 
makes a contribution to the future political, economic and social existence of society 
in that country.”72 
“It is apparent from this description that the child-raising allowance must be 
regarded as an instrument of national family policy which serves social, economic 
and demographic objectives in the longer term.”73 
 
                                                
68 See also Case C-299/05, Commission v Parliament and Council [2007] ECR I-8695. 
69 Case C-456/02, Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, para. 40ff. 
70 See above, section 5.2. 
71 Case C-213/05, Geven [2007] ECR I-6347, para. 21, Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-213/05, Geven [2007] 
ECR I-6347, para. 29. 
72 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, para. 66, see also Case C-212/05, 
Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, para. 32 
73 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, para. 67. 
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The social function of child-care benefit, in other words, is decidedly territorial. Only residence 
can serve as an indicator for eligibility, then. The lawful residence of a child on the territory of 
that state entitles the parents to child-raising benefits. Indeed,  
“[t]here can be no doubt that the Member State are wholly justified in pursuing 
policies aimed at promoting childbirth with a view to guaranteeing a certain degree 
of stability in the demographic composition of their populations. By their very nature 
such policies must ensure that measures taken are aimed at the persons resident on 
their national territories. (…) It would therefore seem that a residence requirement is 
appropriate to ensure that the child-raising allowance is provided to persons who 
belong to the Member State’s national population, which, of course, includes not only 
German nationals, but all persons lawfully resident in Germany irrespective of their 
nationality.” 74 
 
As soon as a child – although this will logically include its parents – has established lawful 
residence in a host member state, family benefits must be automatically extended. The imposition 
of preconditions of economic activity or prior residence are not allowed, for they require a 
connection between applicant and state which is not indicative of the social function of the 
benefits requested. Under the rules of Regulation 883/2004 there is no doubt that family benefits, 
which are defined as “all benefits in kind or in cash intended to meet family expenses, excluding 
advances of maintenance payments and special childbirth and adoption allowances”,75 must be 
extended to cover all resident Union citizens.76 While neither the Regulation itself nor the 
Court’s case law explains the normative basis for this demand of complete equal treatment, it is 
likely to follow the logic set out above. Family benefits are almost all inextricably tied to the 
added costs of raising children, and as such are premised on the same demographic concerns and 
territorial solidarity highlighted above, which logically extends to include all resident Union 
citizens. 
 
Gottwald is another good example of another type of reciprocity that may underlie welfare 
benefits. The case dealt with an Austrian law that granted free toll discs to disabled residents, but 
not disabled non-residents. Mr. Gottwald, as a German resident on holiday in Austria, was not 
exempted from toll duty. The Court first traced the function of this particular benefit, before it 
assessed whether or not the claim of residence was indeed indicative of that function: 
                                                
74 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-212/05, Hartmann [2007] ECR I-6303, para. 69, Opinion of AG Geelhoed in 
Case C-213/05, Geven [2007] ECR I-6347, para. 29. 
75 Article 1 (z) of Regulation 883/2004. 
76 See combined reading of Article 11 (3)(e), Article 4 and Article 5 of Regulation 883/2004. 
 154 
“the measure at issue (..) is intended to promote the mobility and social integration 
of disabled persons who, because of their disability, cannot use public transport and 
who, as a consequence, depend on a private vehicle. Thus, that measure applies, as 
shown by the validity of the toll disc of one year, to persons who have to use the road 
network relatively frequently”77 
 
“With regard to a measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings, intended to 
facilitate regular journeys in Austria by disabled persons with a view to their 
integration in national society, the place of residence or of ordinary residence then 
appears to be a criterion suitable to establish the existence of a connection between 
those persons and the society of the Member State concerned”78 
 
What seems to underlie the Court’s ruling, then, is not that the policy itself is inherently territorial 
(such as the demographic policies underlying child-raising benefits), but rather that its objective, 
to encourage the social integration of immobile citizens, requires that the applicant demonstrate (a 
presumption of) the willingness to actually integrate in that society. That is the citizens’ part of 
the bargain. A criterion of residence, in other words, is indicative for such willingness to 
integrate; implying that the right to free toll-discs does not include people like Mr. Gottwald, who 
only spend a few days in Tirol.79 
 
5.3.3 UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
Unemployment benefits can be defined as financial entitlements for persons who have “reduced, 
ceased or suspended their remunerative activities and are available on the labour market”.80 This 
shows that the logic underlying unemployment benefits is a composite one. Access requires both 
a past and a prospective commitment to the labour market. Past commitment is typically reflected 
by the fact that workers will have insured themselves, while in employment, against the risks of 
unemployment. The demand of future participation is ensured by making access to 
unemployment benefits contingent on the willingness and capability of the workseeker to join the 
employment market though requirements of compulsory acceptance of suitable work or the 
imposition of targets for applications. But how does this composite nature of unemployment 
benefits operate in a transnational context – say where a worker was employed in one state but 
makes himself available in another? Does he have a right to unemployment benefits as a 
                                                
77 Case C-103/08, Gottwald [2009] ECR I-9117, para. 31. 
78 Case C-103/08, Gottwald [2009] ECR I-9117, para. 36. 
79 See Opinion of AG Mazak in Case C-103/08, Gottwald [2009] ECR I-9117, para. 10. 
80 F. Pennings, ‘European Social Security Law’, (Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2010), p. 225, with reference to Case C-
66/92, Acciardi [1993] ECR I-4567. Emphasis added. 
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reflection of his past insurance record, or rather as a reflection of his willingness to participate in 
the economy of the state in which he make himself available for work?81 
 
The case of frontier workers is where this conflict is played out most explicitly. Regulation 
883/2004 allocates the duty to pay unemployment benefits to the state of residence of the 
unemployed citizen, regardless of the fact that he was previously employed in another state, and 
accrued rights to unemployment benefit there.82 Article 61 of Regulation 883/2004 stipulates that 
periods of insurance and employment completed in another Member State count towards criteria 
of entitlement in the state of residence. The reason for this allocation of the responsibility to pay 
unemployment benefits to the state of residence rather than the state of former employment 
appears to prioritises future availability on the labour market over past insurance as a connecting 
factor for access to unemployment benefits.83 In Aubin, the Court indeed explicitly emphasized 
this:   
 “That choice [as to the state from which the citizen can obtain unemployment 
benefits] is made essentially – indeed, exclusively – by the worker’s making himself 
available to the employment office of the state from which he is claiming the 
benefits.”84 
 
In justification of the default allocation of such responsibility to the state of residence, the Court 
highlighted that the conditions for the search of new work are generally most favourable in the 
place of residence,85 presumably due to issues of qualifications, language, practical availability 
and cultural differences.86 What this means, really, is that the nature and function of 
unemployment benefits is primarily contingent on the willingness and availability of the citizen 
to work in a certain Member State, rather than on his past contribution to insurance schemes. It is 
not, however, exclusively contingent on such willingness. As Article 61 (2) of Regulation 
883/2004 emphasises by generally precluding former workers from asking unemployment 
benefits from a state other than the one in which he worked or resided at the time of loss of 
employment, even if he makes himself available to the employment authorities in that state, 
                                                
81 See Article 61 of Regulation 883/2004, and also R. Cornelissen, ‘The New EU coordination system for workers 
who become unemployed’, 9 European Journal of Social Security (2007), p. 195. 
82 Article 65 of Regulation 883/2004. 
83 See Article 65 (2) of Regulation 883/2004 for the demand of availability on the labour market. 
84 See Case 227/81, Aubin [1982] ECR 1991, para. 19.  
85 Case 39/76, Mouthaan [1976] ECR 1901, para 13-14; Case 227/81, Aubin [1982] ECR 1991, para. 19, 21. 
86 F. Pennings, ‘European Social Security Law’, (Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2010), p. 237. 
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access to unemployment benefits still requires some sort of prior link to the state – whether in 
economic or more abstract social terms.87  
 
This may be different for social assistance benefits such as jobseeker allowances, which 
evidently prioritise prospective engagement of the applicant with the labour market over 
retrospective commitments. Indeed, in Collins, D’Hoop and Ioannidis, which all dealt with 
jobseeker allowances,88 the Court first qualified which sort of commitment could legitimately be 
asked before access should be extended to economically inactive migrants:  
“The jobseeker’s allowance (..) requires in particular the claimant to be available 
for and actively seeking employment and not to have income exceeding the 
applicable amount or capital exceeding a specified amount. It may be regarded as 
legitimate for a Member State to grant such an allowance only after it has been 
possible to establish that a genuine link exists between the person seeking work and 
the employment market of that State.”89 
 
The Court then tested whether the Belgian and British eligibility criteria actually reflected this 
commitment: 
 “However, a single condition concerning the place where the diploma of completion 
of secondary education was obtained is too general and exclusive in nature. It unduly 
favours an element which is not necessarily representative of the real and effective 
degree of connection between the applicant for the tideover allowance and the 
geographic employment market, to the exclusion of all other representative 
elements.“90 
“However, while a residence requirement is, in principle, appropriate for the 
purpose of ensuring such a connection, (...) the period [of residence] must not exceed 
what is necessary in order for the national authorities to be able to satisfy themselves 
that the person concerned is genuinely seeking work in the employment market of the 
host Member State.”91 
 
In these cases, the Court has unpacked the assumptions that implicitly underlie the rules of 
allocation in Regulation 883/2004. While the requirement constitutive of access to 
unemployment benefits is composed of both prospective and retrospective commitments, access 
                                                
87 Even if, as will be discussed in the next section, Article 64 of the Regulation allows for the temporary export of 
unemployment benefits from the competent state to accommodate such situations; in other words, availability in third 
state while funded by state of (former) residence.  
88 Even if it was named tideover allowance Case C-224/98, D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191 and in Case C-258/04, 
Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275. 
89 Case C-138/02, Collins [2004] ECR I-2703, para. 68-70. 
90 Case C-224/98, D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191, para. 39; Case C-258/04, Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275, para. 31 
91 Case C-138/02, Collins [2004] ECR I-2703, para. 72. 
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to jobseekers allowances is solely dependent on the migrant’s availability on the labour market. 
This shows that the Court is indeed committed to the view that Member States are only allowed 
to set eligibility criteria which are actually indicative of the social function of a certain welfare 
good.  
 
5.4 ASPIRATIONAL SOLIDARITY 
The rights to free movement may be aspirational, but they are neither as aspirational as to allow 
citizens to collect welfare benefits at will throughout Europe, nor do they allow for free 
movement of so-called ‘needy’ migrants. As discussed above, the establishment of lawful 
residence in another Member State is contingent upon the migrant possessing sufficient resources 
before entering the territory of that state. Aspirational solidarity serves to strengthen the capacity 
of such citizens to participate in free movement. It allows citizens to export from the home state 
those social entitlements which reflect past commitments, and which do not depend on 
prospective commitments. Aspirational solidarity, in other words, serves as a mirror to the logic 
of communitarian solidarity: just like the latter allows migrants to access social benefits for which 
they meet the preconditions of reciprocity in the host state; aspirational solidarity allows migrants 
to retain social benefits for which they continue to meet the conditions of reciprocity in their 
home state, regardless of the lack of residence. Unjustified restrictions to the right to export social 
entitlements under aspirational solidarity will be struck down on the basis of Article 21 TFEU.92 
Together, communitarian solidarity and aspirational solidarity create a seamless web of 
entitlements to social benefits: they allocate the responsibility to provide benefits in accordance 
with the different roles that the migrant plays in the different states.  
 
The possibility to export social security and social assistance benefits is decidedly aspirational. It 
acts as a mechanism to reduce the risks inherent in the exercise of the rights to free movement. In 
doing so, it facilitates the individual citizens’ choice to move to another Member State in pursuit 
of ‘the good life’ in two significant ways. First, it allows migrants to more easily meet the 
precondition of sufficient resources, upon which lawful residence in the host state is 
conditional.93 Second, it insulates the migrants’ choice to change his life against the social risks 
                                                
92 See Case C-406/04, De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-6947; and Case C-244/98, D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191. See also 
section 2.3. 
93 This argument was made explicitly by De Cuyper; see Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-406/04, De Cuyper 
[2006] ECR I-6947, para. 94. 
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for which he is not yet protected in the host state. In other words, aspirational solidarity serves to 
protect the possibility and willingness of Union citizens to aim for something ‘better’.  
 
In legal terms, aspirational solidarity functions like its mirror image of communitarian solidarity. 
Member States may only impose eligibility criteria that are indicative of the nature and function 
of any particular social benefit. In consequence, welfare entitlements that reflect a past 
commitment of the migrant to their home state, and are thus unrelated to continuous residence on 
the territory of that state, are exportable.94 Entitlements whose nature and social function are 
inextricably tied to the territory of the state, on the other hand, may require continuous residence 
and can thus not be exported. In the most general terms, this entails that entitlements that reflect a 
risk against which citizens have ensured themselves can be exported, given that the element 
which indicates their access is the materialisation of the risk rather than their residence (5.4.1); 
whereas entitlements that stem from means-tested social assistance cannot be exported, as they 
are meant to help the applicant in relation to his socio-economic situation in one particular state 
(5.4.2). For benefits that cannot be classified as exclusively risk-based or charity-based, the Court 
needs to undertake a more fluid assessment of their nature and function (5.4.3). 
 
5.4.1 SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 
Regulation 883/2004, like its predecessor Regulation 1408/71, allows for the export of most 
financial benefits:95  
“Unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation, cash benefits payable under the 
legislation of one or more Member States or under this Regulation shall not be 
subject to any reduction, amendment, suspension, withdrawal or confiscation on 
account of the fact that the beneficiary or the members of his family reside in a 
Member State other than that in which the institution responsible for the providing 
benefits is situated.”96 
 
This general waiving of residence criteria finds its justification in the nature of the benefits 
covered, and the reciprocal commitments that they express. Simply put, the nature of such risk-
based benefits entails that entitlement is contingent on past contribution, and not continuous 
residence in a certain state.97 Most social security benefits, for example, are funded by making 
                                                
94 See Case C-388/09, Da Silva Martins [nyr], para. 74. 
95 Article 10 of Regulation 1408/71.  
96 Article 7 of Regulation 883/2004. 
97 See also recital 16 to Regulation 883/2004. 
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individual contribution compulsory. The contribution and insurance record, then, gives rise to 
financial entitlements when the event whose hardship it is meant to alleviate strikes.98 In other 
words, both the reason for entitlement and the height of cash benefits are tied to the insurance 
record of the individual citizen. Accordingly, access to such benefits is dependent on the 
individual’s past commitment in the form of his insurance record, and not on ‘thicker’, more 
abstract demands of belonging and political membership nor on continuous residence. In 
consequence, Regulation 883/2004 allows for the export of sickness benefits, old-age benefits, 
disability benefits, death grants, and family benefits.99 Aspirational solidarity thus serves to 
expand the social function of such social security measures to cover the territory of the whole 
Union. 
 
The Court has articulated the assumptions that underlie this right to export risk-based benefits 
more explicitly. Meints dealt with a German resident who had worked in the Netherlands, and had 
applied for a Dutch compensation scheme for agricultural workers whose contract of employment 
was terminated as a result of the setting aside of land belonging to their former employer.100 The 
Court held that, since the benefit was “dependent on the prior existence of the employment 
relationship” and is “intrinsically linked to the recipient’s objective status as [a] worker”,101 
Meints could access the benefit regardless of his residence in Germany. In other words, the 
benefit reflected a past commitment, and present residence was immaterial for continuous access. 
This approach was confirmed in Leclere. The case dealt with a Belgian resident who had worked 
in Luxembourg, and, in that capacity, was a victim of an accident at work. As a result of his 
participation in Luxembourg social security schemes at the time of the accident, he received an 
invalidity pension from Luxembourg, regardless of his status as a non-resident.102 The Court 
emphasized that a former worker continues to be entitled to “certain advantages acquired by 
virtue of his employment relationship”, even if he cannot “acquire new rights having no links 
with his former occupation.”103 In Da Silva Martins, the Court even explicitly linked past 
contribution to the right to export, arguing that EU law allows, as a general principle, for the 
                                                
98 See for Court’s definition Case C-215/99, Jauch [2001] ECR I-1901, para. 25: “a benefit is regarded as a social 
security benefit where it is granted, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, to 
recipients on the basis of a statutorily defined position.” See also Case C-228/07, Petersen [2008] ECR I-6989, para. 
19. 
99 See e.g Articles 21, 36, 43 of Regulation 883/2004.  
100 Case C-57/96, Meints [1997] ECR I-6689, para. 22. 
101 Case C-57/96, Meints [1997] ECR I-6689, para. 41. 
102 Case C-43/99, Leclere [2001] ECR I-4265, para. 15.  
103 Case C-43/99, Leclere [2001] ECR I-4265, para. 58-59. See also for similar assessment Case C-33/99, Esmoris 
Cerdeiro-Pinedo Amado [2001] ECR I-4265. 
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export of benefits “especially where those advantages represent the counterpart of contributions 
which they have paid”.104 
 
These cases give us a clearer picture of the logic that underlies the right to export social security 
benefits within the scope of Regulation 883/2004. Access to benefits that reflect a past 
commitment, such as individual insurance contribution, is solely dependent on the actual 
materialization of that risk, and the solidarity which they express logically does not require the 
citizen to reside on the territory of the state which provides the benefit.105 This logic enhances the 
aspirational capacity of such benefits: they not only allow the individual to live a ‘good life’ by 
substituting loss of resources, but also allow him to decide in which Member State to live such 
life by guaranteeing the exportability of those entitlements.  
 
5.4.2 SOCIAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS  
The exportability of special non-contributory benefits is explicitly excluded by Regulation 
883/2004. Article 70 (2) emphasizes that only residents can obtain such benefits. The Court’s vast 
amount of case law on this provision is relatively coherent: as long as a benefit is meant to (i) 
provide for basic subsistence income and is (ii) non-contributory, a criterion of residence is 
allowed.106 It its case law, the Court gives little indication of the normative reason107 for the 
prohibition of export beyond the fact that such benefits are “closely tied to the socio-economic 
situation in the state of residence” of the applicant,108 and are provided from public funds.109 It 
seems that the non-exportability reflects the nature and function of such benefits. They serve to 
liberate citizens from subsistence and allow them to live their lives with a minimum of autonomy 
and dignity by providing a basic level of resources necessary to ensure that they can survive in 
any given place.110 These types of benefits are not returns upon investment through compulsory 
                                                
104 See Case C-388/09, Da Silva Martins [nyr], para. 74. 
105 See also Case C-206/10 Commission v Germany [nyr] on benefits for the blind, deaf and disabled, and Case C-
3/08, Leyman [2009] ECR-9085, para. 46-50; where the Court goes to much trouble and confuses its reasoning in 
order to ensure that this logic is preserved within the rules of Regulation 1408/71.  
106 Most recently see Case C-299/05, Commission v Parliament and Council [2007] ECR I-8695; Case C-154/05, 
Kersbergen [2006] ECR I-6249, para. 27, and Case C-537/09, Bartlett [nyr].  
107 As opposed to practical concerns, which are also relevant: see F. Pennings, ‘European Social Security Law’, 
(Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2010), p. 237-8. 
108 Case C-537/09, Bartlett [nyr], para 38; Joined Cases C-419/05 and C-450/05, Habelt [2007] ECR I-11895, para. 
78 and 81; Case C-154/05, Kersbergen [2006] ECR I-6249, para. 33. 
109 E.g Case C-154/05, Kersbergen [2006] ECR I-6249, para. 37; Case C-215/99, Jauch [2001] ECR I-1901, para. 
32-33. 
110 Article 70 (2) of Regulation 883/2004. 
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or voluntary insurance, but reflect a basic moral duty to ‘save’ fellow citizens. Such duty is 
incumbent on the each political community in respect of all residents.111 In other words, the duty 
which underlies the provision of minimum subsistence allowances is territorial and such 
allowances are not exportable since by physically moving outside the confines of a certain 
political community, the citizens also moves outside that community’s obligation ‘to save’ (and 
into another’s). 
 
In addition, the social function of these entitlements requires assessments of purchase power, 
inflation, and costs of primary goods such as housing, food, or electricity. In this light, only the 
state of residence of the citizen can actually ‘save’ him. The Court’s continuous reference to the 
socio-economic situation of the place of residence is meant to reflect this logic: a benefit issued 
by the city of Bucharest, meant to ensure that a citizen can access primary goods, will not go very 
far in meeting that objective if the recipient lives in Stockholm. Likewise, an applicant for 
Swedish minimum subsistence allowance may nominally fall below the threshold at which he is 
entitled to such allowances, but if he resides in Bucharest he may not actually find himself in a 
position where he needs to be saved. In other words, citizens can only demonstrate that they meet 
the preconditions of necessity that underlie access minimum subsistence allowances in respect of 
the state in which they reside. As a reflection of their nature and function, then, benefits that offer 
a minimum level of income cannot be exported.  
 
5.4.3 HYBRID BENEFITS 
Most benefits are premised on a type of reciprocity that reflects both past and prospective 
commitments. For such benefits, the Court must tease out the exact dynamic between these 
indicators of eligibility, and then translate such findings to the transnational setting. Tas-Hagen is 
a good example of a type of benefit that, even though it is charity-based, nevertheless reflects a 
past commitment and should thus be exportable. It dealt with Ms. Tas-Hagen, who wished to 
export Dutch civilian war benefits, to which she was entitled on account of health problems that 
had occurred during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia.112 In other words – the question was 
whether the nature and function of such benefit may require continuous residence:  
                                                
111 See also above, section x.x 
112 See also Case C-499/06, Nerkowska [2008] ECR I-3993; which dealt with similar benefits for Polish citizens 
deported to Siberia.  
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“[C]ompensatory allowances for former prisoners of war, who prove that they 
underwent a long period of captivity, are commonly acknowledged as constituting 
testimony of national gratitude for the hardships they endured (..) [I]t would appear 
legitimate for a Member State to grant also to civilians with whom it has a particular 
connection both at the time of the war events and thereafter certain social benefits as 
an expression of national solidarity for the material and non-material damage they 
suffered during the war.”113  
“a criterion requiring residence cannot be considered a satisfactory indicator of the 
degree of connection of applicants to the Member State granting the [civilian war] 
benefit when it (..) lead[s] to different results for persons resident abroad whose 
degree of integration into the society of the Member State granting the benefit is in all 
respects comparable.“114  
 
The Court, much like in issues of student grants or sickness benefits,115 disallows residence 
requirements for social benefits whose social function is unrelated to the national territory, but is 
instead premised on past commitments or occurrences. In Tas-Hagen, clearly, the benefit was 
meant to compensate for the hardship suffered on Dutch territory during the second world war. 
The only possible condition indicative of that function, of course, is that the applicant has indeed 
suffered such hardship, not that she continue to reside in the Netherlands.116 Again – this 
interpretation is decisively aspirational. It extends the capacity of Ms. Tas-Hagen to enjoy the war 
benefit to include the territory of all Member States.  
 
The case in which the Court has been most explicit in the demand that Member States must allow 
for the export of benefits depending on their nature is the recent Stewart case.117 The case dealt 
with a British girl who suffers from Down’s syndrome, and who moved to Spain with her parents. 
While in Spain, she had received disability living allowance from the UK, but was rejected access 
to a short-term incapacity benefit on the ground that she did not reside in the UK.118 The Court 
faced the question head on: is a criterion of residence constitutive of the reciprocity implicit in 
short-term incapacity benefits? The Court argues that even if it might be; so many other factors 
may affect the determination if the migrant falls within such reciprocal commitments that 
residence alone is not a legitimate criterion:  
                                                
113 AG Kokott in Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen [2006] ECR I-10451, para. 59. 
114 Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen [2006] ECR I-10451, para. 38. See also Case C-499/06, Nerkowska [2008] ECR I-
3993, para. 43. 
115 See, above, section 3.4.2 and chapter 4. 
116 See also Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-499/06, Nerkowska [2008] ECR I-3993, para. 22-24. 
117 Case C-503/09, Stewart [nyr]. 
118 Case C-503/09, Stewart [nyr], para. 18-21. 
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“while the rules for applying that condition do not, in themselves, appear to be 
unreasonable, none the less that condition is too exclusive in nature. Indeed, by 
requiring specific periods of past presence in the competent Member State, the 
condition of past presence unduly favours an element which is not necessarily 
representative of the real and effective degree of connection between the claimant to 
short-term incapacity benefit in youth and that Member State, to the exclusion of all 
other representative elements. (..)  
In fact, is not inconceivable that the existence of such a connection could be 
established from other representative elements, [such as] the relationship between 
the claimant and the social security system of the competent Member State (..) the 
claimant’s family circumstances (..) [or the fact that] the appellant, a United 
Kingdom national, has passed a significant part of her life in the United 
Kingdom.”119 
What the Court argues, then, is not necessarily that Stewart should be awarded the benefit, but 
rather that the imposition of a criterion of past residence is not sophisticated enough to capture the 
reciprocal commitments which underlie short term incapacity benefits. The Court seems to 
suggest that access to such benefits should reflect a more general engagement with society.  
 
The ties of reciprocity that underlie unemployment benefits are possibly the most complex to 
locate in the scale between past and prospective commitment. As discussed above, they are 
premised both on past contributions and on continuous willingness to work in a certain state. In 
our discussion on communitarian solidarity it appeared that both find a place in the transnational 
setting, even if the latter appeared to be more indicative of the social function of unemployment 
benefits than the former.120 We could expect, then, that the export of unemployment benefits is 
quite restricted. Lack of residence could legitimately be seen as automatically invalidating the 
claim that the citizen is capable, willing and available to work in the state that he has just left. 
Article 63 of Regulation 883/2004 indeed limits the export of unemployment benefits.  
 
At the same time, unemployment benefits also partially reflect past commitments to the state of 
(former) employment. An absolute prohibition to export unemployment benefits would, 
moreover, not only overlook the composite nature of the commitments which underlies 
unemployment benefits, but also quell the aspirational capacity of Europe: surely looking for 
work in another Member State must be accommodated within such aspirational structures? 
Indeed, Article 64 of Regulation 883/2004 provides for a compromise that reflects the composite 
                                                
119 Case C-503/09, Stewart [nyr], para. 95-101. 
120 See section 5.3.3. 
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nature of unemployment benefits. It provides that unemployed citizens who have unsuccessfully 
searched for work in their home state for four weeks,121 and who make themselves available for 
the employment authorities of another state and are subject to control procedures there,122 are 
allowed to export unemployment benefits for up to three months.123 This is a convincing way to 
reshape the composite nature and function of unemployment benefits in the aspirational 
transnational setting. After those three months, reliance on past commitments towards the home 
state ‘expires’ and the citizen can only apply for unemployment benefits in the host state under 
communitarian solidarity, as long as he makes himself available for work in that state.124  
 
The limited nature of this exception, which does not allow for an unconditional right to export 
unemployment benefits, has been challenged in De Cuyper and Petersen.125 The core question, in 
both cases, was whether, when citizens are exempted from the obligation to be available for work, 
they are also automatically exempted from the requirement of residence. After all, the main 
reason why the export of unemployment benefits is not allowed is by virtue of the fact that 
citizens must remain available for the employment authorities in the state providing such benefits. 
A contrario, this would mean that export is allowed whenever such obligations are waived.126 In 
Petersen the Court was faced with the question whether temporary unemployment allowances, 
which were granted to cover the time between a citizens’ application for invalidity allowance and 
the authorities’ decision, could be exported.127 During the time required to process the applicant’s 
eligibility for invalidity allowance, applicants were relieved from the obligation to be capable, 
willing and available for work, while the national legislation imposed no further control 
mechanisms:  
“applicants for the benefit at issue (..) are [under national law] not subject to any 
particular checks by the employment service of the Member State concerned, since they 
are dispensed from the obligations concerning capacity to work, willingness to work 
and availability to work.”128 
 
                                                
121 Article 64 (1)(a) of Regulation 883/2004.  
122 Article 64 (1)(b) of Regulation 883/2004. 
123 Which is extendable to 6 months; see Article 94 (1)(c) of Regulation 883/2004. 
124 Cf. Article 24 of Directive 2004/38. See also section 5.3.3. 
125 Case C-406/04, De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-6947, and Case C-228/07, Petersen [2008] ECR I-6989.  
126 An interpretation supported by the Commission and AG Geelhoed in De Cuyper. See Opinion of AG Geelhoed in 
Case C-406/04, De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-6947, para. 80 and 94. 
127 Case C-228/07, Petersen [2008] ECR I-6989, para. 23. 
128 Case C-228/07, Petersen [2008] ECR I-6989, para. 61. 
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In other words, the function of the benefit was not, as the absence of a requirement of availability 
on the labour market shows,129 to support the citizen in expectation of him joining the domestic 
labour market. Rather, it served as a temporary substitute for invalidity allowance, which, in turn, 
is not contingent on residence but on the applicant being insured against invalidity in the home 
state.130 The nature and function of the benefit, in other words, was connected to the applicant’s 
past commitment rather than his continuous availability on the labour market, and Mr. Petersen 
could therefore export his benefit.    
 
De Cuyper dealt with a similar situation. The Belgian legislation on unemployment benefits 
exempts unemployed citizens over the age of 50 from the duty to be available for, and accept, 
work. At the same time, it still imposes a residence criterion in order to facilitate administrative 
controls that ensure that such citizens do not in fact carry out a ‘remunerated activity’, which 
would evidently have consequences for their entitlement to unemployment benefits.131 It was with 
this in mind that the Court validated the residence clause: 
“The justification given (…) for the existence (…) of a residence clause is the need (…) 
to monitor compliance with the legal requirements laid down for retention of 
entitlement to the unemployment allowance. Thus it must inter alia allow those 
inspectors to check whether the situation of a person who has declared that his is living 
alone and unemployed has undergone changes which may have an effect on the benefit 
granted.”132 
 
Translated into the vocabulary used above, the Court seems to reason that the nature of 
unemployment benefits is composed of three elements. It not only reflects past commitments and 
future availability on the employment market (as in such case, Mr. De Cuyper could have 
exported his benefits to his houseboat in the Provence), but also lack of income. In the Court’s 
view, the latter element prevents the exportability of unemployment benefits, given that the 
prevention of potential abuse requires the applicant to be subject to controls by the Belgian 
authorities. This does not appear very convincing from a normative perspective, but can perhaps 
be explained by the practical administrative problems that transnational controls would imply. 
Either way, De Cuyper and Petersen, read together, indicate that the Court at least intuitively, if 
maybe not conceptually, appreciates that the question of whether or not a benefit is exportable is 
                                                
129 Case C-228/07, Petersen [2008] ECR I-6989, para. 58-62. 
130 Case C-228/07, Petersen [2008] ECR I-6989, para. 50. 
131 Case C-406/04, De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-6947, para. 11. 
132 Case C-406/04, De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-6947, para. 43. 
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directly and exclusively connected with the links of reciprocity underlying the function and 
nature of that particular benefit.  
 
Aspirational solidarity is thus a conceptual mirror of communitarian solidarity – it uses similar 
concepts to ensure that migrants do not lose access to the social entitlements in their home state 
which they ‘deserve’ on the basis of the nature and function of the good and the type of 
reciprocity which it presupposes. In doing so, it encourages the aspirational pursuit of the 
individual’s interpretation of a ‘good life’ by disaggregating the migrant’s formal status as a 
resident from the links, rights and obligations of solidarity and reciprocity which bind him to the 
different states with which he has previously established such links. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The financial benefits that fall under the umbrella of social assistance and social security are 
important not only for the capacity of individual citizens to live their lives with a minimum of 
dignity and autonomy, but also to insulate their capacity to choose how to structure their lives. 
That latter capacity is greatly enhanced by the transnational regulation of eligibility criteria for 
social benefits. The transnational solidarities offer a framework that overcomes the limits of 
territoriality and membership that serve to sustain the mechanisms of social security and social 
assistance on the national level. By severing ties between territory, residence and entitlement, and 
reconstructing the individual’s entitlement on the basis of the specific social function of a specific 
social assistance or social security benefit, the Union legislator and Court insulate the reciprocal 
ties that sustain such benefits while strongly promoting the capacity of citizens to move 
throughout the Union. Read together, the transnational solidarities argue that the state of 
insurance should cover the citizen against the materialisation of a set number of risks wherever he 
may subsequently find himself; while the state of residence prevents the worst of suffering by 
providing for a minimum level of resources required to prevent human suffering. 
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6 LABOUR LAW 
This chapter describes how the transnational solidarities inform the development of labour law on 
the European level. While labour law plays a central role in the creation of a ‘just’ society, it is 
premised on a different institutional logic than the other welfare areas discussed. Labour law does 
not primarily conceive of justice in terms of membership to a polity, but describes the demands 
that justice imposes on the power dynamics between ‘labour’ and ‘capital’. In its core, labour law 
seeks to normatively embed the relationship between the worker and his employer so as to 
insulate the latter’s capacity to engage in the labour market without the loss of dignity and 
autonomy. This social function presupposes the political authority to regulate all employment 
relationships within a certain polity (6.1). This chapter argues that this specific social function 
requires us to conceive of labour law within the Union as a tiered structure. As such, market 
solidarity (6.2) and communitarian solidarity (6.3), each in their own way, explain why the need 
to protect the worker from the imposition of unfair working conditions requires the transnational 
insulation of the political authority to regulate the employment relationship on the national level. 
Aspirational solidarity, on the other hand, serves to rationalise the conditions for access from, and 
exit to, the employment market so that the individual’s chances to live a ‘good life’ is not 
arbitrarily limited by the Member States’ regulation of that market (6.4).  
 
6.1 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF LABOUR LAW 
In order to analyse the development and nature of European labour law, it is crucial to first better 
understand the different social functions of labour law. Its overarching purpose is to infuse justice 
norms in the interaction between ‘labour’ and ‘capital’, both within the contractual relationship 
between the individual employee and his employer, and between the collectivities ‘labour’ and 
‘capital’. In doing so, it seeks to establish a type of ‘market contract’, in which the state 
undertakes to protect the individual’s capacity to live a ‘good life’ from the pressures of 
uncontrolled competition.1 
 
The origins of this ‘market contract’ can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, when the 
rapid industrialisation of European processes of production, and the simultaneous demise of 
agrarian societies and their corporatist regulatory mechanisms mainly based on kinship and 
                                                
1 K. Polanyi, ‘The Great Transformation’ (Boston, Beacon Press, 2002), p. 45-58. 
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voluntary obligations drastically changed societal structures, creating a functionally differentiated 
society in which the efficient exploitation of resources, including labour, became increasingly 
important. The ensuing power asymmetry between capital and labour led to the imposition of 
harsh working conditions and to the exclusion of certain less efficient societal groups – the 
young, the old and the sick – from the manual labour process, and thereby condemned them to 
subsistence. This ‘social insensitivity’ of the market led to the mobilisation of large numbers of 
dissatisfied citizens. It was felt that the externalities of this new asymmetrical ‘division of labour’ 
endangered the basic level of material resources required to protect the individual’s autonomy 
and his potential to live a ‘good life’, and not be trapped in poverty or social status 
undercurrents.2 As Hyman argued: 
“this [asymmetry] derives from the very fact that the productive system is, in the 
main, the private property of a tiny minority of the population. Confronting this 
concentrated economic power, the great majority who depend on their own labour 
for a living are at an inevitable disadvantage. Put simply, the employer can normally 
survive without labour longer than the worker can survive without employment.” 3 
 
In the most functional terms, then, the objective of labour law is to stabilise the relationship 
between labour and capital by embedding the meritocratic logic of the market so that it leads to 
socially acceptable outcomes.4 In doing so, labour law generally gives expression to three core 
claims:5 it (i) seeks to prevent the exploitation of the individual worker by capital, (ii) tries to 
ensure equality of bargaining power between labour and capital,6 and (iii) guarantees that 
individual citizens have an adequate chance to share in the wealth generated by the market.7 
These three claims fit in nicely with the three solidarities identified in the second chapter. As will 
be argued in depth below, the transnationalisation of the marketplace requires that the Union 
incorporate these three claims within its interaction with national labour regimes.  
                                                
2 See K. Polanyi, ‘The Great Transformation’ (Boston, Beacon Press, 2002), p. 136-140 and J. Habermas, ‘Struggles 
for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State’ in: A. Gutmann (ed.), ‘Multiculturalism: Examining the 
Politics of Recognition’, (Princeton, PUP, 1994) p. 45-58 and p. 108-9. 
3 R. Hyman, ‘Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction’, (Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1975), p. 22-23. See also S. 
Webb and B. Webb, ‘Industrial Democracy’, (Basingstoke, MacMillan, 2003), Volume II, p. 654-60. 
4 S. Bacharach and E. Lawler, ‘Bargaining: Power, Tactics and Outcomes’ (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 
1981), p. 4-7. 
5 See also Lukes, who convincingly argues that regulatory intervention is generally warranted in three different 
situations: where an unregulated market would lead to commodification of the workforce, to inequality of power and 
rights between labour and capital, or where it restricts general citizenship rights. S. Lukes, ‘Invasions of the Market’, 
in: M. Miller (ed.), ‘Worlds of Capitalism’ (New York, Routledge, 2005), p. 302ff. 
6 O. Kahn-Freud, ‘Labour Law’, in: M. Ginsberg (ed.), ‘Law and Opinion in England in the 20th Century’ (1959), p. 
224. 
7 See for a good analysis of the different ways in which employment contributes to the ‘good life’: P. Bachman, 
‘Social needs, development, territories and full employment based on solidarity’, in R. Salais and R. Villeneuve 
(eds.), ‘Europe and the Politics of Capabilities’ (Cambridge, CUP, 2004).   
 169 
 
At the time of the signing of the Treaty of Rome it was expected that this Europeanisation of the 
normative assumptions underlying labour law would not be necessary in light of capacity of the 
political systems of the Member States to ensure the fairness in the interaction between labour 
and capital.8 The Ohlin Report,9 compiled in the run-up to the negotiations, supported a model of 
economic integration that heavily relied on Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, insisting 
on the free mobility of goods, services and factors of production.10 This would not affect the 
capacity of Member States to ensure fairness on the market, given that labour demand would 
grow where labour costs were the lowest, thereby facilitating an autonomous process of gradual 
levelling-up of social standards throughout Europe.11 In other words, the internal market itself 
would generate fairness and solidarity. This would be sufficient guarantee that the functioning of 
the internal market would not lead to challenges to the political capacity of the Member States to 
correct the market, and embed demands of solidarity between labour and capital,12 especially 
“when account is taken of the strength of the trade union movement in European countries and of 
the sympathy of European governments for social aspirations”.13 Alas, this is no longer true. The 
capacity of the Member States to sustain the three social functions of labour law has gradually 
slipped away. Bluntly put, the creation of a completely new internal market whose economic 
logic transgresses national regulatory regimes has changed the dynamic between ‘labour’ and 
‘capital’. This is due partially to the level of integration achieved by the European market, which 
fosters truly transnational competition, which creates new disorienting market paradigms; and 
partially due to the Court’s appropriation of the authority to decide whether the national level of 
labour standards has a restrictive impact on the free movement rights of ‘capital’. These 
                                                
8 See Article 118 EEC, which read: “Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and in conformity with 
its general objectives, the Commission shall have the task of promoting close co-operation between Member States in 
the social field, particularly in matters relating to employment; labour law and working conditions; (…) social 
security; (…) the right of association, and collective bargaining between employers and workers.” See also C. 
Barnard, ‘EU Social Policy: From Employment Law to Labour Market Reform’ in: P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), 
‘The Evolution of EU Law’ (Oxford, OUP, 2011), p. 642ff and K. Lenaerts and P. Foubert, ‘Social Rights in the 
Case-Law of the ECJ’ 28 LIEI (2001), p. 267.  
9 International Labour Organisation, Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation. Report by Group of 
Experts (‘Ohlin Report’), 74 International Labour Review (1956), p. 99-123. 
10 See also S. Simitis and A. Lyon-Caen, ‘Community Labour Law: A Critical Introduction to its History’, in: P. 
Davies, A. Lyon-Caen, S. Sciarra and S. Simitis (eds.), ‘European Community Labour Law: Principles and 
Perspectives’ (Oxford, Clarendon, 1996), p. 5ff.  
11 International Labour Organisation, Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation. Report by Group of 
Experts (‘Ohlin Report’), 74 International Labour Review (1956), p. 101 and 111-112. 
12 S. Giubboni, ‘Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution: A Labour Law Perspective’ 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2006) p.  54-56.  C. Barnard and S. Deakin, ‘Market Access and Regulatory Competition’ in C. 
Barnard and J. Scott (eds.), ‘The Law of the Single Market: Unpacking the Premises’ (Oxford, Hart, 2002). 
13 Report by a Group of ILO Experts, ‘Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation’ (Geneva, International 
Labour Office, 1956), para. 210.  
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developments have fostered the fear that the effective protection of the individual worker from 
the pressures of the marketplace – which lies at the core of national labour law – would become 
politically undesirable due to competitive factors, or infeasible due to legal constraints.14 
 
The question put to the European Union is how to deal with such externalities, generated by the 
retention on the national level of regulatory competences in the area of labour law. The rest of 
this chapter proposes an answer to that question. It argues that in light of the weak political 
structures on the transnational level, the Union’s focus has not been on the re-calibration of the 
balance between labour and capital on the European level, but rather on the insulation of the 
capacity of the national political process’ to do so against the potentially destructive effects of the 
creation of a new transnational market. In other words, EU labour law provides a transnational 
buffer insulating the capacity of ‘the political’ to restrain the market. In elaborating on this tiered 
structure, the Union legislator seeks to ensure that the individual worker is treated fairly (6.2) and 
that the power symmetry between ‘labour’ and ‘capital’ is not skewed by transnational economic 
dynamics (6.3). This tiered structure is more unstable where divisive issues are concerned – such 
as in matters of collective bargaining or minimum pay – which are left to the Court to arrange in 
the transnational setting. The Court, as will be discussed, has not grasped that such embedding 
must necessarily take place, in light of the weakness of the political process on the transnational 
level, in the national arena. Aspirational solidarity, on the other hand, does not deal with the 
structure of the market but rather with the capacity of the individual to access its fruits. Union law 
strengthens this capacity by rationalising the ways in which Member States exclude individuals 
from the employment market (6.4). 
 
6.2 MARKET SOLIDARITY 
This section argues that both the structure and content of most labour regulation on the European 
level can best be explained in terms of market solidarity. Such measures aim to prevent the 
functioning of the internal market from leading to the worker being treated unfairly. Until the 
completion of the internal market in the early 90s, such ‘unfairness’ seemed to result primarily 
from the effect of increased competition on the worker’s job security. After the completion of the 
single market, the Union legislator’s focus has gradually shifted towards the insulation of the 
                                                
14 S. Deakin ‘Legal diversity and regulatory competition: which model for Europe?’ 12 ELJ (2006), p. 443-4. 
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capacity of national political processes to express market solidarity from the potentially distorting 
effects of mutual recognition and regulatory competition.  
 
The theory of market solidarity argues that a market can only function, in normative terms, when 
it is premised on a degree of organic solidarity between the different parties. Theoretically, this 
solidarity, which describes what market actors ‘owe each other’, originates spontaneously as a 
consequence of the mutually advantageous nature of interactions on the market.15 In other words, 
since the different parties to the employment contract need each other in order to achieve their 
own objectives, they owe each other some sort of ‘just return’ on their (physical or financial) 
investment. Yet, within the scope of labour law, a structural asymmetry underlies the relationship 
between labour and capital. Simply put, an individual worker needs capital more than capital 
needs the individual worker.16 If parties were to start their negotiations from a power basis that is 
too disparate, the eventual outcome cannot be mutually advantageous, and can therefore neither 
be ‘just’ nor ‘fair’. 
 
The unfairness does not necessarily derive from the asymmetry of power, but from its effect on 
the workforce. It allows capital to exploit labour and pummel workers into accepting 
unreasonable working conditions.17 In other words, it leads to the commodification of the 
workforce, in which labour is treated as just another production factor. The prevention of such 
commodification lies at the core of the worker’s struggle ever since the emergence of political 
parties. It changes the paradigm of the employment relationship18 from one centred around the 
good produced or service provided, to one that seeks to insulate the workers’ human dignity and 
private autonomy from competitive pressures.19 As Article 31 CFR for example emphasises, the 
worker has right to fair and just working conditions that respect “his or her health, safety and 
dignity”. In juridical terms, this recalibration of fairness takes place by imposing limits on the 
                                                
15 See above, section 2.1. 
16 R. Hyman, ‘Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction’, (Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1975), p. 22-23. 
17 H. Collins, ‘Beyond the Third Way in Labour Law: Towards the Constitutionalisation of Labour Law’, Paper for 
workshop: The Social Contract Revisited, Oxford, 2008, p. 2. 
18 See R. Martin, ‘Bargaining Power’, (Oxford, Clarendon, 2002), p. 17-25 for an interesting analysis of the mutual 
dependence of labour and capital to achieve their objectives. C. Offe, ‘The European Model of ‘Social’ Capitalism: 
Can it Survive European Integration?’, in M. Miller (ed.) ‘Worlds of Capitalism’ (New York, Routledge, 2005), p. 
159. 
19 See also P. O’Higgins, ‘Labour is not a Commodity – an Irish Contribution to International Labour Law’, 26 
Industrial Law Journal (1997), p. 225. Also, S. Lukes, ‘Invasions of the Market’, in: M. Miller, ‘Worlds of 
Capitalism’ (New York, Routledge, 2005), p. 302-309. 
 172 
freedom of contract that underlies the individual employment relationship.20 The political process 
thus directly describes the outer boundaries of ‘fair competition’ through the setting of minimum 
requirements that ensure that labour can be exercised without the threat of commodification and 
exploitation. It is this type of market solidarity – based on the political determination of a ‘just 
return’ on the “depletion of the [worker’s] wage-earning capacity”21 and his submission to the 
authority of the market – with which we are concerned in this section. 
 
The creation and subsequent development of the internal market has led to two challenges to the 
capacity of Member States to ensure an appropriate level of market solidarity. While in both cases 
the response was to entrench labour norms on the European level, the challenges faced – and 
therefore the structure of such entrenchment – were very different. The first challenge became 
apparent in the late 60s/early 70s. The deteriorating economic situation and lack of protective 
national trade barriers had led to increased competition on the newly established European 
market, which not only led to new opportunities but also caused problems for many businesses, 
and, by implication, its workers. The first labour law measures enacted on the European level can 
be seen as a political recognition of this problem,22 and were aimed to protect the worker in case 
of business restructuring, and thereby alleviate the hardship suffered by workers which resulted 
from the functioning of the internal market. As such, directives were enacted harmonising 
worker’s rights in case of collective redundancies,23 transfer of undertaking24 or the insolvency of 
the employer.25 These measures were not only meant to protect the rights of individual workers, 
but at the same time sought to ensure ‘fair competition’ between companies, so that the 
‘casualties’ of the internal market would not be dictated by differences between regulatory 
                                                
20 See S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, ‘Rights vs. efficiency? The economic case for transnational labour standards’ 23 
Industrial Law Journal (1994), p. 61, where they argue that ‘labour market regulation in necessary in order to restore 
both equity and efficiency’. 
21 C. Offe, ‘The European Model of ‘Social’ Capitalism: Can it Survive European Integration?’, in M. Miller (ed.) 
‘Worlds of Capitalism’ (New York, Routledge, 2005), p. 158. 
22 Cf. Paris Declaration: “[e]conomic expansion is not an end in itself […] It should result in an improvement in the 
quality of life as well as in standards of living. As befits the genius of Europe, particular attention will be given to 
intangible values and to protecting the environment, so that progress may really be put at the service of mankind” 
Declaration adopted at the Paris Summit of 19-21 October 1972, published in the Sixth General Report on the 
Activities of the Communities 1972, p. 7; and M. Shanks, ‘The Social Policy of the European Communities’ 4 CMLR 
(1977), p. 377, who speaks of the ‘political backlash’ which would occur if capital was allowed to exploit the 
common market. 
23 Directive 75/129/EEC on collective redundancies, amended by Council Directive 92/56/EEC, consolidated by 
Council Directive 98/59/EC; and Council Directive 80/987/EEC on acquired rights, amended by Council Directive 
2002/74/EC. 
24 Directive 77/187/EEC on transfers of undertakings, amended by Council Directive 98/50/EC, consolidated by 
Council Directive 2001/23/EC; 
25 Council Directive 80/987/EEC on acquired rights, amended by Council Directive 2002/74/EC. 
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regimes.26 In the negotiations on the Directive on Collective Redundancies, for example, it was 
argued that disparity in national regulation would:  
 “create disparities in conditions of competition which are likely to influence the 
decisions by enterprises, whether national or multinational, on the distribution of 
posts they have to be filled. It must for example be expected that any firm intending to 
reorganise itself by a plan including the partial or total closedown of certain 
departments, will decide which departments to close down on the basis, at least in 
part, of the level of protection offered to the workers.”27 
 
The strange logic of protecting worker’s rights by preventing unfair competition between 
companies can be partially explained by the rigid internal market legal basis, upon which the 
European measures had to be based for lack of legislative competences in the social sphere. More 
importantly, however, it reflects that, for a long time, the threat to market solidarity was primarily 
perceived to come from the effect of increased competition on the job security of the individual 
worker.  
 
In the early 90s, however, this paradigm changed. Since then, the focus of the Union legislator 
has been on a more direct insulation of the political capacity to socialise the labour relationship 
against the pressures of market integration, rather than on the prescription of harmonised norms. 
Two processes may have triggered this shift in paradigm, which have become increasingly visible 
and salient after the eastern enlargement of the Union28 and the more recent economic downturn. 
These relate to the (perceived) negative effects of direct competition between Member States on 
the capacity and political willingness of Member States to enforce their perception of justice and 
fairness on market participants. Such concerns relate to the pressures of mutual recognition and 
regulatory competition, respectively. The increased centrality of the cross-border delivery of 
services for the economic growth of the Union had raised the question whether the logic of 
mutual recognition (or ‘country of origin’ principle) should apply in that field.29 Simply put: can 
                                                
26 G. Mancini, ‘Labour Law and Community Law’ 20 The Irish Jurist (1985), p. 1, 2, and 12. See also Lord 
Wedderburn, ‘Freedom and Frontiers of Labour Law’, in: Lord Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law and Freedom’, (London, 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1995), p. 388. 
27 See text in European Industrial Relations Review, No. 1 (January 1974), p. 18, see also B. Bercusson, ‘European 
Labour Law’, (CUP, Cambridge, 2009), p. 114, and Lord Wedderburn, ‘Freedom and Frontiers of Labour Law’, in: 
Lord Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law and Freedom’, (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1995), p. 397. 
28 S. Schmidt, ‘When Efficiency Results in Redistribution: The Conflict over the Single Services Market’ 32 West 
European Politics (2009), p. 853. 
29 “There are more and more instances of firms based in one Member State and moving with their staff to another 
State to provide a service, or of firms sending their workers from their country of origin to another Member State to 
work for a legally distinct undertaking.” Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Directive 
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service providers send out their workers to a host state with the retention of the laws applicable in 
the home state? The area of minimum wages provides the most politically sensitive and socially 
divisive example of the potential subversive effect of mutual recognition. National legislation 
setting out the minimum to be paid for a certain work is central to concepts of market solidarity, 
fairness and justice, in that it directly ensures that workers are not exploited and are appropriately 
rewarded for their participation in the market. The level of minimum wages, however, differs 
radically within the European Union, making harmonisation pointless, and mutual recognition 
socially subversive.30 After all, if Bulgarian workers are 20 (!) times less expensive than Dutch 
workers, how can a company employing the latter ever possibly win a tender, assuming that both 
workers provide a service of comparable quality?31 And maybe more importantly, when this 
tender is for a job within the Dutch territory, what capacity does the Dutch state have to ensure 
that its perception of worker protection and market solidarity is not undercut? Properly 
understood, then, this is a problem of displacement of the exact political authority that is required 
to enforce ideas of market solidarity.  
 
At the same time, the ‘ghost’ of regulatory competition made its entrance. It was feared that the 
increased ease of capital movement might exploit the decision to leave the power to socialise the 
market within national political structures. Whereas the Ohlin Report had stressed that differences 
in labour standards throughout Europe were immaterial for competition as they reflected the 
relative competitiveness of Member States, the logic of mutual recognition entails that labour 
standards directly affect their competitiveness, as it highlights that labour standards impose an 
indirect cost on production.32 In consequence of the fact that capital is much more mobile and 
adaptive to dynamic competition than labour,33 yet its presence on the national level vital to 
prevent the immense social cost of high unemployment, Member States, no longer able to use 
                                                                                                                                                   
concerning the posting of workers, COM (91) 230 final, para. 5. See also B. Bercusson, ‘European Labour Law’, 
(CUP, Cambridge, 2009), p. 356. 
30 S. Schmidt, ‘When Efficiency Results in Redistribution: The Conflict over the Single Services Market’ 32 West 
European Politics (2009), p. 855-6 
31 In Bulgaria, the minimum monthly wage is the equivalent of 61 €, while in the Netherlands this amount is 1264 €. 
See http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/07/study/tn0507101s.htm 
32 B. Bercusson, ‘European Labour Law’, (Cambridge, CUP, 2009), p. 133, S. Schmidt, ‘When Efficiency Results in 
Redistribution: The Conflict over the Single Services Market’, 32 West European Politics (2009), p. 852. 
33 Logically, capital faces increased competition on the internal market, which generates further incentives to cut 
indirect costs such as those imposed by labour standards. This is facilitates both due to inherent characteristic of 
capital as an intangible factor of production, and its treatment by the Court: See Case C-212/97, Centros [1999] ECR 
I-1459, and S. Deakin ‘Legal diversity and regulatory competition: which model for Europe?’ 12 ELJ (2006), p. 448-
450. See also H. Collins, ‘The European Civil Code: The Way Forward’, (Cambridge, CUP, 2008), p. 38.  
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currency fluctuation to mitigate this effect,34 could start to internalise concerns about their 
competitiveness in the political determination of labour standards.35 In this view, the process of 
market integration would produce game-theoretical incentives for Member States to compete to 
attract capital by limiting indirect costs, such as labour regulations, for ‘threat of exit’ by 
capital,36 thereby relinquishing their obligations of fairness and justice in favour of courting 
transnationally mobile capital. 
 
Simply put, the ‘ghosts’ of mutual recognition and regulatory competition, with their potential to 
limit the Member States’ capacity and willingness to enforce domestic notions of market 
solidarity,37 has focused the attention of the Union legislator on new regulatory techniques. Full 
harmonisation of all labour standards proved too difficult politically, due to the divergence of 
national legal techniques and political incentives; and economically undesirable, given that 
certain labour rights – such as minimum wages – reflect, and are therefore inextricably tied to, 
national (or sectoral) rates of productivity.38 Moreover, full harmonisation was not necessary. The 
objective of this second wave of labour legislation was, after all, not to protect workers’ rights per 
se, but to insulate the political authority on the national level and protect the capacity of the 
Member States to do so, in accordance with their own national conceptions of market solidarity. 
Rather than prescribing the standard of worker protection to be implemented throughout Europe, 
then, two new legal techniques were introduced. Within the fields of labour law that are unrelated 
to rates of productivity, intervention on the European level aimed at establishing: 
“minimum standards below which nobody should be allowed to fall, but on the basis 
of which those [Member States] who can afford to do so should build their own more 
ambitious systems.”39 
 
                                                
34 S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, ‘Rights vs. efficiency? The economic case for transnational labour standards’ 23 
Industrial Law Journal (1994), p. 296. 
35 See W. Streeck, ‘Citizenship Under Regime Competition: The Case of the “European Works Councils”’, 1 EIoP 
No. 5, (1997), p. 3, who traces this effect all the way back to the work of Adam Smith. See for another completely 
different account of internalisation of competitiveness concerns.  
36 S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, ‘Rights vs. efficiency? The economic case for transnational labour standards’ 23 
Industrial Law Journal (1994), p. 295-6. See also M. Piore, ‘Labor Standards and Business Strategies’, in: S. 
Hersenberg and J. Perez-Lopez (eds.), ‘Labor Standards and Development in the Global Economy’ (US Department 
of Labor, 1990).  
37 S. Giubboni, ‘Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution: A Labour Law Perspective’ 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2006) p. 82ff; and F. Scharpf, ‘The asymmetry of European integration, or why the EU cannot be 
a ‘social market economy’, 8 Socio-economic Review (2010), p. 222-4. 
38 See also S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, ‘Rights vs. efficiency? The economic case for transnational labour standards’ 
23 Industrial Law Journal (1994), p. 292 and 302-303. 
39 M. Shanks, ‘The Social Policy of the European Communities’, 12 CMLR (1977), p.  380. 
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In other words, it was thought that Member States would be less inclined to pursue regulatory 
competition,40 and companies would be restrained from exploiting the logic of mutual recognition 
to force the workforce to accept lower standards of protection, if a ‘floor of rights’ could be 
agreed. The minimum standards set by harmonisation measures are thus not really meant to serve 
as a new, default, transnational level of protection, but meant to induce ‘second order effects’. By 
coupling regulation on the transnational level with the re-affirmation of national self-regulation,41 
and indeed encouraging Member States to set higher levels of labour protection,42 the Union 
legislator managed to simultaneously prevent the threat of regulatory competition described 
above, and reinforce the capacity of the national political process to normatively embed the 
relationship between ‘labour’ and ‘capital’. Much of the recent labour and company law 
regulation on the European level can be typified by this approach, from the Directive on 
information and consultation,43 the Framework on Parental Leave,44 to directives on part-time 
work,45 fixed-term work,46 temporary agency work,47 working-hours,48 or the protection of 
pregnant workers.49 All these measures set ‘floors of rights’, from which upward deviation is 
explicitly encouraged, so that national conceptions of fair competition are not undercut by the 
dynamics of the internal market. 
 
Within other areas, however, even the setting of minimum standards is problematic. The area of 
minimum wages again is a good example. Given their disparity between Member States,50 no 
level could possible effectively promote its objective – the prevention of the exploitation of the 
worker – in all Member States simultaneously. For a long time, the question of how to deal with 
the idea of mutual recognition in the area of minimum wages was deferred to the Court. The cases 
                                                
40 S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, ‘Rights vs. efficiency? The economic case for transnational labour standards’ 23 
Industrial Law Journal (1994), p. 289.  
41 C. Barnard and S. Deakin, ‘Market Access and Regulatory Competition’ in C. Barnard and J. Scott (eds.), ‘The 
Law of the Single Market: Unpacking the Premises’ (Oxford, Hart, 2002), p. 219. 
42 S. Deakin, ‘Labour Law as Market Regulation: the economic foundations of European social policy’, in: P. Davies, 
A. Lyon-Caen, S. Sciarra and S. Simitis (eds.), ‘European Community Labour Law: Principles and Perspectives’ 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1996), p. 87. 
43 See Articles 1(1) and 9 (3) and (4) of Directive 2002/14/EC on information and consultation of employees. 
44 See Clauses 1, 3 and 8 (1) attached to Directive 2010/18/EU implementing the revised Framework Agreement on 
parental leave.  
45 See Clauses 2 (2) and 6 (1) attached to Directive 97/81/EC on part-time work. 
46 See Clause 8 (1) attached to Directive 1999/70/EC on fixed-time work.  
47 See Article 9 of Directive 2008/104 on temporary agency work. 
48 See Article 15 of Directive 2003/88 on Working Time. 
49 See Recitals 5 and 22 and Article 1 (3) of Directive 92/85 on the protection of pregnant workers. 
50 See http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/07/study/tn0507101s.htm 
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Seco, Rush Portuguesa and Van der Elst,51 all dealt with workers from ‘low-wage countries’ who 
were temporarily posted to work in ‘high-wage countries’. In these cases, the Court first reiterated 
that while host Member States could not prevent access of service providers and their workers to 
their territory, they could nevertheless impose domestic labour law regulations: 
“[Union] law does not preclude Member States from extending their legislation, or 
collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry relating to 
minimum wages, to any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their 
territory, no matter in which country the employer is established;”52 
 
The Court later nuanced this stance, only allowing host Member States to impose national 
legislation which prevented the actual exploitation of workers, to the exclusion of double burdens 
and administrative requirements which make the provision of services less attractive without 
increasing the protection offered to workers.53 Simply put, the Court reversed the idea of mutual 
recognition and took working conditions, including minimum rates of pay, ‘out of competition’;54 
in so far as such conditions differed between Member States.  
 
The Posted Workers’ Directive (‘PWD’) was adopted in order to codify these rulings, and add 
transparency to the legal situation in case of the transnational provision of services.55 The PWD 
does not harmonise labour standards,56 but rather arbitrates to what extent local labour standards 
of the host Member State govern the employment relationship, and to what extent home state 
labour standards may be ‘imported’. Its Article 3 lays down a number of areas in which host 
Member States are allowed to insulate their own conceptions of fairness. These cover the fields 
most sensitive to direct competition, such as maximum hours, minimum paid holiday, minimum 
wage, health and safety and non-discrimination. Two mechanisms ensure that Member States do 
not abuse this prerogative to frustrate the right to movement that service providers derive from 
the Treaty.57 First, the PWD requires transparency of the content of the applicable law,58 which 
                                                
51 Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/81, Seco [1982] ECR 223, Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa [1990]ECR I-1417, and 
Case C-43/93, Van Der Elst [1994] ECR I-3803. 
52 Case C-43/93, Van Der Elst [1994] ECR I-3803, para. 23. 
53 See Hatzopoulos and T.U. Do, ‘The case law of the ECJ concerning the free provision of services: 2000-2005’ 43 
CMLR (2006), p. 972. 
54 B. Bercusson, ‘European Labour Law’, (Cambridge, CUP, 2009), p 358. 
55 As such, it gives expression to the Treaty right of freedom to provide services. 
56 Article 3 (1)(c) and (a) of Directive 96/71 on the Posting of Workers. 
57 See most recently Case C-515/08, Santos Palhota [nyr], para. 35. 
58 See recitals 5 and 6, as well as Article 4 of Directive 96/71 on the Posting of Workers, and in particular Article 4 
(3), which requires Member States to set up bodies “to make the information on the terms and conditions of 
employment referred to in Article 3 generally applicable”. See also Case C-165/98, Mazzoleni [2001] ECR I-2189, 
para. 35-36 and Case C-515/08, Santos Palhota [nyr], para. 29-44 for an overview of the case law. See C. Kilpatrick, 
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must be either imposed by law, laid down in a collective agreement that has been declared 
universally applicable,59 or mirror the collective agreements that are generally applicable to 
similar undertakings in the host state’s territory.60 This focus on transparency can be seen as 
expression of the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality.61 Second, as Article 
3 (7) PWD indicates, Member States may – in conformity with the case law of the Court (at the 
time) – impose higher standards only when they add to the protection of labour:  
 “paragraphs 1 to 6 shall not prevent application of terms and conditions of 
employment which are more favourable to workers.”62 
 
On first reading, then, the PWD seems to be another instrument to ensure market solidarity.63 It 
re-appropriates the capacity of Member States to ensure ‘fair’ competition by insulating its 
political determination of justice from pressures that arise from direct competition between 
‘home’ service providers and those from low-wage Member States.64  
 
This assumption, however, has recently suffered a fatal blow. In a series of cases that came before 
it in the last few years, the Court has redefined the purpose and nature of the PWD. Cases like 
Laval, Rüffert or Commission v Luxembourg65 all dealt with foreign service providers seeking 
exemption from locally applicable rules on the basis that it infringed their freedom to provide 
services, and all thus focused on the interpretation of Article 3 of the PWD. At its core, the cases 
asked in light of which objective the provisions of the PWD should be interpreted: is the PWD an 
instrument to prevent the subversive effects of direct competition on national conceptions of 
market solidarity, or a narrow exception to the logic of mutual recognition and the principle of 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘Laval’s Regulatory Conundrum: collective standard-setting and the Court’s new approach to posted workers’ 34 
ELRev (2009), p. 850.  
59 Article 3 (1) of Directive 96/71 on the Posting of Workers. 
60 Article 3 (8) of Directive 96/71 on the Posting of Workers. See also P. Davies, ‘Posted Workers: Single Market or 
Protection of National Labour Law Systems?’ 34 CMLR (1997), p. 571ff.  
61 See also, explicitly, Case C-260/04, Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I-7083, para 24. 
62 Article 3 (7), emphasis added. Also explicitly repeated in recital 17 of the preamble to Directive 96/71 on the 
Posting of Workers. 
63 See for example S. Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition after Laval’, CBR Working Paper 364, (2008), p. 15-16; C. 
Barnard, ‘The UK and Posted Workers: The Effect of Commission v Luxembourg on the Territorial Application of 
British Labour Law’ 38 ILJ (2009), p. 126; P. Davies, ‘Market Integration and social policy in the Court of Justice’ 
(1995) 24 ILJ p. 49; C. Kilpatrick, ‘Laval’s Regulatory Conundrum: collective standard-setting and the Court’s new 
approach to posted workers’ 34 ELRev (2009), p. 848, or N. Reich, ‘Free Movement v. Social Rights in an Enlarged 
Union – The Laval and Viking Cases before the ECJ’ 9 German Law Review (2008), p. 141. 
64 See P. Davies, ‘Posted Workers: Single Market or Protection of National Labour Law Systems?’ 34 CMLR (1997), 
p. 577-591. 
65 Case C-319/06, Commission v Luxembourg [2008] ECR I-4323, Case C-346/06, Rüffert [2008] ECR I-1989, and 
Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767. 
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home state control?66 The Court chose the latter, arguing that the objective of the PWD was the 
protection of the:  
“interests of employers and their personnel [by laying down] the terms and 
conditions governing the employment relationship where an undertaking established 
in one Member State posts workers on a temporary basis to the territory of another 
Member State”.67  
 
The equation of the interests of employers and their personnel is, of course, already remarkable in 
light of the (at least partially) opposed objective in entering into the employment contract. Given 
that the PWD must – if it is to be in the interest of the employer that sends out his workers to 
work in another Member State – be an exception to the logic of mutual recognition, the Court 
then moved to interpret the norms elaborated in Article 3 PWD restrictively,68 even to the extent 
that they become senseless. The term “more favourable conditions”, laid down in Article 3 (7) 
PWD, for example, was re-interpreted to refer to more favourable rules in the home state.69 
Article 3 (10) PWD, which allows host Member States to impose higher labour standards to 
protect public policy objectives of that state, was interpreted equally restrictively.70 As a 
consequence, the PWD: 
“cannot be interpreted as allowing the host Member State to make the provision of 
services in its territory conditional on the observance of terms and conditions of 
employment which go beyond the mandatory rules for minimum protection.”71 
 
In other words, any imposition of labour law beyond the areas defined in Article 3 (1) PWD, as 
well as any imposition beyond the minimum standards set, is automatically regarded as a 
restriction to the freedom to provide services.72 Rather than a floor of rights, like other recent 
                                                
66 See also Case C-60/03, Wolff & Müller [2004] ECR I-9553, para. 42. 
67 See Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para. 58. 
68 See Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para. 59. 
69 Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para.  80/81. Which is – of course – completely counterintuitive as it 
presupposes that the provision of services would be imported into states where domestic competitors are cheaper. 
70 See also P. Davies, ‘Case note on Case C-346/06, Ruffert’, 37 ILJ (2008), p. 293. As Barnard has argued, it is very 
difficult to imagine how any labour legislation, especially areas left out of Article 3 (1), such as the basic right to a 
written contract, rights to unfair dismissal, redundancy payments, ‘living wages’, and family rights, could pass the 
very high threshold of being a response to “a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of 
society”, as required by the Court in order to be considered to fall within the public policy exception. C. Barnard, 
‘The UK and Posted Workers: The Effect of Commission v Luxembourg on the Territorial Application of British 
Labour Law’ 38 ILJ (2009), p. 126-9. See Case C-319/06, Commission v Luxembourg [2008] ECR I-4323, para. 50. 
71 Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para. 80 and Case C-346/06, Rüffert [2008] ECR I-1989, para. 33. 
72 Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para. 80 and Case C-346/06, Rüffert [2008] ECR I-1989, para. 33. 
Indeed, in Rüffert the Court did not even test the imposition in light of the Treaty. It simply assumed that a measure 
that goes beyond the ‘nucleus’ not only falls foul of the PWD but also Article 56 TFEU. See also P. Davies, ‘Case 
note on Case C-346/06, Ruffert’, 37 ILJ (2008), p. 293. 
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labour law directives, then, Article 3 (1) PWD provides a ceiling of rights, limiting the scope of 
rules that may detract from the most effective (ab)use of the logic of mutual recognition and the 
potential of free movement.73  
 
This interpretation of the PWD conflicts with the trend in EU labour law seeking to insulate the 
Member States’ autonomy to ensure market solidarity and fair competition.74 The imposition of a 
demand of transparency in the imposition of labour conditions on foreign service providers, for 
example, would have done exactly that without allowing the host Member States to protect their 
own industries.75 Instead, the Court chose the exact opposite solution: it now actually mandates 
competition below the level of working conditions considered acceptable in the host state – in at 
least two different ways.76 First, it essentially rules out that workers, whether domestic or foreign, 
are paid more than the minimum required, even for jobs which would normally fetch more due to 
the danger, timing, location or prestige of the project.77 It creates a downward competitive 
pressure on wages and increases the number of workers who live on, or below, the minimum 
level of income meant to prevent commodification.78 Second, the Court’s interpretation of the 
PWD disbalances the domestic relation between ‘labour’ and ‘capital’. By limiting the measures 
to be applied to foreign service providers to the areas covered by Article 3 (1) PWD alone, the 
Court has excluded entitlements such as the right to a written contract, the protection against 
unfair dismissal, redundancy payments, living wages and family rights. This creates an internal 
downward pressure on such rights in richer Member States, as it puts national workers in direct 
competition not only (and legitimately) with the qualities and productivity of foreign workers, but 
also with the level of labour regulation in the home state of those workers.  
                                                
73 S. Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition after Laval’, CBR Working Paper 364 (2008), p. 21-22. 
74 Cf. with Case C-60/03, Wolff & Müller [2004] ECR I-9553, para. 40. 
75 As the Court did in Case C-260/04, Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I-7083, para 24. 
76 S. Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition after Laval’, (2008) CBR Working Paper 364, p. 15. See also C. Kilpatrick, 
‘Laval’s Regulatory Conundrum: collective standard-setting and the Court’s new approach to posted workers’ 34 
ELRev (2009), p. 856), who shows that this has far-reaching consequences for cases of public procurement, where 
Member States must accept tenders below rights that it seeks to protect. A third challenge originates from the very 
narrow procedural interpretation of Article 3. See Case C-346/06, Rüffert [2008] ECR I-1989, para. 28-29. 
77 C. Kilpatrick, ‘Laval’s Regulatory Conundrum: collective standard-setting and the Court’s new approach to posted 
workers’ (2009) 34 ELRev, p. 852, in combination with Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para. 70. 
Consider, for example, the difference between the UK minimum wage of £5.93 per hour and the living wage in 
London of £7.85, below which life in London becomes too expensive to live a normal life.  
78 See also Case C-346/06, Rüffert [2008] ECR I-1989. In a public tender, the Land Niedersachsen had stipulated that 
whoever won the contract could not impose on its workers labour standards below the collectively agreed threshold. 
The subcontractor, who employed Polish nationals, got away with paying half the amount on the ground that the 
collective agreement was not declared universally applicable by the German state (nor could it, in fact, as a result of 
its federal structure).  Cf. S. Schmidt, ‘When Efficiency Results in Redistribution: The Conflict over the Single 
Services Market’ (2009) 32 West European Politics, p. 854-7. 
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While in most aspects of labour law the tiered nature of market solidarity is increasingly visible – 
wherein transnational structures serve to reinforce the capacity of the national political process to 
implement market solidarity and ensure fair competition on the European market – the Court has 
turned this logic upside down in the area of the provision of services. The PWD, as interpreted by 
the Court, does not appear to fit in with the second wave of labour directives, in that it does not 
seek to protect the political authority necessary for the effective implementation of norms of 
market solidarity. Rather than taking ‘working conditions out of competition’ – and thereby 
protect the worker from exploitation – the Court in fact mandates competition on the basis of 
working conditions. The latter not only entails a significant social and political challenge, but also 
paints a picture of an internal market that is ‘unfair’ to its participants and therefore in the long 
run unsustainable.79 Rather worryingly, a recent Commission proposal for a Directive that seeks 
to clarify the PWD, does not much more than codify the Court’s approach, rather than address the 
social concerns mentioned above.80  
 
6.3 COMMUNITARIAN SOLIDARITY 
In the second chapter it was argued that individuals derive certain rights simply by virtue of their 
membership to a certain political community – be it on the national or transnational level.81 In 
Europe, this sense of communitarian solidarity is reflected primarily by creating the preconditions 
that allow citizens to be free. Industrial citizenship rights seek to do exactly this by insulating 
workers from the asymmetrical bargaining power of capital82 which threatens to subvert the 
individual worker’s capacity to be free. As Streeck explains, whereas: 
“citizens workers and employers may or may not adhere to identical values; as 
participants in economic exchange they also have different interests. As citizens they 
have rights and obligations in relation to the state; as participants in production they 
create rights and obligations for each other. And while as citizens they are equal, 
their position in the economy is highly unequal. Advanced forms of citizenship take 
account of differences in interest and capacity, as well as of asymmetrical 
relationships within civil society, by attaching differential status rights and 
obligations to different economic positions - what Marshall has called industrial 
                                                
79 G. Majone, ‘Dilemmas of European Integration’ (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009). 
80 See Commission Proposal for a Directive on the enforcement of Directive 96/71, COM (2012) 131 final.  
81 See above, section 2.2. 
82 Naturally, in some sectors the bargaining power is inverted. Consider skilful football players or popular actors. See 
for an econometric discussion: P. Cahuc, F. Postel-Vinay and J-M. Robin, ‘Wage Bargaining with on-the-job Search: 
Theory and Evidence’, 74 Econometria (2006), p. 323-364. 
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citizenship - and adding them to the civil and political rights awarded to all citizens 
alike.”83 
 
Industrial citizenship rights, in other words, seek to even out power asymmetries in the 
production process, both by insulating the autonomy of labour as a collectivity, through collective 
bargaining and collective action rights; and by institutionalising the voice of labour through rights 
to information and consultation, and co-determination in the management of the workplace. The 
most useful conceptualisation of industrial citizenship, then, is to see such rights as participation 
rights in the power struggle between capital and labour that will eventually determine the norms 
that govern the worker’s working conditions, job security, and – by proxy – the quality of the 
worker’s life. The collective defence84 and improvement of living and working conditions, in a 
sense, constitutes an extension of political rights into the private sphere,85 which explains the 
practice in many Member States whereby central governments devolve standard setting to the 
collectivities of labour and capital.86 
 
Industrial citizenship thus implies a very peculiar triangular relationship between market forces, 
the individual and the state. Given that, in the absence of insulation through industrial citizenship 
rights, the interaction between ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ would revert to the pre-existing bias in 
favour of capital, the role of Member States appears to be to guarantee the stability of the 
symmetry of bargaining power:  
“protected by means of public authority, [industrial citizenship rights] are supposed 
to be non-negotiable between the labor market participants to which they apply, 
insulating them against the impact of differences in bargaining power. For example, 
just as workers cannot sell their right to bargain collectively, or agree to work for 
less than the minimum wage, employers are not allowed to buy themselves out of 
their obligation to consult.”87  
                                                
83 W. Streeck, ‘Citizenship Under Regime Competition: The Case of the “European Works Councils”’, 1 EIoP No. 5, 
(1997), p. 3. 
84 While industrial citizenship rights may be granted on an individual basis, and are attached to the economic 
subordination of the individual, their exercise is nevertheless collective. Individual negotiation on working conditions 
would be subject to the risk of individual substitutability and game-theoretical levelling-down of demands. The 
collective exercise of industrial rights – with collective action as the ultimate pressure instrument – ensures its 
highest effectiveness as a counterbalance against the employers’ bargaining power. See M. Freeman, ‘Are there 
collective Human Rights?’ 43 Political Studies (1995), p. 39-40. See P. Bagguley, ‘Industrial Citizenship in Britain: 
Its Neglect and Decline’, available at: www.leeds.ac.uk/sociology/people/pbdocs/ Industrial%20Citizenship.doc. See 
also T. Janovski, ‘Citizenship and Civil Society’, (Cambridge, CUP, 1998), p. 42-45. 
85 T.H. Marshall, ‘Class, Citizenship and Social Development’, (Chicago, UCP, 1964), p. 94. 
86 H. Collins, K. Ewing and A. McColgan, ‘Labour Law’, (Oxford, Hart, 2005), p. 647. 
87 W. Streeck, ‘Citizenship Under Regime Competition: The Case of the “European Works Councils”’, 1 EIoP No. 5, 
(1997), p. 3. 
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We already saw in the previous section that the development of the internal market further 
skewed the power relation between labour and capital. As a shield against this process, the role of 
the social partners in the development of the internal market was emphasised from very early on. 
As the Paris Declaration highlights:  
“[Member States] attach as much importance to vigorous action in the social field as 
to the achievement of economic union [and consider] it essential to ensure the 
increasing involvement of labour and management” 88 
 
It appears that a European commitment to industrial citizenship rights either requires the 
elaboration of its transnational exercise, or the insulation of its exercise on the national level. It 
seems that the Union chose both avenues. Within the scope of its competences, it has developed a 
transnational elaboration of the social dialogue, the right to co-determination in the workplace 
and the right to information and consultation. Ever since its Val Duchesse process, the Union has 
been committed to incorporating the social partners within its legislative structure. Since the 
Treaty of Lisbon, their role in indeed entrenched in the Treaty:  
 “The Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its level, 
taking into account the diversity of national systems. It shall facilitate dialogue 
between the social partners, respecting their autonomy.”89 
 
This captures the role of the social partners on the European level, and relation with national 
social structures, in a nutshell. An tiered system of social partners is created, whereby the exercise 
of the social dialogue on the European level is not meant to replace national equivalents, but 
merely supplement the latter’s functioning in the transnational space. In other words, the role of 
norm-setting on the European level is to empower, rather than replace, the social dialogue on the 
national level. Directives dealing with issues such as parental leave,90 part-time91 and fixed-time 
work,92 all adopted on the basis of the social dialogue on the Union level,93 emphasise this by 
                                                
88 Declaration adopted at the Paris Summit of 19-21 October 1972, published in the Sixth General Report on the 
Activities of the Communities 1972, p. 7. 
89 Article 152 TFEU. See also p. 17 of the Commission’s 2020 Agenda, which lists as one of its objectives: “to 
strengthen the capacity of social partners and make full use of the problem-solving potential of social dialogue at all 
levels (EU, national/regional, sectoral, company)”. 
90 See Directive 2010/18/EU implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave. 
91 See Directive 97/81/EC on part-time work. 
92 See Directive 1999/70/EC on fixed-time work. 
93 Evolved into Article 155 TFEU now: “should management and labour so desire, the dialogue between them at 
labour level may lead to contractual relations, including agreements. Agreements concluded at Union level shall be 
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explicitly allowing more favourable provisions to be negotiated by the social partners on the 
national level, thus leaving the latter in charge of the final substantive decision.94 The Court 
indeed acknowledges this tiered structure and seems to grant wide discretion to national social 
partners in implementing such directives.95 In other words, the social function of the rights to 
industrial citizenship is extended beyond the national level by insulating its national exercise 
from the pressures of the internal market. This same tiered structure can be traced within the right 
of co-determination in the management of the workplace. Article 27 CFR lays down the right to 
information and consultation: 
“Workers or their representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be guaranteed 
information and consultation in good time in the cases and under the conditions 
provided for by Union law and national laws and practices.”  
 
This right has been elaborated in the Directive establishing the European Works’ Council, and in 
Directive 2002/14, establishing a framework for the information and consultation of workers. 
Their preambles highlight the function of the recognition of such rights on the transnational level. 
On the one hand, transnational rights to information and consultation seek to limit the impact of 
the internal market on such rights: 
“Procedures for informing and consulting employees as embodied in legislation or 
practice in the Member States are often not geared to the transnational structure of 
the entity which takes the decisions affecting those employees. This may lead to the 
unequal treatment of employees affected by decisions within one and the same 
undertaking or group of undertakings.”96 
 
This objective, however, is not achieved by the establishment of a new across-the-board level of 
worker participation throughout Europe. Rather, the rights laid down in the directives operate as a 
safety net for the national exercise of industrial citizenship rights: 
“This Directive is part of the Community framework intended to support and 
complement the action taken by Member States in the field of information and 
consultation of employees.”97 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
implemented either in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour (…) or (…) 
by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission”.  
94 See recitals 11 and 12, and Clauses 1 (1) and 8 (1) of the new framework agreement as implemented by Directive 
2010/18. 
95 See most recently, and explicitly, Case C-45/09, Rosenbladt [nyr], para. 67-69. 
96 Recitals 9-10 of Directive 2009/38 (emphasis added). 
97 Recital 7 of Directive 2009/38. 
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This tiered structure shines through very clearly in both Directives, which lay down an 
organisational structure for information and consultation, and set out a minimum standard of 
rights for its effective exercise. Both explicitly allow, however, for higher or different standards 
to be negotiated on the national level.98 Its main purpose, then, seems to be to bolster the capacity 
of labour to negotiate better terms on the national level by levelling-out any advantage that 
capital may derive from unchecked market integration.99  
 
How about rights to collective bargaining and to collective action, in which Union competence is 
explicitly excluded?100 How to give shape to the Union’s commitment to their protection – as 
reflected in the CFR:  
 “Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance 
with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude 
collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, 
to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.”101 
 
In light of the lack of legislative competences to elaborate on the transnational exercise of such 
rights, it appears that the inclusion in the CFR was meant to insulate the exercise of such rights on 
the national level rather than create a novel and autonomous right on the transnational level:  
“[t]he modalities and limits for the exercise of collective action, including strike 
action, come under national laws and practices, including the question of whether it 
may be carried out in parallel in several Member States.”102  
 
The defensive attitude by Member States in rejecting the legislative elaboration of transnational 
rights to collective action and collective bargaining is informed in part by the sensitive and highly 
politicised nature of such rights, but mainly by the apparent incapacity of the Union to reproduce 
the preconditions for their effective exercise. Simply asserting the existence of the right to 
collective bargaining or collective action on the European level does not suffice to ensure their 
effectiveness, as it would merely directly expose the power relationship between labour and 
                                                
98 See Article 1 (1) of Directive 2002/14 and Recital 18, Articles 6 and 7, and Annex I of the Recast Directive 
2009/38.   
99 See also B. Bercusson, ‘European Labour Law’, (Cambridge, CUP, 2009), p. 114. 
100 See Article 153 (3) TFEU, and Article 1, and recital 22, of Directive 96/71 on the Posting of Workers. Articles 1 
(6), 1 (7) and 16 (3) of Directive 2006/123. See also Article 2 of Regulation 2679/98. 
101 See Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. As a reflection also of their incorporation in the ILO 
Conventions, the European Social Charter, and simply by virtue of the fact that all Member States recognise such 
rights. See Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para. 90. 
102 See the Official Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, (2007/C 303/02), p.10. See also 
Article 1(2) of the Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights attached to the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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capital to the elements of regulatory movement, which inherently favour the much more mobile 
capital. Rather, a truly transnational industrial citizenship would require Europe to answer the 
‘social question’ of what exact type of ‘social market economy’ Europe is meant to sustain, and 
what such answer entails for the interaction between the collectivities ‘labour’ and ‘capital’; 
which, at the moment, Europe cannot for lack of a robust enough political sphere.103 This is 
acerbated by the fact that transnational trade unions do not appear sufficiently integrated to 
provide a considerable counterweight to capital, even if such transnational rights were to exist.104 
In other words, transnational recognition of rights to collective bargaining and collective action 
can only ‘work’ if they are interpreted as an instrument to protect their national exercise.  
 
None of these considerations, however, prevented the Court, in Viking and Laval, from 
interpreting the recognition of rights to collective action on the European level so as to require the 
exact opposite: namely the imposition of transnational limits on its national exercise.105 Both 
cases dealt with collective action that was directed against companies exercising their free 
movement rights. In Viking, a Finish ferry operator, operating between Helsinki and Tallinn, 
intended to reflag one of its ferries to Estonia, in order to compete more effectively against its 
direct competitors, which were based in Estonia and thus obliged to respect Estonian rather than 
Finnish labour law, the latter imposing significantly higher wage standards.106 The Finnish trade 
unions, in order to prevent the reflagging,107 gave notice of a strike, which would have been legal 
under Finnish law. Viking, after having negotiated in vain with the trade unions, sought relief 
against the strikes by claiming that they constituted a restriction on its freedom of 
establishment.108 In Laval,109 a Latvian company was awarded a public contract to renovate a 
school in Vaxholm, a town close to Stockholm. Laval had signed collective agreements with the 
builders’ trade union in Latvia, and decided to post Latvian workers to the building site in 
Vaxholm.110 In the meantime, negotiations had begun between Laval and the Swedish trade 
unions with a view to establish basic working conditions. However, no agreement could be 
                                                
103 See above, section 1.2.2.  
104 See Wedderburn, ‘Multi-national enterprise and National labour law’ in: Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law and 
Freedom’, (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1995), p. 243. 
105 Which is now codified; see recital 11 of the preamble to the Commission’s Proposal for a Council Regulation on 
the exercise of the right to collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment, COM (2012) 130 
final.  
106 Case C-438/05, Viking [2007] ECR I-10779, para. 9-18. 
107 Case C-438/05, Viking [2007] ECR I-10779, para. 13. 
108 Case C-438/05, Viking [2007] ECR I-10779, para. 23. 
109 See for a more detailed outline Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para. 3-38. 
110 Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para. 39. 
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reached with the Swedish trade unions, which subsequently started a blockade of all works on the 
Vaxholm site, in compliance with the Swedish limits on the right to collective action.111 Laval 
sought a declaration of illegality of that action on the basis that it infringed the freedom to 
provide services. The assessment of the Court in both cases is relatively similar. First it argued 
that:  
“Although the right to take collective action must (..) be recognised as a fundamental 
right which forms an integral part of the general principles of Community law the 
observance of which the Court ensures, the exercise of that right may none the less 
be subject to certain restrictions.”112 
 
Then, the Court continued, such restrictions cannot only flow from the national legislator (in 
accordance with their political perception of the required bargaining balance between labour and 
capital), but also from the EU legal order: 
“ It must therefore be examined whether the fact that a Member State’s trade unions 
may take collective action (..) constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide 
services, and, if so, whether it can be justified.”113 
 
In other words, EU law, and its market freedoms more specifically, can directly limit the right to 
collective action and collective bargaining114 as protected by national (constitutional) provisions. 
Rather than insulating national labour law, then, EU law exposes such rights to the dynamics of 
free movement. In allowing industrial rights to be limited by both national and transnational 
requirements, the Court has conflated two conceptually distinct questions. One is the recognition 
of a right in the EU legal order, the other the legality of its exercise. As discussed above, the 
former does not (and should not) necessarily imply a determination of the latter. The first flaw in 
the Court’s approach, in other words, is that it misread the tiered nature of industrial citizenship in 
the EU, and manoeuvred itself in a position where it could no longer delegate the substantive 
decision as to the balance between the rights of capital (free movement) and labour (right to 
collective action) to the national level or the political process, but had to itself define the 
normative content of a distinct and autonomous European form of industrial citizenship. This 
approach is diametrically opposed to the approach of delegation favoured by the Union legislator.  
 
                                                
111 N. Reich, ‘Free Movement v. Social Rights in an Enlarged Union – The Laval and Viking Cases before the ECJ’ 9 
German Law Review (2008), p. 141ff. 
112 Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para. 91 and Case C-438/05, Viking [2007] ECR I-10779, para. 44. 
113 Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para. 96 and Case C-438/05, Viking [2007] ECR I-10779, para. 47. 
114 Case C-271/08, Commission v Germany (nyr), para 38-44. 
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In setting the balance between free movement and rights to collective action, the Court arguably 
made two further mistakes. The first and most crucial one was to interpret the role of trade unions 
akin to public actors.115 It argued that the:  
“freedom to provide services would be compromised if the abolition of State barriers 
could be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise, by associations or 
organisations not governed by public law, of their legal autonomy”116 
 “Article [49 TFEU] must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as 
those in the main proceedings, it may be relied on by a private undertaking against a 
trade union or an association of trade unions.”117 
 
In other words, the free movement provisions are horizontally applicable. Not only the state, but 
also trade unions may not restrict the regulatory movement of capital. While this finding is 
theoretically compatible with the rulings in Bosman or Walrave,118 in which the Court extended 
the scope of the free movement provisions to cover regulatory bodies exercising (de facto) public 
power, its extension to trade unions constitutes a significant misreading of the nature of industrial 
rights.119 As described above, such rights are explicitly meant to protect the autonomy of the 
social partners by setting out the markers within which the parties are allowed to negotiate.120 
Inexplicably, however, the Court transfers the obligation to determine these markers between 
which both parties may pursue and defend their interests onto the trade unions. After all, by 
allowing the free movement rights to be invoked against trade unions, the exercise of collective 
action can no longer be justified by self-interest, but by public policy requirements only.121 This 
completely reverses the logic of struggle and autonomy. While capital can act out of complete 
self-interest, the weaker of both parties has to take the legitimate interest of the stronger into 
account within the negotiation process! This questionable outcome is the result of the Court’s 
oversight of three central characteristics of industrial relations: first, the existence of a systemic 
bargaining asymmetry between the labour and capital, second, the crucial role of ‘the political’ in 
                                                
115 L. Azoulai, ‘The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy: The Emergence of an Ideal and the Conditions 
for its Realisation’ 45 CMLR (2008), p. 1350. 
116 Case C-438/05, Viking [2007] ECR I-10779, para. 57. 
117 Case C-438/05, Viking [2007] ECR I-10779, para. 61. In Laval the Court simply bypasses this question, see Case 
C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para, 98-99. 
118 Case 36/74, Walrave and Kock [1974] ECR 1405; and Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
119 D. Ashiagbor, ‘Collective Labour Rights and the European Social Model’ 3 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 
(2009), p. 246. 
120 C. Offe, ‘The European Model of ‘Social’ Capitalism: Can it Survive European Integration?’, in M. Miller (ed.) 
‘Worlds of Capitalism’ (New York, Routledge, 2005), p. 160. 
121 See also C. Barnard, ‘EU Social Policy: From Employment Law to Labour Market Reform’ in: P. Craig and G. 
De Búrca (eds.), ‘The Evolution of EU Law’ (Oxford, OUP, 2011), p. 667. 
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the establishment and maintenance of a more symmetrical interaction between the two parties,122 
achieved by insulating the autonomy of collective labour structures,123 and third, the notion that 
rights to collective action do not only serve as a tool for social dialogue, but primarily for social 
struggle. 
 
After recognising the horizontal effect of the freedoms, the Court limited the function of 
industrial citizenship even further. Given that trade unions were forced to justify their actions on 
grounds of public policy, the Court argued, it could only take such action if it was clear that it 
was (i) aimed at protecting workers124 (ii) whose job or conditions of employment were under 
serious threat,125 and (iii) when the trade union had exhausted any other means at its disposal.126 
This interpretation significantly limits the exercise of the right to collective action.127 Its legality 
cannot logically be contingent on its impact on capital, for that is exactly its objective. The more 
successful the right to strike is employed, the more capital is affected, and the more likely it is to 
move towards the wishes of labour. The weapon of a strike ensures the symmetry of bargaining 
power between labour and capital not only at the end of the bargaining process, but constitutes a 
lever throughout. The Court, by limiting its use and threat to situations in which all other options 
are exhausted, undermines its effect, and, simultaneously, the autonomy and bargaining power of 
labour in its struggle for better working conditions.128  
 
If we compare the Court’s approach with how other rights to industrial citizenship have been 
developed by the Union legislator, we notice a direct discrepancy. Whereas the recognition and 
                                                
122 See G. Orlandini, ‘Right to Strike, Transnational Collective Action and European Law: Time to Move on? Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 8/07, p. 16-18. See also Case C-112/00, Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, and Case C-
265/95, Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959, para 34 , where the Court still humbly held that it is “not for the 
Community institutions to act in place of the Member States and to prescribe for them the measures which they must 
adopt and effectively apply in order to safeguard [the exercise of free movement].” 
123 This is stranger still given that in its previous case law the Court had indeed recognised both that the obligations 
of accommodating free movement were imposed on the Member States rather than private parties, and that the 
Member States retained a wider margin of appreciation in assessing the legality of the exercise of fundamental rights. 
See Case C-112/00, Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, para. 60and 93. 
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126 Case C-438/05, Viking [2007] ECR I-10779, para.  87. 
127 See also D. Ashiagbor, ‘Collective Labour Rights and the European Social Model’ 3 Law & Ethics of Human 
Rights (2009), p. 256 – 258. 
128 C. Offe, ‘The European Model of ‘Social’ Capitalism: Can it Survive European Integration?’, in M. Miller (ed.) 
‘Worlds of Capitalism’ (Routledge, New York, 2005), p. 160. Moreover, as highlighted by Katherine Apps, this 
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Apps, ‘Damages Claims against trade unions after Viking and Laval’ 34 ELRev (2009), p. 141. 
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elaboration of rights to information and consultation and co-determination serve to supplement 
and protect the autonomy of social partners at the national level, the Court has completely 
reversed that logic in the area of collective action. It not only liberates capital from national 
constraints imposed in order to protect labour, but also allows capital to exploit the additional 
bargaining advantage that it derives from the dynamics of the internal market. The Court has 
neither understood the social objectives of industrial citizenship nor construed any normative 
justification for its rulings beyond the remarkable assertion that capital needs to be protected from 
the bargaining power of labour. This is potentially highly problematic for both the development 
of the internal market and the stability of industrial rights on the national level, which are a result 
of decades of political struggle – only to be outdone by a Court trying to figure out what a ‘social 
market economy’ entails. Rather than extending the social function of industrial citizenship to 
cover the whole Union, it has allowed the economic function of free movement to hollow out 
industrial citizenship. The Commission, aware of this trend, has proposed a legislative initiative 
aiming to re-evaluate the impact of Viking and Laval on the right to collective action.129 The 
current version of the proposal, however, far from re-evaluating the rulings and insulating the 
right to collective action, codifies the rulings.130 The Union legislator, much like the Court, 
apparently does not appreciate that the protection of industrial citizenship simply cannot take 
place on the transnational level, but instead presupposes the insulation of such rights within the 
national context.   
 
6.4 ASPIRATIONAL SOLIDARITY 
Aspirational solidarity denotes the capacity of the European project to help individual citizens 
make something of their lives by enlarging their capabilities and opportunities.131 In labour law as 
in the other areas of welfare, aspirational solidarity proves to be the most contentious and divisive 
way in which the Union reconceptualises national justice structures. It promotes a highly 
individualised perspective of justice, which invariably pits one citizen’s aspirations against 
everyone else’s. National labour law is already faced with this problem. Given that not enough 
quality jobs exist for all citizens, Member States, in their management of the employment market, 
constantly need to devise mechanisms to ensure that all citizens have a chance to engage in that 
                                                
129 See Commission Communication: ‘Towards a Single Market Act’, COM (2010) 608 final/2, p. 22-23. 
130 Commission’s Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to collective action within the 
context of the freedom of establishment, COM (2012) 130 final. See in particular Article 2 and p. 12. 
131 See above, section 2.3. 
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market – and that those who cannot still manage to live their lives with the retention of basic 
levels of dignity and autonomy. Aspirational solidarity serves to rationalise this process; and 
demands that Member States connect the aspirations that its citizens have within the employment 
market with those beyond the workplace. 
 
The importance of employment in the individual aspirational pursuit of a ‘good life’ is evident. It 
adds meaning to the individual’s life, is an instrument for self-determination, provides a context 
for social interaction, and generates the income necessary for the pursuit of other interests and 
desires.132 Conversely, unemployment can be hugely damaging for the individual’s capacity to 
live the life he desires. Lack of motivation, confidence, meaningful social context, and income 
can all lead to downwards spirals of the capacity and willingness to work, and ultimately create 
traps of social exclusion. In addition, high figures of unemployment are damaging for more 
indirect reasons. High unemployment causes a massive strain on the welfare budget, given that 
states compensate for periods of non-participation of the individual on the employment market 
through their systems of social security – think of unemployment benefits or old-age pensions;133 
and it destabilises normative standards such as working conditions, health and safety, minimum 
wages, and even the system of collective bargaining or collective action.134 In consequence, the 
objective of full employment remains squarely at the centre of most Member States’ employment 
policies, as it not only accommodates the aspirations of those within the labour market, but also 
finances the aspirations of those excluded. On the macro-economic level, states try to attain full 
employment by generating public sector jobs, funding vocational training courses aimed at the 
development of marketable skills, or providing for an attractive regulatory climate for investors. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, not enough (quality) jobs exist to satisfy the aspirations of all 
citizens, and Member States must therefore inevitably pit the aspirations of those who are in 
employment against the aspirations of the ‘excluded’ citizens in their management of the 
employment market.  
 
                                                
132 See for a good analysis of the different ways in which employment contributes to the ‘good life’: P. Bachman, 
‘Social needs, development, territories and full employment based on solidarity’, in R. Salais and R. Villeneuve, 
‘Europe and the Politics of Capabilities’ (Cambridge, CUP, 2004).  
133 N. Bernard, ‘Between a Rock and a Soft Place: Internal Market Vs. Open Coordination’, in: M. Dougan and E. 
Spaventa (eds.), ‘EU Social Welfare Law’ (Oxford, Hart, 2005), p. 279. 
134 C. Offe, ‘The European Model of ‘Social’ Capitalism: Can it Survive European Integration?’, in M. Miller (ed.) 
‘Worlds of Capitalism’ (New York, Routledge, 2005), p. 161and 167 for a quite brilliant metaphor of a house. 
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The most obvious way in which the European Union contributes to the individual’s aspirations is 
by ensuring access to that market in other Member States.135 Union law, however, also 
contributes to the aspirations of citizens regardless of their movement between different Member 
States. It does so by helping individuals overcome the two strongest exclusionary forces on the 
employment market: lack of marketable skills, and discrimination in access to the employment 
market.136 The paradigm offered by the EU, both in its ‘soft’ and its ‘hard’ law, aims to ensure 
that all citizens have a shot at finding employment. At the same time, the Union stresses that 
Member States’ are allowed to encourage access to the employment market for certain groups of 
citizens, but this should not deprive the citizens who are excluded from pursuing their aspirations 
in the private sphere. The role of aspirational solidarity in labour law seems to require the 
rationalisation of the impact that Member States’ employment policies have on the lives of its 
citizens. 
 
This entails a double focus: one the one hand it calls for the empowerment of the individual to 
find a job, while on the other hand it presupposes the existence of safety nets and mechanisms of 
social security to cater for the aspirations of those excluded. This double focus is visible in the 
‘soft law’ approach through which the Union seeks to steer national employment policies towards 
more inclusive paradigms. The main instruments of the OMC approach, such as the flexicurity 
agenda, or the employment guidelines,137 clearly emphasise the aspirational orientation of the 
common indicators. One the one hand, they seek to enhance the individual’s capabilities138 and 
employment opportunities139 by retraining workers, devising programs of life-long learning, 
increasing the individual’s adaptability and promoting active labour policies which match skills 
with the demands on the labour market.140 On the other hand, they encourage Member States to 
take care of their citizens beyond the workplace. The focus on the need to modernise welfare 
systems stems from a vision that strong social security safety nets are not the result, but in fact 
                                                
135 Cf. Article 15 CFR: ‘Everyone has the right to engage in work’. 
136 C. Offe, ‘The European Model of ‘Social’ Capitalism: Can it Survive European Integration?’, in M. Miller (ed.) 
‘Worlds of Capitalism’ (New York, Routledge, 2005), p. 169. 
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constitute a prerequisite for an open and inclusive employment market with high employment 
numbers.141 In other words, the flexicurity approach and the employment guidelines accept that 
not all the aspirations of all citizens can be met through the employment market. It stresses, 
however, that excluded citizens should not be left behind, but must be accommodated in social 
security structures that guarantee such citizens a basic income, either with a view to re-instate 
them as productive actors in the market, or to mitigate the effect of unemployment on their 
capacity to live decent lives in the private sphere.142 While recent research suggests that the OMC 
approach struggles to convince Member States to move beyond policy objectives that are already 
identified on the national level,143 the renewed focus on political control proposed by the recent 
‘Euro Plus Pact’ may see a more structured re-assessment of national employment policies in 
these aspirational terms.144 
 
One area of the regulation of the employment market has already seen the ‘hardening’ of this 
aspirational paradigm. Ever since the Treaty of Rome, the exclusion of certain (groups of) 
citizens from the employment market, or their discrimination within the market, has been 
perceived as potentially frustrating the optimal functioning of the internal market,145 and, 
progressively, as undermining the social aspirations and private autonomy of such citizens.146 
More recently, discrimination in access to the employment market has been highlighted as a 
cause for structural underemployment.147 Both for economic and social reasons, then, the Union 
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has implemented measures ensuring the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
religion or belief, age, disability, or sexual orientation in access to employment.148 The Court’s 
interpretation of these norms reveals a strong reliance on the aspirational paradigm discussed 
above.149 One area of the regulation of the employment market in particular has seen much 
litigation.150 Since the employment market cannot provide for sufficient quality jobs for all, 
discrimination on the basis of age, fostering access to the employment market for the young by 
excluding the old, is a widely used policy tool to ensure generational solidarity in the distribution 
of jobs – think of compulsory retirement. Such policies, however, are not only highly divisive and 
politicised, as they pit the aspirations of whole groups of citizens against each other, but also have 
an enormous distributive impact, both on the individual (promoting or curtailing access to stable 
income) and on the communal level (as exclusion is tied to welfare access).  
 
Two mechanisms of employment market regulation in particular have been challenged; 
compulsory retirement schemes, which force certain age groups off the employment market to 
make room for the younger generations; and fixed-time schemes, which make it easier for certain 
age groups to (re-)enter the employment market.151 The approach taken by the Court in assessing 
the legality of such schemes implicitly draws its normative justification from the aspirational 
paradigm discussed above, whereby the management of access to the employment market must 
be coordinated with access to social security, so that all citizens’, one way or another, can live 
‘good lives’. This wider reading of the principle of non-discrimination, which prevents the 
aspirations of individuals from being directly pit against each other, is a smart way of taking the 
divisive ‘sting’ out of aspirational solidarity, and explains the seemingly haphazard distinction 
between instances in which the Court allows discrimination on the basis of age, and instances 
where it does not. Article 6 (1) of Directive 2000/78 indicates that Member States in principle 
                                                                                                                                                   
(‘EES’) was unveiled. It laid down four pillars on the basis of which structural unemployment could be combated – 
one being the pillar of ‘equal opportunities’. 
148 Directive 2000/43 and Directive 2000/78. 
149 See for another opinion Somek, who argues that the underlying concept of justice is regulatory, rather than 
aspirational. See A. Somek, ‘Engeneering Equality’, (Oxford, OUP, 2011).  
150 Much like within the scope of the market freedoms, the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of age was 
appropriated by private litigants to re-challenge national regulatory decisions. And, like in the scope of the market 
freedoms, the docket is asymmetrical: with the exception of Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365, all 
litigants have argued in favour of more favourable employment access for older workers. 
151 Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa [2007] ECR I-8531, Case C-45/09, Rosenbladt [nyr], Joined Cases C-159/10 
and C-160/10, Fuchs and Kohler (pending), Case C-388/07, Age Concern [2009] ECR I-1569, Case C-144/04, 
Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981, Case C-109/09, Deutsche Lufthanse (pending), Case C-341/08, Petersen [nyr], Joined 
Cases C-250/09 and C-268/09, Georgiev [nyr]. 
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retain a reasonable scope of discretion in differentiating on the basis of age within their 
employment policies: 
“Member States may provide that differences of treatment on grounds of age shall 
not constitute discrimination, if, within the context of national law, they are 
objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate 
employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the 
means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.”152 
 
The Court has generally been lenient in assessing national schemes of compulsory retirement, as 
long as such schemes consider their impact on the aspirations of those excluded from the 
employment market. Recitals 6 and 25, as well as Article 6 (2) of Directive 2000/78, create a 
strong presumption that such schemes – even though they clearly limit access to the employment 
market for citizens over a certain age – do not constitute discrimination. The Court has, however, 
introduced two conditions that must be met by compulsory retirement legislation before it is in 
compliance with aspirational solidarity. First, its objective must actually help certain groups in 
accessing the employment market:153 
“encouragement of recruitment undoubtedly constitutes a legitimate aim of Member 
States’ social or employment policy(..), in particular when the promotion of access of 
young people to a profession is involved. Consequently, encouragement of 
recruitment in higher education by means of the offer of posts as professors to 
younger people may constitute such a legitimate aim.”154 
 
In its assessment, moreover, the Court demands not only that the exclusion of older workers 
fosters access for younger workers, but also that the exclusion of the former is necessary, taking 
account of the “actual situation in the labour market”,155 including “political, economic, social, 
demographic and/or budgetary considerations”.156 This requirement of specificity, which looks at 
                                                
152 Article 6 (1) of Directive 2000/78. 
153 Case C-341/08, Petersen [nyr], para. 65-68, Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa [2007] ECR I-8531, para. 65; 
Case C-45/09, Rosenbladt [nyr], para. 43. See also Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-268/09, Georgiev [nyr], para. 30-
31.  
154 C-268/09, Georgiev [nyr], para. 45. 
155 Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa [2007] ECR I-8531, para. 69, emphasis added. See also Case C-45/09, 
Rosenbladt [nyr], para. 44.  
156 Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa [2007] ECR I-8531, para. 69, emphasis added. See also Case C-45/09, 
Rosenbladt [nyr], para. 44.  
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the employment market in a certain sector157 or even geographical region,158 serves to ensure that 
the aspirations of those excluded from the employment market are not unnecessarily restricted.159  
 
Once the need for a compulsory retirement scheme is established, the Court imposes a second, 
more substantive, requirement. This requirement – which is essentially one of proportionality160 – 
connects access to the employment market with the aspirations that individuals may have beyond 
the workplace. In this view, compulsory retirement must be accompanied by social security 
mechanisms that ensure that the individuals excluded can still live a ‘decent life’. In other words, 
the forced exclusion from the employment market is only allowed if the state assumes 
responsibility for the well-being of individuals excluded: 
“the measure cannot be regarded as unduly prejudicing the legitimate claims of 
workers subject to compulsory retirement because (..) the relevant legislation (..) also 
takes account of the fact that the persons concerned are entitled to financial 
compensation by way of a retirement pension (..) the level of which cannot be 
regarded as unreasonable.”161 
“the decisive factor is that the professor has acquired a right to a retirement 
pension”162 
 
Conversely, in cases where forced retirement causes particular hardship due to lack of sufficient 
income, individuals cannot be forced off the market, as this would result in a disproportionate 
limitation of their capacity to live a good life. In Rosenbladt, for example, the Court held that: 
“the automatic termination of employment contracts causes significant financial 
hardship to workers in the commercial cleaning sector in general and to Mrs. 
Rosenbladt in particular. As poorly paid part-time employment is a typical feature of 
this sector, the statutory old-age pension is not sufficient to meet the basic needs of 
workers. (..) [A]ccount must be taken both of the hardship [compulsory retirement]  
                                                
157 Case C-45/09, Rosenbladt [nyr], para. 49. Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-268/09, Georgiev [nyr], para. 35; Case C-
268/09, Georgiev [nyr], para. 46 and 51-52. 
158 Case C-341/08, Petersen [nyr], para. 71-72.  
159 Case C-341/08, Petersen [nyr], para. 62 and 64. See, specifically, Case C-447/09, Prigge [nyr], para. 60, where 
the Court ruled that compulsory retirement of pilots over 60 on reasons of safety could not fall under Article 6 (1) as 
they were unrelated to employment policy objectives. 
160 See for a discussion how this external element was introduced in the principle of proportionality: E. Muir, 
‘Enhancing the effects of Community Law on national employment policies: the Mangold case’ 31 ELRev (2006), p. 
886. 
161 Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa [2007] ECR I-8531, para. 73. See also Case C-45/09, Rosenbladt [nyr], para. 
48 and the Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-268/09, Georgiev [nyr], para. 36, Court in Case C-268/09, Georgiev [nyr], 
para. 54. 
162 Case C-268/09, Georgiev [nyr], para. 63.  
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may cause to the persons concerned and of the benefits derived from it by society in 
general and the individuals who make up society”163    
 
This citation shows what the Court takes aspirational solidarity to mean in labour law: 
employment policies may limit the individual’s capacity to work, but not his capacity to pursue a 
‘good life’.164 In other words, the Court’s rationalisation of the leeway that Member States 
dispose of does not challenge their legitimate assessments as to who should receive priority 
access to employment, but instead demands that such policies be objectively necessary and take 
account of their impact on the aspirations of those excluded from the employment market.  
 
This double requirement of rationalisation explains why the Court, in Mangold, Kücükdeveci and 
Andersen, found that certain national employment measures infringed obligations of transnational 
aspirational solidarity. In those cases, the national measures were invariably general in nature and 
did not take account of the individual’s aspirations beyond the workplace. In Mangold, a German 
measure which lifted the prohibition on successive fixed-term contracts for all employees older 
than 52 was challenged. The measure’s objective was to facilitate the inclusion of older workers 
in the labour force.165 It was not, however, specific enough to show the necessity of the measure: 
 “such legislation takes the age of the worker concerned as the only criterion (..) 
regardless of any other consideration linked to the structure of the labour market in 
question or the personal situation of the person concerned.”166 
 
Moreover, given that the national measure also applies to workers already in employment, it has 
the potential to significantly decrease the aspirations of such workers without alleviating the 
ensuing hardship. Simply put, the risk exists that workers who would have had an open-ended 
contract now end up with fixed-term contracts. This constitutes a disproportionate limitation of 
such workers’ aspirations since it:  
“leads to a situation in which the workers concerned [already in employment](..) are 
in danger, during a substantial part of their working life, of being excluded from the 
                                                
163 Case C-45/09, Rosenbladt [nyr], para. 71-73. 
164 Or, in Sen-speak: may limit process-related freedoms but not opportunity-related. See above section 1.1. 
165 Case C-144/04, Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981.  
166 See Case C-268/09, Georgiev [nyr], para. 58-59, and the Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-268/09, Georgiev [nyr], 
para. 38. 
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benefit of stable employment which constitutes, according to the Court, a major 
element in the protection of workers.” 167 
 
In Kücükdeveci another German measure was challenged. The legislation at issue made the period 
of notice to be given to the employee dependent on the amount of years that the employee had 
worked for the employer, discounting any years worked before the age of 25.168 As a justification, 
Germany adduced that this would stimulate employers to hire more young workers, and that, 
since such workers react more adequately to changing demands on the labour market, a degree of 
flexibility may be expected of them. The Court was neither convinced that the measure was 
necessary for its objective of encouraging companies to hire more young staff – indeed, it 
promotes their subsequent exclusion – nor that it took account of how the scheme affected the 
aspirations of more vulnerable individuals. Under the scheme, bluntly put, a cashier who started 
work at sixteen, suffers disproportionate hardship if compared to a lawyer who starts work at 
twenty-five:  
 “the legislation is not appropriate (..) since it applies to all employees who joined 
the undertaking before the age of 25 (..) even if the person concerned has a long 
length of service in the undertaking at the time of dismissal. (..)[I]t affects young 
people who enter active life early after little or no vocational training, but not those 
who start work later after a long period of training.”169 
 
The same demand that a national measure take account of its different impact on the aspirations 
of different citizens was discussed in the recent Andersen case. Denmark had enacted a rule 
whereby dismissed older workers were entitled to severance payment to facilitate re-entry in the 
employment market unless they were eligible for old-age pension.170 Denmark made an exception 
to this rule to cater for those who had entered the employment market after the age of 50, in order 
to permit: 
“the allowance to be paid to workers who, although eligible for a pension, have not 
been affiliated to their pension scheme for long enough to receive a pension which is 
sufficient to guarantee them a reasonable income.”171  
 
                                                
167 See Case C-268/09, Georgiev [nyr], para. 58-59, and the Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-268/09, Georgiev [nyr], 
para. 38. Green Paper: “Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century”, COM (2006) 708 final, 
p. 3. 
168 Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365, para. 10/11. 
169 Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365, para. 39-42. 
170 Case C-499/08, Andersen [nyr], para. 27 and 34. 
171 Case C-499/08, Andersen [nyr], para. 42. 
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While the Court expressly lauded this initiative for taking account of the individual worker’s 
needs beyond employment, it held that the measure at the same time unjustly excluded workers 
who, even though they were entitled to a pension and had started to work before 50, nevertheless 
wished to remain in employment.172 In other words, by equating those workers who could retire 
and receive a pension with those that wished to do so, the Danish measure restricted their “right to 
work”,173 which would lead “to a significant reduction in their income in the long term”,174 as it 
would decrease the pension they would subsequently receive. Again, then, the Court invalidated 
the measure for lack of (sufficient) attention to the hardship that exclusion of the workforce 
causes to the workers’ aspirations beyond employment. 
 
The Court’s case law is far from incoherent when read from the perspective of aspirational 
solidarity.175 While each and every employment policy has winners and losers, dictated by 
economic requirements and legitimised through the national political process, the Court’s 
rationalisation effort seems to focus on policies which produce no winners – that is, when 
exclusion is neither compensated by social security measures, nor contributes to someone else’s 
aspirations. This effect of rationalisation is reminiscent of the idea of flexicurity, which also ties 
employment policies to strong social security benefits.176 Indeed, all labour law mechanisms in 
the Union, whether its non-discrimination agenda, health and safety measures,177 or employment 
strategies, revolve around the individual’s aspirations by promoting his employability and 
protecting his dignity and autonomy beyond the employment market. This process of 
rationalisation attempts to produce a ‘better fit’ between the aspirations of those within and those 
excluded from that market, without directly challenging divisive choices made in the 
management of the national employment market.  
 
                                                
172 Case C-499/08, Andersen [nyr], para. 9. 
173 Case C-499/08, Andersen [nyr], para. 45. 
174 Case C-499/08, Andersen [nyr], para. 46. 
175 See for the opposite view: AG Kokott in Case C-499/08, Andersen [nyr], para. 22-23 and 53-59; AG Trstenjak in 
Case C-45/09, Rosenbladt [nyr], para. 87-95 and 167-171. 
176 Indeed, it seems to provide the opportunity for a ‘hardening’ of the flexicurity measures, in so far as the Court 
may be more easily convinced to allow employment policies as long as strong systems of social security exist to 
accommodate the groups excluded from the workforce. 
177 “The common denominator of the myriad of regulations (..) is the intention (..) to protect workers from some of 
the disutility and hazards of the labour process, thereby enhancing not just work motivation and productivity, but 
also the long-term viability of the worker as a productive agent.” See C. Offe, ‘The European Model of ‘Social’ 
Capitalism: Can it Survive European Integration?’, in M. Miller (ed.) ‘Worlds of Capitalism’ (New York, Routledge, 
2005), p. 159. 
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6.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has reviewed how the different transnational conceptions of justice inform the 
development of EU labour law. Read together, the three types of transnational solidarity seek to 
institutionalise the social functions of labour law – to protect the worker’s role in and beyond the 
employment market – on the European level. It was argued that EU labour law does not 
contribute to such institutionalisation by developing new transnational standards of intervention, 
but rather by supplementing and insulating the social functions of labour law on the national level 
against the pressures generated on the European level. On the legislative level, the virtuous 
interaction between decentralised autonomy and centralised externality management is 
recognised: 
“Responsibility for safeguarding working conditions and improving the quality of 
work in the Member States primarily rests on national legislation and on the efficacy 
of enforcement and control measures at national level. At the EU level, the social 
acquis supports and complements the actions of the Member States in this sphere”178 
 
The Court, on the other hand, has not always appreciated this sophisticated interaction between 
the different layers of social governance in Europe’s market. Rather than deferring difficult social 
questions to the national level and its political process, it tries to come up with novel, 
transnational standards of justice. In certain areas, indeed, this does not only undermine the 
capacity of Member States to regulate how ‘labour’ and ‘capital’ interact, but, as a consequence 
of the asymmetrical bias in favour of capital that is implicit in the functioning of the internal 
market, and the absence of a robust political system on the transnational level, it creates a ‘social 
market’ that is distinctly light in the protection of the interests of workers. Even more worryingly, 
it appears that the Union legislator is increasingly following the Court’s cue.179 
 
                                                
178 Green Paper: “Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century”, COM (2006) 708 final, p. 6. 
179 Commission’s Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to collective action within the 
context of the freedom of establishment, COM (2012) 130 final; and Commission Proposal for a Directive on the 
enforcement of Directive 96/71, COM (2012) 131 final. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has argued that a distinctly European ethics of justice does exist. It is a tiered concept 
of justice, which is reliant both on the nation state, with its capacity to generate the redistributive 
commitments and political structures required for the provision of healthcare, education, social 
security, social assistance or labour law; and on the European Union, whose rights to free 
movement bolster the capacity of its citizens to pursue their own perception of the ‘good life’. 
The institutions involved in the construction of this tiered ethics of justice, however, articulate its 
nature only very implicitly. This is both a strength, as it prevents the process of open political 
contestation that a thin political community such as the Union cannot accommodate. At the same 
time, the implicit nature of its articulation is also its greatest weakness. It leads to problems of 
normative coherence and institutional coordination, which frustrates not only the Union’s effort 
in contributing to the capacity of citizens to live ‘good lives’, but also fragments the precarious 
legitimacy of the Union to engage in that process in the first place. More explicit articulation of 
the role that the Union can play in creating a framework for citizens to live ‘good lives’, in fact, 
appears vital for its very capacity to do so.  
 
The emphasis in this thesis on the free movement provisions as the most important expression of 
the transnational element of the tiered ethics of justice in Europe reflects its main strength: it 
serves to overcome the limitations of the territorial or political model of justice that exists on the 
national level. The most evident way in which that model limits the attainment of justice is by 
constraining the capacity of the individual citizen to decide how to live his life – in both spatial 
and normative terms. While citizens are given a chance to voice their conception of the ‘good 
life’ through the national political process, their chances to actually pursue that life are 
circumscribed by the outcome of that same political process. In other words, the territorially 
bounded logic of justice reduces individual self-determination to political self-determination. The 
fundamental critique on the national model of justice, however, is not that it limits the 
individual’s freedom as such – after all, it also generates the positive welfare entitlements that 
allow citizens to live a life that freedom alone cannot – but that it makes individual movement 
beyond the territory of the state contingent upon the renunciation of those entitlements. The 
modern day welfare state, with its demands of membership and territoriality, in other words, has 
forced individuals to choose between accessing positive welfare entitlements ‘at home’ or 
exercising their freedom to pursue the ‘good life’ outside the territory of the home state. This 
limitation was long justified by reference to the need to protect the solidaristic and reciprocal 
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commitments that underlie positive welfare entitlements. This thesis has argued that EU law in 
general, and the free movement provisions in particular, serve to overcome this limitation while 
remaining sensitive to the stability of the redistributive commitments that typify the welfare state.  
 
The instrument for this exercise is the concept of transnational solidarity. Market solidarity, 
communitarian solidarity, and aspirational solidarity reflect the different assumptions of justice 
that are implicit in free movement, and serve simultaneously to stabilise the delivery of social 
goods on the national level (by insulating domestic redistributive commitments and the political 
authority to ‘produce’ justice), and expand the range of available types of life for Union citizens 
from those offered by ‘their’ Member State to include those offered by any of the twenty-six 
others. As such, market solidarity suggests that the interaction between actors on the European 
market is not only based on economic efficiency or comparative advantage, but must also reflect 
the rights and obligations of solidarity that their mutual interdependence engenders. This means – 
as we saw – different things in different welfare areas, in light of the different type of transaction 
that underlies those areas. Communitarian solidarity serves a different purpose. It explains why 
the incipient European political community requires Member States to redraw both the 
boundaries of national citizenships and the eligibility criteria for access to the social entitlements 
that are attached to that status. It suggests that in devising such criteria, Member States may no 
longer differentiate solely based on nationality. Rather, communitarian solidarity requires that the 
eligibility criteria be drawn on the basis of the commitments of reciprocity that underlie the 
different welfare entitlements. As we saw, this primarily depends on their specific nature and 
social function. Communitarian solidarity, in other words, serves to expand the scope of national 
citizenship to accommodate ‘deserving’ Union citizens. Aspirational solidarity, finally, reflects 
the obligations that Member States have entered into by ‘buying into’ the promise of more choice 
and opportunity that underlies the logic of free movement. It suggests that part of the ethos of 
Europe lies in its capacity to offer its citizens a way to meet their aspirations by way of movement 
throughout the Union. Member States accrue an obligation under aspirational solidarity to allow 
their citizens to make use of the free movement provisions. Such obligations, as was discussed in 
this thesis, still remain conditional on the capacity of all citizens, and in particular immobile 
citizens, to access the positive welfare entitlements sustained on the national level.1 This 
balancing act of aspirational solidarity, which can be traced in each chapter, is required in order to 
                                                
1 The Court’s recent emphasis on empirical data, in combination with a strict supervisory role for the Commission, as 
recently codified in Regulation 883/2004 and the PRD, could prove to be a very reliable mechanism to accurately 
define the scope of aspirational solidarity across the different policy areas. 
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ensure that EU law both extends the capacity of the mobile citizen to pursue his aspirations 
throughout Europe and protects access for all citizens to the positive welfare entitlements that 
allow for a life that freedom alone does not.  
 
As this thesis has emphasized, the transnational solidarities do not yield the same outcome across 
the different policy areas considered. Rather, their translation into individual entitlements is 
heavily influenced by the specific social function of the different policy areas. As the chapter on 
labour law has shown, moreover, the three different transnational solidarities cannot only be 
traced in the interpretation of the free movement provisions, but also in the transnational 
development of other policy areas that contribute to the attainment of justice. It would appear, in 
fact, that the three transnational solidarities offer a prism through which to understand and 
evaluate the state of justice across EU law. Read together, they serve to ensure that the European 
Union more fully exhausts the demands of justice than its Member States alone can. They 
rationalise the ways in which the Union can contribute to meet the demands of justice, while, at 
the same time, being sensitive to the normative commitments undertaken on the national level, 
and as such overcome the reflex that ties the potential of justice to political self-determination by 
a demos.  
 
If this thesis has highlighted that an ethics of justice exists in EU law, it has, however, also 
highlighted that it is somewhat obscured by the very implicit way in which the Union institutions 
have elaborated it. The Union’s overall architecture of justice appears to be a mere by-product of 
intuitive decision-making and is often downright confused and conflated. The little academic 
debate on the state of justice in Europe, and its incomplete articulation when it is addressed,2 is 
another symptom of this implicit nature. It can be seen as a strength, in so far as it prevents the 
process of open (political) contestation that the institutionalisation of justice almost inevitably 
engenders. The Union’s political settlement can, simply put, not accommodate such a process; 
nor could the norms that were to emerge from that process serve the demands of justice in the 
sophisticated way that the transnational solidarities currently can. The implicit nature of the 
elaboration of transnational justice, however, is also its main weakness. It distorts the view of 
how the Union can participate in the generation of justice and what the limits to its contribution 
are, not only from the perspective of the Union institutions, but also from the perspective of the 
                                                
2 See e.g. Somek, who argues that justice in Europe is mainly of a regulatory nature, and Williams, who argues that it 
does not go much beyond cosmopolitanism: A. Somek, ‘Engeneering Equality’ (Oxford, OUP, 2011); and A. 
Williams, ‘The Ethos of Europe: Values, Law and Justice in the EU’ (Cambridge, CUP, 2010). 
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citizens, national politicians, and other (inter)national institutions involved in the same process. 
This, as will be discussed below, frustrates the potential for the Union to ‘do’ justice and at the 
same time questions the legitimacy of its engagement in that process. 
 
This particular challenge is perhaps most visible in the powerful narrative that is emerging at the 
national level, where citizens and their politicians increasingly question whether the Union ‘does’ 
anything useful. As Breton has argued, the stability of a tiered institutional system like the 
European Union to a large extent depends on (the perception that) both its national and its 
supranational institutions participate in the generation of the preconditions for the individual to 
be able to live a ‘good life’.3 The Union currently struggles to convey how it does so. Its 
traditional objectives of ‘peace’ and ‘prosperity’ no longer seem sufficient to justify the Union’s 
existence. The threat of war between European states seems more remote than ever before, and 
its prevention hardly seems contingent on the European Union’s existence. Equally, the 
redistributive effect of the internal market and the emergence of the politics of austerity in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis are increasingly perceived as unjust. A more forceful and explicit 
articulation of the ways in which the Union’s institutions can help to improve the quality of its 
citizen’s lives appears necessary to insulate the Union’s authority to engage in that process in the 
first place. This requires stressing not only the new opportunities that the Union has created for 
the Polish plumber or the British pensionado, but also the less dramatic ways in which it engages 
with the citizens who, for most of the time, stay within their own Member State. 
 
At the same time, a more explicit engagement with the ways in which the Union can serve to 
enhance the capacity of its citizens to live ‘good lives’ would also benefit the Union institutions 
involved in that process. Its implicit articulation, after all, increases the margin for error in areas 
in which the Union can indeed contribute to the attainment of justice. Cases such as Laval, Geven 
or Bressol,4 in which the Court disguises the assumptions of justice that underlie its ruling by 
employing legalese and by presenting salient and contested rulings as a logical evolution of 
previous case law or legislation, are a good example. Such rulings cannot be criticised for 
breaking with doctrinal orthodoxy, but are problematic exactly because the reliance on doctrinal 
orthodoxy obscures how the underlying assumptions of justice translate into new settings and 
                                                
3 R. Breton, ‘Identification in Transnational Political Communities’, in: K. Knop, S. Ostryn, R. Simeon and K. 
Dwinton (eds.), ‘Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Markets, and Governments in a Changing World’ (Vancouver, 
UBC Press, 1995), p. 42. 
4 Case Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767; Case C-213/05, Geven [2007] ECR I-6347; and Case C-73/08, 
Bressol [2010] ECR I-2735. See sections 6.2, 5.2, and 3.4.2, respectively.  
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new factual situations. A more explicit engagement with the tiered nature of the Union’s ethics of 
justice would serve to ensure that the Union institutions indeed contribute to, rather than detract 
from, the capacity of its citizens to live ‘good lives’.  
 
The implicit articulation of transnational ideas of justice not only obscures the capacity of the 
Union to contribute to the attainment of justice, but also its limitations in doing so. As the very 
first paragraph of this thesis already highlighted, after all, institutions, whether national or 
supranational, cannot fully exhaust the demands of justice. More than that, in order to ‘do’ 
justice, institutions must be sensitive to their own strengths and weaknesses. As discussed, the 
main limitation to the European Union’s capacity to ‘do’ justice lies in its weak political sphere. 
This also explains why within the context of the European Union (and this thesis), the most 
central question in any theory of justice is completely overlooked. This is the question of 
equality; of why and to what extent a polity ought to strive to redistribute resources and life 
chances between its citizens. As this thesis has argued, however, this lack of a distributive 
criterion or concept of equality at the core of the Union’s ethics of justice should not be seen as a 
renunciation of such values. Rather, its absence serves to protect those values. The alleviation of 
inequality or the determination of a criterion of distributive justice presupposes the existence of 
an institutional settlement that can collect, articulate and mediate between different conceptions 
of justice that exist in a society, and generate the individual commitment to share scarce resources 
with fellow citizens. On the national level, these thick and robust institutional structures exist in 
the form of sophisticated public spheres, civic involvement, integrated political parties, and 
democratic institutions. Indeed, this is the great strength (even saving grace) of the model of 
contractarian justice. On the European level, on the other hand, most (if not all) such structures 
are lacking.5 To put it very bluntly, the EU simply cannot ‘do’ inequality or redistribution; as in 
fact becomes painfully obvious whenever it tries to. Importantly, the argument here is not that the 
EU could not deal with equality, but just that it needs to cultivate a thick political community 
before it can do so in a way that ensures the justice and legitimacy of its outcomes.  
 
The Union must be sensitive to such institutional limitations if it is to contribute to the pursuit of 
justice and if it is to protect its role in that process. Recently, however, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that the Union lacks this sensitivity and continues to behave in deference of both its 
institutional limitations and the demands of justice. The cases of Viking and Laval, discussed at 
                                                
5 See chapter 1  
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length in this thesis, already emphasised this.6 The recent euro-crisis, and its response by 
Europe’s political leaders, has brought out this point even more clearly. Many of the measures 
proposed and actions taken in response to the crisis require collective centralised standard-setting 
in sensitive areas such as pensions, labour market costs and rates of taxation, and they presuppose 
fiscal transfers and semi-compulsory austerity measures.7 Such politically salient decisions 
invariably require political mediation if their outcome is to be stable. Yet, within the European 
context, the political spaces that can offer such stability by legitimising the outcome are to be 
found on the national level, and are exactly those currently excluded from the process of political 
exchange. The fall of the Dutch, Slovakian, Italian and Greek governments over the ‘imperial’ 
imposition of the politics of austerity, or the complete lack of political discussion on the European 
level of alternative responses to the crisis, are strong indications about the instability that such 
system produces.8 To the extent that the model of justice elaborated in this thesis tells us 
something about the relationship between the values of redistributive justice or equality and the 
Union, then, it is not (as some would have it) that Union does not care about equality; it is simply 
that it cannot and should not deal with it directly, and that it should circumscribe its assumption 
of power and authority in light of those institutional limitations. The Union simply cannot sustain 
an autonomous and centralised aspiration of equality or criterion of distributive justice – which 
also, of course, underlies its recourse to soft-law mechanisms such as the OMC to tackle 
problems such as poverty or social exclusion.  
 
This lack of understanding of the institutional restraints that a tiered ethics of justice imposes also 
has a detrimental effect on the interaction between the Union institutions and the other 
(inter)national institutions that contribute to the attainment of justice in Europe. In the light of the 
delicate tiered understanding of justice in Europe, efficient coordination between the institutions 
that participate in the attainment of justice in Europe is vital. These different institutions – 
whether national courts and parliaments, the Union legislator and the Court, or the European 
Court of Human Rights – must coordinate their efforts in order to consolidate an overarching 
architecture of justice. This thesis suggests that the transnational solidarities offer a language for 
better coordination. It is interesting, in that vein, that the European Court of Human Rights has 
picked up on several elements of transnational solidarity as discussed in this thesis, such as for 
                                                
6 See chapter 6. 
7 See D. Chalmers, ‘The European Redistributive State and the Need for a European Law of Struggle’, 18 ELJ 
(2012), forthcoming.  
8 See in depth M. Dawson and F. De Witte, ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU after the euro-crisis’, (forthcoming).  
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example the demand that migrant workers not be discriminated against in access to pensions 
simply on the basis of nationality but accrue certain rights simply as a reflection of their 
connection to a certain state.9 At the same time, adherence to a similar concept and language of 
justice could not only solidify an overarching idea of justice, but also emphasise each institutions’ 
limitations, thereby allowing for the allocation of competences to the institution best suited to 
‘do’ justice; and offer feedback loops by way of which institutions can communicate and correct 
each other’s mistakes. Unfortunately, the potential for correcting each other’s mistakes has not 
yet been explored. If properly understood, this can be one of the great strengths of the European 
tiered model of justice. The most evident example of the need for such corrective feedback loops 
discussed in this thesis are the decisions in Viking and Laval, which both the European Court of 
Human Rights10 and the Union legislator11 had the opportunity to correct (but did only partially). 
More explicit engagement with the demands of justice and transnational solidarity by all 
institutions involved, it is argued, would greatly ease institutional cooperation and ensure their 
communal delivery of ‘the good life’ to its citizens. Moreover, it would placate the concerns of 
many national constitutional courts and parliaments that the Union expands according to its own 
logic and is insensitive to the demands of justice, by offering a meta-norm (that is, the 
transnational solidarities) which structures competing claims in accordance with their normative 
merit, rather than their institutional source or democratic pedigree. 
 
This all, ultimately, goes to show the precarious nature a transnational ethics of justice. Its 
development is dependent on a careful understanding of its normative claims and of the 
institutional constraints that such claims impose. It remains dependent on the national political 
process to devise criteria of redistributive justice that can then be extrapolated to the transnational 
level. Without the former, the latter risks becoming as thin as the cosmopolitan ethics of justice 
from which it tries to distinguish itself. The transnational ethics of justice defended in this thesis 
extends, stabilises, and complements national conceptions of justice, but it cannot replace them. 
However inconvenient and inefficient this may be, redistributive decisions must remain 
politicised and must therefore (for the moment) remain on the national level – not only for the 
sake of justice, but also for fear of (longer-term) disenfranchisement and political rupture.12 This 
                                                
9 See most recently ECHR Case 55707/00, Andrejeva v Latvia.  
10 ECHR Case Demir and Baykara, [2008] ECHR 1345. 
11 See Commission Proposal for a Directive on the enforcement of Directive 96/71, COM (2012) 131 final; and 
Commission’s Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to collective action within the context of 
the freedom of establishment, COM (2012) 130 final. 
12 See F. De Witte, ‘Repoliticising the Social Questions through Law’ (2012) GLJ (forthcoming). 
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precarious tiered understanding of justice is, at the same time, what makes the European ethics of 
justice so sophisticated and powerful. It combines access to the positive entitlements that emerge 
from the national welfare states with the capacity of the free movement rights to enlarge the range 
of available choices for citizens in deciding how to live their lives in order to more fully articulate 
the irreducible plurality of conceptions of the ‘good’ which is implicit in, and needs to be 
accommodated by, any polity. Europe, in other words, is not only ‘just’, it can even be ‘more 
just’ than its Member States. Yet, as this thesis has discussed, the capacity of Europe to be ‘more 
just’ that its Member States depends on it being sensitive and articulate about its own limitations, 
which requires a careful institutionalisation of the links that connect the individual citizens in the 
European Union. Only by way of such institutionalisation – for which this thesis proposed a 
theory of transnational solidarity – can we ensure that, rather than an antidote to the commitments 
of equality and redistribution that typify the welfare state, the European Union successfully 
manages the pressures that risk destabilising those values. Such stabilisation, moreover, would do 
much for the Union’s own legitimacy and relevance. While the promise of ‘peace and prosperity’ 
may have convinced European citizens of the relevance and necessity of the integration process in 
1956, it seems that the Europe of today is and needs something else.13 This thesis has argued that 
the transnational solidarities could guide this rhetorical, institutional and normative shift towards 
a new, and perhaps even more specifically European promise of ‘the good life’. It is a promise 
that allows a Belgian national to grow up in Firenze, study in Maastricht, write his PhD in 
London and recuperate from that experience in Berlin. 
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